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This dissertation examines religious and secular stories, their intersections, and the 
possibilities of enchantment that these stories and their intersections might offer modern man in 
four works by Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936): Amor y pedagogía (1902), Del sentimiento 
trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos (1913), Niebla (1914), and San Manuel 
Bueno, mártir (1930).  These works, by combining, twisting, and distorting religious and secular 
stories, underscore the literary quality and tropes of both kinds of narratives and question the 
supposed break between the modern and the pre-modern and the distinction between 
“enchanted” and “disenchanted.”  I argue that there are four interrelated narratives of 
enchantment within these works: the story of losing religion, the story of learning religion, the 
story of experience, and the story of uncertainty.  The story of losing religion traces the changes 
to and decline of Christianity in Spain and Europe and offers a possibility of the continuance of 
the religious tradition through modifications and distortions of Christian myth and secular 
explanations of the world.  In the story of learning I explore what Unamuno and his characters 
deem “religious” and how el hombre de carne y hueso of Del sentimiento trágico and 
Unamuno’s fictional characters acquire beliefs in spirits and god through experiences that the 
body and the embodied mind have with their surroundings and others.  The story of experience 
reveals how experiences that violate the physical properties of the body connect transcendent and 
immanent realms by breaking down the dichotomies of nature/society, primitive/modern, and 
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religious/secular and advances a counternarrative to secular accounts of compartmentalized 
social life and privatized religion.  The story of uncertainty, a story about stories and how they 
are related, by exposing the fictionality of any claim to truth, subverts both secular and religious 































Víctor Goti, in his prologue to Niebla, imagines Miguel de Unamuno’s response to his 
critics.  He writes, “Si ha habido quien se ha burlado de Dios, ¿por qué no hemos de burlarnos de 
la Razón, de la Ciencia y hasta de la Verdad?  Y si nos han arrebatado nuestra más cara y más 
íntima esperanza vital, ¿por qué no hemos de confundirlo todo para matar el tiempo y la 
eternidad y para vengarnos?” (“If there have been men who made a jest of God, why may we not 
just as well make a jest of Reason, of Science, or even of Truth?  If they have taken away the 
dearest and innermost hope of our lives why should we not go on to make confusion of 
everything, so as to kill time and eternity and get our vengeance?”; 103; Fite 12-13).  Although 
Unamuno wrote about such serious topics as our own mortality, he did not write without humor.  
It is with this humor in mind that I want to begin this dissertation, an exploration of religion in 
Unamuno’s works, with a joke that my father told me: 
 After days of rain in west-central Illinois, the Mississippi River began to breach its banks.  
The people living along the river began to evacuate their towns except for one devout man.  As 
he stood in his front yard watching the water rise, his neighbors passed by in their car and said to 
him, “The water’s just going to keep rising.  We have room in the car.  Why don’t you get in?”  
The man responded, “I’ll be fine.  My god will save me.”  The waters indeed continued to rise as 
the man, now on his porch, saw a boat coming toward his home.  The woman in the boat yelled 
out to him, “The water’s continuing to rise.  Get in the boat.”  The man responded, “I’ll be fine.  
My god will save me.”  The waters rose even higher.  The man, now forced into the second floor 
of his home, saw yet another boat coming toward him.  The men in the boat pleaded, “Hop in!  
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The water’s continuing to rise!”  The man again replied, “I’ll be fine.  My god will save me.”  
But the water continued to rise.  The man, now on his roof, saw a helicopter hover over head.  A 
woman dropped a ladder for him and screamed, “Climb up!  The water’s continuing to rise.”   
Yet again, the man replied, “I’ll be fine.  My god will save me.”  The water continued to rise and 
the man drowned.  The good man made it to heaven after his death and, a little dismayed, stood 
before his god.  He said, “I don’t get it.  I’ve been a devout man all my life, believed in you, and 
believed that you would save me.”  God, perplexed, looked at the man and said, “What are you 
talking about?  I sent a car, two boats, and a helicopter and you didn’t get in any of them.” 
 This joke illustrates much of what is to follow in this dissertation.  First, it is a story and 
one in which the boundaries between transcendence and immanence are confused.  The man, 
despite his devotion, cannot conceive of his god active in earthly existence, perhaps without the 
sign of something miraculous.  He has relegated a sense of the divine to transcendence and 
misses the possibility that the help offered to him might be the divine intervening and enchanting 
his world through fellow men and women.  Second, it is a story that has been passed down and, 
in its re-telling has been changed and reformulated.  The joke, like the religious myths and 
secular discourses I explore in this dissertation, gets distorted through interpretation and the 
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“Only from afar, by metaphors and analogies, do we 
come to comprehend what it is in itself, and even so 
our notion is but inadequate and confused.” 
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (1917) 
 
“Vamos, pues, a mitologizar.”(“Let us, then, mythologize.”) 
Miguel de Unamuno, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1913) 
 
In 1917 at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, German economist and 
sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) gave a lecture entitled “Science as a Vocation” in which he 
declared, “The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, 
above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world’” (Essays 155).  He later elaborates on this 
concept in Sociology of Religion (1922): “As intellectualism suppresses belief in magic, the 
world’s processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, and henceforth simply 
‘are’ and ‘happen’ but no longer signify anything” (125).  Weber succinctly summarizes the 
secular script through which the western world has viewed itself for much of the modern era, but 
only partially.  In addition to the narrative of “the disenchantment of the world,” other changes 
came to characterize this script.  Vincent P. Pecora (2006) writes that “…the core of the 
secularization idea, which takes various forms, is the claim that overt belief and participation in 
religion are abandoned as Enlightenment science, technological modernization, and the 
fragmentation of social life into separate and autonomous spheres of endeavor are embraced” 
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(26).1  Religion, according to this script, occupied a sphere of its own and was no longer to be 
lived out in public life but rather through private piety.2 This way of viewing the world posed a 
number of problems for the modern subject.  Richard Jenkins (2000) writes that the privatization 
of religion and the compartmentalization of social life has signified that “[m]eaning no longer 
resides in the axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed beliefs and understandings which 
constitute an epistemic and moral community” (15).3  This crisis of meaning, in turn, presented 
challenges to the modern writer: “a crisis in what could be represented and a crisis in how it 
should be represented, or in other words a crisis in both the content and the form of artistic 
representation” (Lewis Cambridge 2).  This dissertation treats how one such writer, Miguel de 
Unamuno y Jugo (1864-1936), attempted to represent these crises in essay and fiction. 
This project examines religious and secular stories, their intersections, and the 
possibilities of enchantment that these stories and their intersections might offer modern man in 
four works by Unamuno: Amor y pedagogía (Love and Pedagogy) (1902), Del sentimiento 
                                                           
1Pecora identifies three developments that modernization implied: 1. social differentiation; 2. societalization and; 3. 
rationalization of religious beliefs: “1.) social differentiation, that is, the increasing division of labor, fragmentation 
of life-worlds, and separation of economic, legal, political, cultural, and religious spheres of action; 2.) 
societalization, that is, the increasing dependence on large-scale administrative institutions, such as the nation-state 
bureaucracy, capitalist corporations, and mass culture, rather than the local community and the local community’s 
church and customs; and 3.) rationalization of religious beliefs, in which the increased distance of a monotheistic 
god allows for the decreasing use of magic, the increasing invocation of ethics based on utility, the dominance of 
purposive or instrumental rationality, and hence the more efficient pursuit of worldly aims in science, economics, 
and politics” (7). 
 
2Martin Riesebrodt and Mary Ellen Konieczny (2010) explain how the privatization of religion came to form part of 
the secular script (153). 
 
3Others have noted the crisis of meaning associated with disenchantment, privatization and compartmentalization: 
Susana Lee (2006) writes, “…the departure of God from the landscape means the departure of a spiritual force and a 
spiritual cement: a force to which (or to whom) we connect and that connects us to one another” (12) and; Steve 
Bruce (2006) states, “As Marx noted in his theory of class formation (Giddens 1971: 35-45), as the functions of 
society become increasingly differentiated, so the people also become divided and separated from each other – that 
is, structural differentiation was accompanied by social differentiation.  The economic growth implicit in 
modernization led to the emergence of an ever-greater range of occupation and life situation. […]  When the 
community broke into competing social groups, the religiously sanctified vision of that community, united under its 
God, also broke up” (336-37). 
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trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos (On the Tragic Sense of Life in Men and 
Peoples) (1913), Niebla (Mist) (1914), and San Manuel Bueno, mártir (Saint Manuel Good, 
Martyr) (1930).  These four texts each provide a reinterpretation of Christianity in a modern 
context.  Furthermore, Unamuno himself connects each work to at least one other, which 
provides for an intertextual interpretation of the four texts.4  These works, by combining, 
twisting, and distorting religious and secular stories, underscore the literary quality and tropes of 
both kinds of narratives and question the supposed break between the modern and the pre-
modern and, thus, the distinction between “enchanted” and “disenchanted.”  Michael Saler 
(2006) writes that this kind of  “…view that modernity is as enchanted as it is disenchanted may 
conjure alternative vistas to the historical imagination, and at the very least offers the possibility 
of pulling new rabbits out of old hats” (692).  This dissertation considers “new rabbits” and “old 
hats,” reformulations of enchantment and disenchantment from religious and secular narratives, 
in Unamuno’s works.  Through experiments in form and content, these stories offer new ways of 
exploring religion that reflect and question the socio-historical discourses happening in Spain 
and the western world at the time in which they were written. 
I argue that there are four interrelated narratives of enchantment within these works: the 
story of losing religion, the story of learning religion, the story of experience, and the story of 
uncertainty.  The story of losing religion traces the changes to and decline of Christianity in 
Spain and Europe and offers a possibility of the continuance of the religious tradition through 
modifications and distortions of Christian myth and secular explanations of the world.  The story 
of learning relates how el hombre de carne y hueso (“the man of flesh and bone”) of DST 
acquires beliefs in spirits and god through experiences that the body and the embodied mind 
                                                           
4I explore intertextuality in more detail in chapter four. 
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have with their surroundings and others.  The story of experience reveals how experiences that 
violate the physical properties of the body connect transcendent and immanent realms and 
advance a counternarrative to secular accounts of compartmentalized social life and privatized 
religion.  The story of uncertainty, a story about stories and how they are related, by exposing the 
fictionality of any claim to truth, subverts both secular and religious narratives and offers that 
uncertainty might constitute a modern enchantment. 
Because affect plays a central role in these stories of enchantment, I draw on Jane 
Bennett’s (2001) definition that “[t]o be enchanted is to be struck and shaken by the 
extraordinary that lives amid the familiar and the everyday” and that it is also “a comportment 
that can be fostered through deliberate strategies” (4).  Additionally, I consider “enchantment” in 
its etymological relation to “incantation:” “The use of a formula of words spoken or chanted to 
produce a magical effect” (“incantation,” def. A).  As Bennett’s definition suggests, enchantment 
is not (only) a thing of the past but rather something to be explored in the present.  This is 
especially useful in an examination of Unamuno’s works because, as I will argue, his fiction and 
essay do not communicate a nostalgic longing for the past but rather distort literary histories to 
posit enchantments in the present.  I use the second definition of enchantment, especially in the 
last chapter, to explore the power that words have in coercing action in the stories of Unamuno’s 
works and those of the secular script.  
This dissertation proposes an interdisciplinary approach to religion and secularization in 
Unamuno’s works.  By drawing from cognitive, psychological, sociological, and cultural 
approaches to religion, I examine how mind, body, and cultural context mutually shape beliefs 
and experiences that Unamuno and his characters deem religious.  In doing so, I hope to 
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contribute to the understanding of religion in Unamuno’s texts and explore its relation to 
secularization, a problem markedly absent from the scholarship. 
This introduction is divided into five sections.  I begin with an overview of the previous 
scholarship on religion in Unamuno’s works.  In the second section I explore how Unamuno’s 
exclusion from literary modernism has left a void in the criticism on religion and how including 
his works within broader definitions of this movement permit a fuller understanding of how his 
works reflect the social, historical, and cultural changes happening in Spain and the western 
world during the beginning of the 20th century.  The third section summarizes the socio-historical 
context of Spain and the changes it was undergoing at the time when Unamuno wrote.  In the 
fourth section, I outline my approach to religion and secularization in Unamuno’s works and, in 
the final section, I provide an overview of the chapters that comprise the body of this 
dissertation.  
Scholarship on Religion in Unamuno’s Works 
 The scholarship on Unamuno’s works is vast, yet discussion of his essays and fiction as 
responses to a secularizing Spain and western world in general is lacking.  This gap in the 
scholarship is a consequence of trends emerging both from within Spanish literary studies and 
from without. On the one hand, critics such as Pedro Laín Entralgo (1908-2001) maintained that 
Unamuno formed part of the Generation of 98, a group of writers whose work, it has been said, 
was a response to Spain’s national crisis resulting from the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines following the war with the United States in 1898.  While these critics do consider the 
so-called generation’s works as responses to a changing world, their insistence that Unamuno 
and the other members wrote primarily as reactions to Spain’s decline in power, characterized by 
its defeat in Cuba in 1898, overlook other historical changes taking place in Spain, Europe, and 
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the Americas.  Furthermore, this generational model isolated these authors from and often put 
them in opposition to literary modernism.  In doing so, it has neglected these authors’ aesthetic 
experimentations as ways to represent the wider socio-historical changes taking place at the 
beginning of the 20th century.  On the other hand, critics and travel writers from both inside and 
outside of Spain insisted that the country never fully participated in modernity and that it still 
maintained the medieval vestiges that northern Europe had supposedly thrown off.5  This 
criticism has obscured the historical context in which Unamuno wrote.  By insisting that Spain 
was untouched by the crises of meaning brought about by a changing social order in the rest of 
Europe, Unamuno’s writings about religion have been treated either as a continuation of Spain’s 
supposed enchanted past or as a personal crisis divorced from the social context of the author.  
Discussion of secularization and the role religion plays in literature has been treated by 
scholars of northern European and North American literature of the same time period but, 
because of the early scholarship’s insistence that Spain was not a modern nation, is absent in the 
criticism on Spanish writers of the early 20th century.  Susana Lee, in A World Abandoned by 
God: Narrative and Secularism (2006), treats French and Russian modernist writers;6 Gregory 
Erickson, in The Absence of God in Modernist Literature (2007), deals with Austrian, French, 
and American writers;7 and most notably, in The Disappearance of God: Five Nineteenth-
                                                           
5Michael P. Iarocci (2006) conjectures that the northern European image of Spain as medieval affected how the 
country came to see itself: “Common to such views was the assumption that Spanish national identity was 
fundamentally not modern, and to the extent that Spaniards themselves embraced such images, it is not unreasonable 
to conclude that modern Europe successfully interpellated a significant part of Spain’s collective self-understanding” 
(26) 
 
6Lee argues that secularism, which she defines as “the idea of the absence of a supreme structuring power” (13), can 
serve as a narrative structure and strategy.  She develops this idea through a reading of Stendhal’s (1783-1842) The 
Red and Black (1830), Gustave Flaubert’s (1821-1880) Madame Bovary (1857), Ivan Turgenev’s (1818-1883) A 
Nest of Gentry (1859), Jules-Amédée Barbey d'Aurevilly’s (1808-1889) Bewitched (1854), and Fyodor 
Dostoevsky’s  (1821-1881) Demons (1872). 
 
7Erickson questions the “perceived position of godlessness” (2) in modernist literature.  He argues that, through the 
lens of negative theology, “God-ideas” are present throughout modernist literature and music.  He pursues this idea 
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Century Writers (1963),8 J. Hillis Miller takes on religion and the secularized worlds of the 
fiction of five English writers.  In Spanish literary studies, Noël Valis, in Sacred Realism: 
Religion and the Imagination in Modern Spanish Narrative (2010), explores reinterpretations of 
religion in a seemingly secular world but in Spanish realism.9  Finally, Emilio del Río’s La idea 
de Dios en la Generación del 98 (The Idea of God in the Generation of 98) (1973) and Luis de 
Llera Esteban’s anthology Religión y literatura en el modernismo español, 1902-1914 (Religion 
and Literature in Spanish Modernism, 1902-1914) (1994) treat Catholicism and theological 
modernism in the works of Unamuno and writers of the so-called Generation of 98 but do not 
approach religion as it relates to the idea of secularization and, therefore, do not explore their 
intersections.  The former approaches Unamuno theologically from the critic’s own religious 
tradition, Catholicism.  The latter, Religión y literatura, deals less with literary modernism as it 
does with Catholic modernists and their influence on Spanish writers at the beginning of the 20th 
century.  While the connections the authors of this anthology make between Catholic modernists 
and literary modernists show that these Spanish authors were well-read in the religious thought 
of the rest of Europe, they simplify and to some degree dismiss the originality of Unamuno by 
pointing to the influences on his thought. 
                                                           
in Henry James’ (1843-1916) The Golden Bowl (1904), Marcel Proust’s (1871-1922) In Search of Lost Time (1913-
1927), and Arnold Schoenberg’s (1874-1951) Moses und Aron (1930-1932). 
 
8Miller treats the disappearance and the possible presence of God in the works of Thomas De Quincy (1785-1859), 
Robert Browning (1812-1889), Emily Brontë (1818-1848), Matthew Arnold (1822-1888), and Gerard Manley 
Hopkins (1844-1889).   
 
9Valis surveys the influence of Catholicism on structures of the imagination in Spanish realist fiction.  For example, 
she considers how the act of confession informs the imaginative structure of Clarín’s (1852-1901) La Regenta 
(1884-1885), how charity functions in the structure of Benito Pérez Galdós’ (1843-1920) Fortunata y Jacinta 
(1887), and how martyrdom gives form to Ramón J. Sender’s (1901-1982) Requiem por un campesino español 




This search for influences has been one direction critics have taken in attempt to make 
cohere a pre-modern view of Spain and Unamuno’s heterodoxy.  Laín Entralgo’s La Generación 
del Noventa y Ocho (The Generation of Ninety-eight) (1997) illustrates this type of criticism.  In 
this work he often identifies literary characters with their author and claims to find a unified 
“dreamt” vision of Spain that unites the authors under the literary “Generation of 98.”10  This 
vision of Spain is not unrelated to questions of religion as Laín Entralgo interprets Unamuno’s 
and other authors’ writings as nostalgic yearnings for Spain’s enchanted past to promote a 
reading more in line with his own nationalist views.  Also, in an effort to explain why many of 
these authors’ works criticized Spain and Catholicism, he deems their more critical works to be 
the product of the influence of bad modern European thought.11  He writes that the influences on 
Unamuno and these authors  
                                                           
10Laín Entralgo recognizes similarities between the Generation of 1898 and modernismo and, in five indefiniciones, 
he shows that the members of the 98 group had little in common.  However, he does believe that such a “generation” 
of authors exists and that its literary production was affected by and was a response to a uniquely Spanish condition: 
“Un grupo de literatos cuya obra está muy directamente afectada por la situación histórica de España de que el 
desastre es símbolo” (“A group of men of letters whose work is very directly affected by the historical situation of 
Spain, of which the disaster is a symbol”; 80).  He continues that, after the ideals of the groups’ early writings had 
failed to materialize, they envisioned an idealized Spain in order to escape the disillusionment of their present.  He 
maintains that this “ensueño,” or dream, of Spain’s people, land, past, and future is what unites the members of the 
Generation of 1898 and gives form to their works.   
 
11Donald Shaw traces the early scholarship on the “Generation of 98” through his own studies of Spanish literature 
in his essay “El 98 y la ‘conscience malheureuse’ del siglo XX” (2000): “Bajo el influjo de Laín aprendimos a 
interpretar la Generación principalmente en términos de ‘el problema de España’ y a privilegiar obras como el 
Idearium español de Ganivet, En torno al casticismo de Unamuno, y Hacia otra España de Maeztu.  Lo que no 
comprendimos en aquella época era cómo esa interpretación esencialmente “nacionalista” de la Generación estaba 
ligada a las afiliaciones políticas de Laín mismo y a la hostilidad violenta a la Generación mostrada por la derecha 
triunfalista después de la Guerra Civil...” (“Under Laín’s influence, we learned to interpret the Generation 
principally in terms of ‘the problem of Spain’ and to privilege works like Gavinet’s Idearium español, Unamuno’s 
En torno al casticismo, and Maeztu’s Hacia otra España.  What we did not understand in that era was how this 
essentially ‘nationalist’ interpretation of the Generation was tied to Laín’s own political affiliations and to the 
violent hostility toward the Generation shown by the triumphalist right after the Civil War”; 293). 
Further lamenting the Northern European influence on Unamuno’s, Laín Entralgo writes: “demasiado 
influido, tal vez, por sus copiosas lecturas de teólogos protestantes y desconociendo que por amor, precisamente por 
amor, puede el Espíritu divino hacerse dogma” (“too influenced, perhaps, by his copious readings of Protestant 
theologians and not recognizing that through love, precisely through love, the divine Spirit can become dogma”; 
143).  Later, in a footnote, he writes that it would have done Unamuno some good to have read Dios y la deificación 




... son, en su mayor parte, lecturas “europeas” y “modernas.”  A través de la literatura, del 
ensayo, del relato histórico y del libro filosófico entran sus almas en inmediato contacto 
con la Europa “moderna”... y descubren la deslumbradora y terrible aventura hacia la 
total secularización de la vida que desde el siglo XVII, y aun desde más atrás, había 
emprendido el europeo. (136)   
…are, for the most part, “European” and “modern” readings.  Through literature, through 
essay, through the historical tale and the philosophical book their souls enter into 
immediate contact with “modern” Europe…and they discover the blinding and terrible 
venture toward the total secularization of life that, since the 17th century, and even further 
back, European man had set out for.12 
 
This assertion has had a double effect on the scholarship on Unamuno and the other members of 
the so-called Generation of 98: it fortified the notion that these writers formed a separate literary 
group from Spanish, European, Latin American and North American modernists and it suggested 
that the critical writings of these authors could be best understood as regurgitated northern 
European thought in Spanish form.   
The view of Spain as a pre-modern nation has also allowed for a very limited exploration 
of religion in Unamuno’s works.  If Spain continued to be an enchanted, magical place in the 
early 20th century, then the only way to address the crises of faith and meaning in Unamuno’s 
works is to present them as a personal turmoil projected onto the pages of essay and fiction.  This 
biographical approach has dominated the criticism on religion in the study of Unamuno’s texts.  
Emilio del Río’s book exemplifies this sort of scholarship.  He maintains that the crisis of faith in 
Unamuno’s narratives is a personal one and, thus, neglects the changing socio-historical context 
of Spain that Unamuno and other Spanish writers attempted to represent in their works. By 
following this approach, critics limit discussions of religion to the belief or unbelief of the 
historical Unamuno and, if they hold that he is a believer, the orthodoxy of that belief is the next 
subject of focus.  However, what these critics understand as “religious” is generally understood 
as “Christian,” and more often “Catholic,” and what materializes are studies of the consistency or 
                                                           
12All translations of secondary sources and Unamuno’s essays, excluding DST, are mine. 
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inconsistency of Unamuno’s beliefs with Christian and Catholic doctrine.  For example, equating 
“religious” with “Christian,” Gilberto Cancela (1972) posits that Unamuno “…atribuyó a postura 
religiosa aquella su preocupación que en el auténtico sentido de la palabra no lo era…” 
(“…attributed his preoccupation to a religious position which, in the authentic sense, was not 
one”; 83).  Critics that examine religion in Unamuno’s works in terms of its harmony or lack 
thereof with Christianity imply a strong sui generis approach.13  The problem here, again, is one 
of limitation.  Understanding religion in terms of what is “sacred” or “holy” already carries with 
it knowledge of what these terms mean.  For scholars using this approach, what is sacred is 
decidedly Christian and, therefore, generally only discussed in terms of a creator god, 
sacraments, Christ, and life after death.  This approach has led to a multitude of labels attributed 
to Unamuno.  Some critics declare that Unamuno was indeed Catholic and possibly mystic. 
Julian Marías (1943) and Hernán Benítez (1949) find that, despite Unamuno’s frequent attacks 
                                                           
13Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), following Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) and Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890-1950), 
advocated an understanding of religion in terms of what is “sacred” and, therefore a sui generis approach to the 
study of religion.  Eliade writes in Patterns of Comparative Religion (1949), “A religious phenomenon will only be 
recognized as such if it is grasped at its own level, that is to say, if it is studied as something religious.  To try to 
grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art 
or any other study is false; it misses the one unique and irreducible element in it – the element of the sacred” (qtd. in 
B.H. Smith 28). 
     Other scholars of religion, like William James (1842-1910) and Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), took a different 
approach discussing religion in terms of psychology and sociology respectively.  James in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902) compares religion with non-religious things: “Bent as we are on studying religion’s existential 
conditions, we cannot possibly ignore these pathological aspects of the subject.  We must describe and name them 
just as if they occurred in non-religious men” (9).  He later asks: “…who does not see that we are likely to ascertain 
the distinctive significance of religious melancholy and happiness, or of religious trances, far better by comparing 
them as conscientiously as we can with other varieties of melancholy, happiness, and trance, than by refusing to 
consider their place in any more general series, and treating them as if they were outside of nature’s order 
altogether?” (24). Whereas James considers religion in terms of individual mental states, Durkheim considers it in 
terms of effects of society: “Society in general, simply by its effect on men’s minds, undoubtedly has all that is 
required to arouse the sensation of the divine” (208).  He continues later that, “[t]o have a sound basis for seeing the 
efficacy that is imputed to the rites as something other than offspring of a chronic delusion with which humanity 
deceives itself, it must be possible to establish that the effect of the cult is periodically to recreate a moral being on 




on Catholic doctrine, his beliefs were profoundly Catholic.14  Many more critics conclude that 
Unamuno was an atheist and some accuse him of heresy.15  Most critics fall somewhere in 
between these two positions labeling Unamuno a Catholic modernist, an agnostic, or a 
Protestant.16   
  Critics’ categorizations of Unamuno’s thought as “Catholic,” “Protestant,” “agnostic,” or 
“atheist” neglect a fuller picture of religious belief because they tend to focus only on how 
                                                           
14Marías in Miguel de Unamuno declares that Unamuno believed in “un Dios que es el cristiano, uno y trino, con sus 
tres personas, con la maternidad virginal de María, con todo el contenido de la liturgia católica” (“a God that is the 
Christian one, one in the Trinity, with its three people, with the virginal maternity of Mary, with all the content of 
the Catholic liturgy”; 226).  Benítez in El drama religioso de Miguel de Unamuno (Miguel de Unamuno’s Religious 
Drama) categorizes Unamuno’s belief into three stages: 1.) a youth characterized by Catholic belief; 2.) a “mente 
protestante” (“a Protestant mind”) and finally; 3.) a return to Catholicism. 
 
15Antonio Sánchez Barbudo in Estudios sobre Galdós, Unamuno y Machado (Studies on Galdós, Unamuno, and 
Machado) (1968) finds that, after Unamuno’s spiritual crisis in 1897, he was unable to believe in God: “… la verdad 
es que creyente, aunque sea con dudas – creyente en la religión católica – y humilde buscador de Dios, no lo fue ya, 
que yo sepa, después de esa época, nunca más” (“the truth is that a believer, even one with doubts – a believer in the 
Cathoic religion – and humble seeker of God, he was not, that I am aware of, from then on”; 157).  Alberto Cucchia 
(2012) provides a good summary of critics who maintain that Unamuno was an atheist: Nemesio González 
Caminero in Unamuno. Trayectoria de su ideología y de su crisis religiosa (Unamuno. Trajectory of His Ideology 
and of His Religious Crisis) (1948) sees in Unamuno “un descreimiento absoluto en Dios” (“an absolute unbelief in 
God”) and states that Unamuno’s “Dios cordial” (“God of the heart”) is “una ficción fantástica que no puede ser 
tomada en serio” (“a fantastic fiction that cannot be taken seriously”; qtd. in Cucchia 42 ); Vicente Marrero in El 
Cristo de Unamuno (The Christ of Unamuno) (1960) echoes this sentiment: “En el fondo de sus prolijas 
disertaciones teológicas hay un descreimiento absoluto de Dios, ya que su Dios cordial sólo existe en su fantasía” 
(“At the bottom of his verbose theological dissertations there is an absolute unbelif in God, since his God of the 
heart only exists in his fantasy”; qtd. in Cucchia 43); Juan Manyá’s La teología de Unamuno (Unamuno’s Theology) 
(1960) puts Unamuno’s beliefs in “una posición real de ateísmo” (“a real position of atheism”) and that his thoughts 
on religion did not amount to “teología, sino antiteología” (“theology, but rather anti-theology”; qtd. in Cucchia 43); 
Luis S. Granjel in Retrato de Unamuno (A Portrait of Unamuno) (1957) writes that Unamuno falls into “el más 
profundo descreimiento” (“the deepest unbelief”; qtd. in Cucchia 43).  Eduardo Malvido Miguel in Unamuno a la 
busca de la inmortalidad (Unamuno in Search of Immortality) (1977) writes in his conclusión that “seguimos 
escuchando al Unamuno racionalista firmemente plantado en la duda, en la incertidumbre” (“we continue to hear the 
rationalist Unamuno firmly planted in doubt, in uncertainty”; qtd. in Cucchia 43). 
 
16Critics such as Luis de Llera in his chapter “Miguel de Unamuno: Ese tío modernista” (“Miguel de Unamuno: That 
Modernist Guy”) and Juan Cózar Castañar in Modernismo teológico y modernismo literario (Theological 
Modernism and Literary Modernism) (2002) find affinities between theological modernists, especially Alfred Loisy, 
and Unamuno.  José Sarasa San Martín in El problema de Dios en Unamuno (The Problem of God in Unamuno) 
(1989) concludes that “…este agnosticismo teológico unamuniano es total: ni el método de la vía externa, ni el de la 
vía interna o subjetiva, ni ambos combinados, le permiten proclamar a don Miguel la existencia objetiva de Dios” 
(“…this Unamunian theological agnosticism is total: neither the external route, nor the internal, nor both combined, 
allow Don Miguel to proclaim the objective existence of God”; 295).  Eduardo de Agüero in El pensamiento 
filosófico-religioso de Unamuno (Unamuno’s Philosophical-Religious Thought) (1968) recognizes Unamuno’s 




Unamuno’s thoughts might or might not cohere with a particular system of belief or lack thereof.  
For example, Sarasa San Martín and Malvido Miguel both touch on certain aspects of belief in a 
superhuman agent but only recognize such an aspect as potentially religious as it relates to 
Christian doctrine.  The result of this narrow approach leaves out a broader understanding of how 
Unamuno and his fictional characters come to anthropomorphize supernatural agents or why they 
think it is necessary and inevitable.  Also, although Unamuno is often self-admittedly 
contradictory, exploring religion from a Christian perspective causes the critic to find even more 
contradiction and incoherence.  José Luis Abellán, in Miguel de Unamuno a la luz de la 
psicología (Miguel de Unamuno in Light of Psychology) (1964), encounters such a problem and 
ultimately concludes that “[n]os parece indudable la existencia de una neurosis en Unamuno” (“it 
seems to us undeniable the existence of a neurosis in Unamuno”; 201).  These conclusions, as 
well as those that recommend a dose of Catholic theology to cure Unamuno’s existential anxiety, 
do not allow for a dynamic understanding of belief in Unamuno’s narrative and restrict it to the 
static dogma of the Catholic Church that Unamuno so often denounced.17  Finally, this criticism 
disregards both novel and essay as sites of exploration of religion as something dynamic and 
evolving in a modern, secularizing world. 
 One of the lasting effects this tendency has had on the scholarship on Unamuno is to 
focus solely on the quest for immortality as all that is religious.  Malvido Miguel writes, 
“Indicada la raíz sentimental de la religión, Unamuno continúa su análisis y pronto llega a la 
conclusión de que es el ansia de perdurar por siempre, y por consiguiente más allá de la muerte, 
lo que constituye al sentimiento humano en sentimiento religioso” (“Having indicated the 
                                                           
17Enrique Rivera de Ventosa in Unamuno y Dios (Unamuno and God) (1985) writes that Unamuno could have better 




sentimental root of religión, Unamuno continues his analysis and soon arrives at the conclusion 
that it is the longing to live forever, and therefore beyond death, that which constitutes human 
feeling in religious feeling”; 35).  Sarasa San Martín agrees: “… en el pensamiento unamuniano, 
el problema de Dios se halla íntimamente relacionado y vinculado, como soporte y garantía, al 
problema de la inmortalidad” (“…in Unamunian thought, the problem of God finds itself 
intimately related and linked, as foundation and guarantee, to the problem of immortality”; 105).  
However, understanding the desire to exist beyond death as that which makes man religious is 
problematic in its circularity: man is religious because he has an instinct for immortality and he 
has this instinct because he is religious.  Additionally, it would make sense that man, exclusively 
by virtue of this religious instinct, could posit a life after death without the need for any 
superhuman agent.  Lastly, approaching the desire for immortality as something religious in 
itself leaves unexamined how and why this desire is set apart from others. 
This approach has been especially problematic in the study of Unamuno’s fiction.  Many 
of these critics treat Unamuno’s fiction as autobiography.18  For example, they will point to 
similarities between the fictional Augusto Pérez of Niebla or Don Manuel of SMBM and the 
historical Unamuno.  While such connections can be made, what such an approach often 
overlooks are the thoughts expressed by secondary characters and the dialogues they have with 
these protagonists.  After all, the same Unamuno that created Augusto also created Víctor Goti 
and Eugenia who frequently offer new and conflicting views to those of the protagonist.19  
                                                           
18Ángel Raimundo Fernández y González uses an autobiographical approach to the literary character Don Manuel in 
his article “Morir y sobrevivir: estructura autobiográfica en ‘San Manuel Bueno, mártir’” (“Dying and Surviving: 
Autobiographical Structure in Saint Manuel Bueno, Martyr”) (1968).  Thomas Franz (1980) writes that Fulgencio 
Entrambosmares is “[o]ne of Unamuno’s most thinly-disguised autobiographical characterizations…” (647). 
 
19C. A. Longhurst (2014) reminds readers of Unamuno’s own caution against making such a connection: 
“[Unamuno’s characters] constitute an exploration of authorial preoccupations and in that sense reflect his inner 
nature, although the parallel ends here, and incautious critics who have seen the characters as simulacra of the author 
or fictional alter egos are choosing to ignore Unamuno’s warning: ‘¡Es que Augusto Pérez eres tú mismo…! – se me 
14 
 
Unamuno problematizes this approach even further by writing himself as a fictional entity in his 
own works, thus blurring the lines between the fictional character and the historical man.  This 
approach goes hand in hand with an understanding that divorces Unamuno’s fiction from its 
historical context.  Rather than considering the texts as artistic representations grappling with the 
changing dynamics of belief at the beginning of the 20th century, this approach too neatly closes 
the open-endedness of some pretty ambiguous texts.  After all, we never really know what Don 
Manuel believed or how Augusto Pérez dies. 
Modernity, Modernism, Modernismo, and Generation of 98 
Some scholarship on Unamuno’s works still approach them autobiographically, but most 
contemporary critics have moved beyond the modernismo-98 distinction.20  For example, 
scholars such as José Carlos Mainer, John Butt, and Javier Blasco, following Ricardo Gullón’s 
La invención del 98 y otros ensayos (The Invention of the Generation 98 and Other Essays) 
(1969),21 have dismissed this duality but, for the purposes of this dissertation and despite Germán 
                                                           
dirá -.  ¡Pero no!  Una cosa es que todos mis personajes novelescos, que todos los agonistas que he creado, los haya 
sacado de mi alma, de mi realidad íntima […] y otra cosa es que sean yo mismo’ (‘Augusto Pérez is you…! – it will 
be said to me -. But no!  It is one thing that all my fictional characters, that all the agonists that I have created, have 
been taken from my soul, from my intimate reality […] and another thing that they are me myself’) (II, 196), a 
warning repeated in his well-known 1933 article ‘Almas sencillas’ (‘Simple Souls”), following the publication of 
San Manuel Bueno, mártir y tres historias más, which had prompted some commentators to identify Unamuno with 
the priest Don Manuel” (Theory 201).  Just how much Unamuno puts of himself into his characters and writings and 
how this affects the interpretation of his works will be taken up in chapter four. 
 
20Luis Álvarez Castro’s La palabra y el ser en la teoría literaria de Unamuno (Word and Being in Unamuno’s 
Literary Theory) (2005) is one recent example that provides an autobiographical reading.  While Álvarez Castro 
does consider Unamuno’s works as a response to secular modernity when he writes, “el estigma de una modernidad 
secularizada cuya única esperanza de lograr la perduración del yo se cifra en la perpetuación del nombre, esto es, en 
la fama” (“the stigma of a secularized modernity, whose only hope of achieving the persistence of the self, is in the 
perpetuation of the name, that is to say, in fame”; 18), he explains this, through a reference to Unamuno’s own 
spiritual “crisis de 97,” as the author’s own personal desire for immortality through his works and readership.  I 
address the scholarship’s focus on this personal crisis in chapter one. 
 
21Gullón argues for the elimination of the distinction between modernismo and the Generation of 1898 and for the 
consideration of Spanish literature at the beginning of the 20th century within a more global context.  He writes: “El 
error de particularizar lo general, considerando fenómeno castizo lo acontecido en tantas partes, ha impedido 
observar afinidades de fondo y exaltado diferencias de superficie” (“the error of particularizing what is general, 
considering what has happened in so many parts as a Spanish phenomenon, has prevented the observation of deep 
15 
 
Gullón’s (1992) assertion that circumscribing modernismo to “rubendarianismo” and opposing 
the so-called Generation of 98 to it has become “un juego académico muy pesado” (“a tiresome 
academic game”), an overview of this “juego” is helpful here to understand how Unamuno’s 
exclusion from modernism has had an effect on the criticism on religion in his works and why 
discussion of secularization is absent.22 
Guillermo Díaz Plaja, in Modernismo frente a noventa y ocho: una introducción a la 
literatura española del siglo XX (Modernismo Versus Ninety-Eight: An Introduction to 20th-
Century Spanish Literature) (1951, 1966, and 1979),23 points to northern Europeans such as 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Ernest Renan (1823-1892), Charles Dickens (1812-1870) and 
especially Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and Nietzsche (1844-1900) not 
only to trace their influence on Spanish thought but to distinguish, even further than the previous 
criticism had done, modernismo from the Generation of 1898.  According to Díaz-Plaja, while 
the modernistas looked to Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849), Paul Verlaine (1844-1896), and Charles 
Baudelaire (1821-1867) for aesthetic inspiration, the Generation of 98 looked to northern 
                                                           
affinities and has exalted superficial differences”; 13).  Gullón asserts that the only thing the Generation of 1898 
writers have in common with each other “son los elementos epocales y de reacción frente a situaciones generales (y 
no sólo españolas)” (“are epochal elements and reactions to general situations (and not only Spanish ones)”; 18).  
Mainer, in “El modernismo como actitud” (“Modernism as an Attitude”) (1994), John Butt, in “The ‘Generation of 
98’: A Critical Fallacy?” (1980), and Javier Blasco in “El ‘98’ que nunca existió” (“The ‘98’ that Never Existed”) 
(2000) reject the dualities put forth by Díaz Plaja and advocate for discarding the term “Generation of 98.” 
 
22Germán Gullón, in La novela moderna en España (The Modern Novel in Spain) (1992), addresses the narrowness 
of defining modernismo simply in aesthetic terms: “Insistir en que un componente de la modernidad, ‘la faceta 
simbolista’, el rubendarianismo, debe tomar posesión de la palabra e impedir la entera comprensión en términos 
crítico-literarios de una época resulta hoy en día un juego académico muy pesado” (“To insist that a component of 
modernity, the symbolist side, the rubendarianismo, should take possession of the word and impede the entire 
understaning of the era in critical-literary terms, has become today a very tiresome academic game”; 35).   
 
23Díaz-Plaja systematically distinguishes modernismo from the Generation of 1898 through a series of binary 
oppositions.  For example, whereas the Generation of 1898 is masculine and concerned with ethics, modernismo is 
feminine and concerned with aesthetics.  Díaz-Plaja further separates modernismo from the Generation of 1898 
using the generational paradigm of German literary critic Julius Petersen (1878-1941).  Employing the “defining 
elements” of a literary generation, Díaz-Plaja finds that the generational guides of the 98 writers were Spanish 




European philosophers for answers to philosophical and religious questions, albeit to assuage 
their personal existential anxieties.  While this “aesthetic versus ethic” approach does treat the 
religious concerns expressed in Unamuno’s novels, it fails to take into account how the problems 
of belief in a superhuman agent manifest themselves through his formal experiments with both 
novel and essay.  For example, a modernist technique like fragmented narrations and dialogues, 
according to this approach, is not viewed as a potential artistic illumination problematizing the 
relationship between creation and creator in the perceived new reality of the early 20th century 
vis-a-vis the relationship between reader and author in literature, but rather as either a 
lamentation for the perceived loss of absolutes like a Christian god that characterized Spain’s 
past or as a symptom of Unamuno’s own “multiple personality” or “neurosis.”24   
 Although José Martínez Ruiz (1873-1967) (more commonly known by his pseudonym, 
Azorín), the originator of the label “Generation of 98,” points to Spain’s loss of its last remaining 
colonies as an event that had deeply affected the group as a whole, the labels he previously used 
to describe the group indicate that the year 1898 had not been so important in uniting these 
writers.  That in 1910, three years before he used the label “Generation of 98,” Azorín employed 
“Generation of 96” to refer to the same group of writers demonstrates that he saw a group of 
writers united by something other than the “disaster” in Cuba.25  Connected to this problem of 
establishing a year or event that united the group is the problem of membership.  Early critics 
maintained that Unamuno was thoroughly noventayochista and indeed a leader of the group but 
membership, as Azorín originally understood it, included the Nicaraguan modernist Rubén 
                                                           
24Thomas Franz (1980) holds that Unamuno’s characters, many of whom become narrators within their own stories, 
are his attempts at working out this multiple personality through his writings.  I return to this in chapter four. 
 
25María Pilar Celma, in “¿Generación del 96, del 98 o Modernismo?” (“Generation of 96, 98, or Modernismo?”) 
(1995), engages in the debate over the Generation of 98 versus Modernismo by returning to what Azorín actually 
wrote when he first coined the term “Generación del 98.”  She writes that not only did Azorín refer to the group as 
the “Generación del 96” in 1910 but that, two years later, he uses “Generación del 97” (48).   
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Darío.  Celma affirms that, by including Rubén Darío, modernista par excellence, in this group 
“es fácil deducir que Azorín en absoluto está oponiendo Generación del 98 y Modernismo” (“it 
is easy to deduce that Azorín is in no way opposing the Generation of 98 to Modernismo”; 51).  
One major problem of early scholarship’s insistence on setting a firm date that supposedly 
unified this group, followed by the later exclusion of Darío, is that it overlooks events and ideas 
pre-dating the U.S., Cuban, and Spanish war and, as mentioned above, it isolates these Spanish 
writers from the more widely felt crises of Europe and the Americas at the end of the 19th 
century and beginning of the 20th.  Unamuno had already identified modernization as a crisis in 
Spain in En torno al casticismo (On Spanish Purism) published in 1895.  Additionally, mention 
of the “disaster” of 1898 is virtually absent in his fiction.   
 Several of these contemporary critics, recognizing these changes, have argued that 
modernismo is not simply a Hispanic literary movement separate from modernism.26  Jesús 
Torrecilla in the introduction to the anthology La Generación del 98 frente al nuevo fin de siglo 
(The Generation of 98 at the New Turn of the Century) (2000) writes, “Los autores europeos de 
finales del XIX y principios del XX poseen ideas, temas, personajes y rasgos de estilo comunes, 
por el simple hecho de respirar una determinada realidad histórica que condiciona su manera de 
pensar y de escribir” (“European authors at the end of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th 
possess common ideas, topics, characters, and stylistic features for the simple fact of breathing in 
                                                           
26Ana Suárez Miramón (2006) affirms that writers like Unamuno were taking part in a more universal movement: 
“La fecha sólo rememora un acontecimiento histórico.  Lo que sí ocurrió es que, por razones literarias (que se 
hubieran podido dar igual sin necesidad de la guerra), se desarrolló la corriente crítica que se había iniciado en la 
Restauración, bajo la influencia del pensamiento krausista, y se llegó a unas claves estéticas nuevas.  Estas claves se 
correspondían con el estilo moderno, propio de la nueva mentalidad cosmopolita finisecular, que si era nueva para 
España no lo era para Europa” (“The date only recalls an historic event.  What did happen is that, for literary reasons 
(which would have happened without the necessity of war), a critical current developed that had begun during the 
Restoration, under the influence of Krausist thought, and arrived at some new aesthetic key characteristics.  These 
key characteristics corresponded with the modern style, typical of the new, end-of-the-century cosmopolitan 




a particular historical reality that conditions their way of thinking and writing”; 6).  Despite 
Torrecilla’s and other critics’ call for inclusion, Spanish and Latin American literature is still 
widely excluded from more global definitions of modernism.27   
 One of the major difficulties in including Spanish-language literature of this time period 
under the literary movement “modernism” has been again a question of dates.  In Modernism 
(2007), editor Michael H. Whitworth sets the frame of his anthology between the years 1910 and 
1939, ruling out any possible inclusion of early writings from Unamuno.  In addition, asserting 
that the most productive years of modernism occurred between and were affected by the two 
World Wars is problematic for the inclusion of Spanish literature as Spain, marred by her own 
internal conflicts, did not participate in either war.  Whereas Whitworth focuses mainly on 
English-language authors, editors Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, in their collection 
titled Modernism: 1890-1930 (1991), expand their chronological frame and endeavor to include 
authors outside of England, France, and Germany, but literature from Spain and Latin America is 
remarkably absent.  McFarlane and Bradbury seem to suggest in their introduction and in the 
short biography of Unamuno at the end of their study that Spanish authors could have been 
discussed along with Russian, Scandinavian, and Central European authors such as Anton 
Chekov (1860-1904), Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), and Franz Kafka (1883-1924) but there was not 
                                                           
27Alejandro Mejías López (2009) convincingly posits how this came to be. [The modernista writers]…were also the 
first to coin the term “modernism,” in a conscious effort to bring about an aesthetic revolution against academicism 
and realism and foreground the self-conscious constructedness of literature.  They were the first to theorize not just 
Hispanic, but “Western” modernism and the problematic relationship of literature and art to the changing 
environment brought about by modernization, which they believed threatened the very drive for human knowledge 
and progress they thought central to modernity itself since the Renaissance” (4).  And remarks later that 
“[m]odernity and coloniality – inseparably linked, as Dussel and Mignolo have argued – began with the Iberian 
colonization of the Americas in the sixteenth century.  In the mid-eighteenth century, however, northern European 
discourse began to monopolize the concept of the modern, writing that date as its origin and erasing more than two 
centuries of modernity and coloniality.  As a result, Hispanic history and cultural and intellectual production were 
excluded from the ‘modern’ archive, despite having made that archive possible; as a consequence, Spanish ceased to 




enough space in the anthology.28  Pericles Lewis identifies modernismo with modernism in The 
Cambridge Introduction to Modernism (2007) but limits his discussion to northern European and 
North American authors.29  Although these scholars have neglected to incorporate Spanish 
literature in their studies, their definitions of modernism certainly do make possible its inclusion.   
  While the term “modernism” has been problematic, recently revised definitions of the 
literary movement are helpful in that they capture how art attempted to represent the various 
changes the western world was undergoing at the time when Unamuno wrote.  Terrence Wright 
(2005) acknowledges an “imprecise sliding” between “modernism” and “modernity” as one of 
the problems affecting literary criticism:  
The former applies to a group of writers normally dated from 1910 to 1930 famous for 
their experimental style. […] ‘Modernity’, according to Peter Childs, is ‘a word first used 
by Baudelaire in the mid-nineteenth century ‘to describe a way of living and experiencing 
life which has arisen with the changes wrought by industrialisation, urbanisation and 
secularisation’.  It is characterised by fragmentation and rapid change, ephemerality and 
insecurity….  It is at least arguable that modernity ‘caused’ modernism, that the literary 
forms of the early twentieth century were a response to the changing ‘reality’ they were 
trying to depict. (4) 
 
Whitworth, acknowledging the often-contradictory aesthetic tendencies within modernism such 
as surrealism, creationism, Dadaism, offers that “‘Modernism’ is not so much a thing as a set of 
responses to problems posed by the conditions of modernity” (3).  Even wider than this, Lewis 
proposes that modernism is “the literature that acknowledged and attempted to respond to a crisis 
                                                           
28McFarlane and Bradbury state that the nature of the anthology inevitably meant the exclusion or under-
representation of some authors “and key geographical locations (Iberia, Latin America)” (14).  In addition to the 
small biography on Unamuno (627) they include a small biography on Federico García Lorca (1898-1936) (637).  
Also, in their chronology of Modernist events for authors of Latin origin, denoted by “Lat.”, they note the 
publication of DST and Niebla but this “Lat.” section is generally reserved for Italian authors’ accomplishments 
(595-96). 
 
29Lewis relates modernismo, avant-garde, Expressionismus, decadentismo and Modernism stating: “In Spanish 
modernismo referred as early as 1888 to a movement closely allied with symbolism and led by the Nicaraguan poet 
Rubén Darío.  What links all these movements is the shared apprehension of a crisis in the ability of art and 




of representation beginning in the mid-nineteenth century” (Cambridge xviii).  McFarlane and 
Bradbury also identify modernism as a response to modernity and give several characteristics of 
what modernism implies: “Clearly it is an art of a rapidly modernizing world, a world of rapid 
industrial development, advanced technology, urbanization, secularization and mass forms of 
social life” (57).30  Finally, Gabriel Josipovici (2011), “Modernism … becomes a response by 
artists to that ‘disenchantment of the world’ to which cultural historians have long been drawing 
our attention” (11).  These definitions revise older ones that characterized modernists as 
“inward” and allow for an exploration of introspection in modernist works but it also permits an 
understanding of how the modernist author and his characters engage with their changing 
context.31  Likewise, framing Unamuno’s work within these definitions of “modernism” not only 
allows for a fuller understanding of the milieu of the era and how his works respond to the 
change in values and aesthetics in society and literature taking place in Spain and elsewhere but 
also how the “inwardness” and introspection of characters like Niebla’s protagonist, Augusto 
                                                           
30McFarlane and Bradbury address the often contradictory nature of modernist works and further present 
characteristics to which they see modernists responding: “…Modernism is less a style than a search for a style in a 
highly individualistic sense; and indeed the style of one work is no guarantee for the next” (29). And then later, “In 
short, Modernism was in most countries an extraordinary compound of the futuristic and the nihilistic, the 
revolutionary and the conservative, the naturalistic and the symbolistic, the romantic and the classical.  It was a 
celebration of a technological age and a condemnation of it; an excited acceptance of the belief that the old régimes 
of culture were over, and a deep despairing in the face of that fear; a mixture of convictions that the new forms were 
escapes from historicism and the pressures of the time with convictions that they were precisely the living 
expressions of these things.  And in most of these countries the fermenting decade was the eighteen nineties” (46). 
 
31Fredric Jameson (1981), for example, held that “[t]he most influential formal impulses of canonical modernism 
have been strategies of inwardness, which set out to reappropriate an alienated universe by transforming it into 
personal styles and private languages: such wills to style have seemed in retrospect to reconfirm the very 
privatization and fragmentation of social life against which they meant to protest” (Fables 2).  I follow Pericles 
Lewis (2000) who questions this: “Many critics have interpreted the modernists’ concern with psychology, with the 
subjective experience of time, and with the form of the novel itself as a sign of ‘introversion’ or of a lack of political 
commitment, corresponding to a rejection of the ‘external reality’ that concerned nineteenth-century realist 
novelists.  Yet…the modernist novel does not reject external reality entirely; rather, it concerns itself with the 
relationship between the individual consciousness and the external reality that it confronts.  Perceiving a gap 
between the meaningful inner life of the individual consciousness and an out world that shapes that inner life but 
seems in itself devoid of spiritual meaning, the modernists sought a means to bridge that gap, to glean a meaning 




Pérez, try to engage with others in a changing social context and how Unamuno attempts to 
engage with his readers.   
Where Is Spain?  When Was Spain? 
This dissertation claims that Unamuno’s essay and fiction are responses to and distortions 
of secular and religious narratives brought about by a modernizing world.  But, to understand his 
works as attempts to aesthetically represent socio-historical crises of meaning brought about by 
secularization and to place him among literary modernists, an important question still must be 
addressed: was Spain a modern nation or, at least, a modernizing one?  This question would 
seem silly in a study of French, English, or North American modernists but seems to be of great 
concern in the examination of 19th and 20th-century Spanish writers.  Iarocci, in Properties of 
Modernity: Romantic Spain, Modern Europe, and the Legacies of Empire (2006), finds himself 
addressing the question of Spanish modernity as he examines Spanish Romanticism.  He writes 
that, beginning in the late 17th century, northern and central Europe defined themselves as 
“modern” in relation to peripheral, “backwards” Spain and then, at the beginning of 19th-century 
romanticism “Europe began to see something new in the uncivilized south; it began to see itself” 
(19).32  The northern European contentions that Europe ended at the Pyrenees and that Spain 
never ceased to be medieval did not end in the early 19th century.  Haughty claims that Spain was 
                                                           
32Iarocci argues that northern and central Europe’s negation of Spanish modernity begins during the Enlightenment: 
“What emerged from Spain’s struggles against a burgeoning north was thus a series of stereotypes – the Inquisition, 
the Black Legend, and, in the eighteenth century, a more general portrait of uncivilized backwardness.  The common 
denominator to each of these images was the tacit expulsion of Spain from European history; or, to put it more 
precisely, from the celebratory history of Western rationalism” (12).  This negation then continues through 
Romanticism celebrating Spain as a thoroughly nonmodern and medieval nation (19-20).  Iarocci refers to Walter 
Mignolo’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of modernity: “…Hegel’s omission of Spain, Portugal, and, by 
extension, the colonial Atlantic world is symptomatic of the ‘imperial difference’ that from the eighteenth century 
forward came to characterize the conceptualization of European modernity” (8).  He then references why 
Montesquieu believed that northern Europe embraced Protestantism and why southern Europe maintained 
Catholicism in The Spirit of the Laws (1748): “This is because the people of the north have and will always have a 
spirit of independence and liberty that the people of the south do not, and because a religion that has no visible 




backwards and uncivilized and approving declarations that it was mystic and irrational had very 
much become a sustained campaign in travel literature and literary criticism from the late 19th 
century through the 20th.   
 Mair José Benardete, David Rubio, and Edgar Allison Peers, writing at the beginning of 
the 20th century, see, or least imagine, in Spain the spiritual values that northern Europe and 
North America had supposedly lost.  Their argument is that Spain, never having been tainted by 
modernity, still retained absolute values, like a Christian god, that went unquestioned.  In 
“Spiritual Spain – A Synthesis” (1927), Benardete states, “We are today on the threshold of a 
very significant contact with a Spain that promises spiritual values to a world aimlessly drifting 
toward an impasse” (1).  Rubio’s The Mystic Soul of Spain (1946) echoes this sentiment.  Rubio 
maintains, largely through an interpretation of literary works, that Spain’s essential mystic nature 
has kept it safe from the crises of modernity experienced in the rest of Europe.  This “mystic” 
nature of Spanish literature was thoroughly explored by Spanish literary scholar and founder of 
the journal Bulletin of Hispanic Studies Edgar Allison Peers.  Although Peers had done much to 
bring the study of Spanish literature to England and the United States, his analysis of Spanish 
Romanticism as superficial only helped to sustain the belief that Spain never fully experienced 
its own Enlightenment or romantic period.  This idea has plagued the scholarship on Unamuno’s 
works, in which the subject of Spain’s modernization is still in debate.     
 The search for Spanish modernity through its literature has led scholars to claim that 
either Spain was not a modern nation and, if her literature did reflect any aspect of modernity, it 
was feeble and simply imitative of northern and central Europe, as in Laín Entralgo’s analysis, or 
that Spain was indeed modern and was quickly catching up to other European nations.  Current 
criticism of the matter reflects this.  While critics Jesús Torrecilla (2000), Germán Gullón 
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(1992), Gonzalo Navajas (2000), Dale Pratt (2001), and Ana Suárez Miramón (2006) all agree 
that Unamuno should be considered in a more global context, there is little agreement as to 
Spanish modernity.33  Torrecilla, for example, writes that Spain “es un país marginal cuyos 
problemas fundamentales no están causados por la modernidad sino por la falta de ella: atraso, 
debilidad, atonía, conciencia de inferioridad...” (“is a marginal country whose fundamental 
problems are not caused by modernity but rather by a lack of it: backwardness, weakness, 
lethargy, inferiority complex”; 8), while Germán Gullón points to the beginning of “the modern” 
in Spanish literature as predating Modernism: “Queda claro que el período moderno en España 
hay que datarlo con anterioridad a 1898, ya que las novelas de Benito Pérez Galdós (1843-1920) 
o de Armando Palacio Valdés (1853-1937), pongamos por caso, presentan unos orbes ficticios 
cuya configuración física y social corresponde con la moderna” (“It is clear that the modern 
period in Spain must be dated before 1898, since Benito Pérez Galdós’and Armando Palacio 
Valdés’ novels, for example, present some fictional worlds whose social and physical 
configuration correspond to the modern”; 21).  In addressing the various terms such as maladie 
du siècle, abulia, and spiritual malaise often used to describe the general atmosphere of the turn 
                                                           
33In “La ética del ’98 ante el siglo XXI: de Unamuno a Antonio Muñoz Molina” (“The Ethics of the Generation of 
98 in Light of the 21st Century: Unamuno to Antonio Muñoz Molina”) Navajas writes of modernity: “En contra de 
lo que ha sido la visión rutinaria del período con relación a España ese proyecto común no está ausente del país.  
Aunque de modo fragmentario y esporádico existe y permite, como han señalado Fuis y Palafox, en su reciente 
España: 1808-1996.  El desafío de la modernidad (13), la emergencia de segmentos parciales pero genuinos de 
modernidad que se extienden desde Galdós, Castelar y la Institución libre de Enseñanza a Ramón y Cajal, 
Unamuno...” (“Contrary to what has been the routine view of the period in relation to Spain, this common project is 
not absent from the country.  Although fragmentary and sporadic, it exists and permits, as Fuis y Palafox has pointed 
out in his recent Spain: 1808-1996. The Challenge of Modernity, the emergence of partial yet genuine segments of 
modernity that extend from Galdós, Castelar and the Free Institute of Education to Ramón y Cajal, Unamuno…”; 
175).  Dale Pratt in his book Signs of Science: Literature, Science, and Spanish Modernity since 1868 argues that 
“changes in various literary images of Spanish science mark fundamental steps in Spain’s difficult transition into 
modernity.  Cultural modernity came to Spain at the very end of the nineteenth century and in the earliest decades of 
the twentieth…” (9).  Suárez Miramón, however, holds that Spanish society at the beginning of the 20th Century 
“descansaba en pilares más propios de la edad antigua que de la modernidad” (“rested on pillars more typical of the 




of the century, Carlos Blanco Aguinaga (2005) declares, “Esa ‘crisis universal’ es la de la 
modernidad…” (“That ‘universal crisis’ is the crisis of modernity”) (“Crisis espiritual" 
(“Spiritual Crisis” 196).  This project agrees with Blanco Aguinaga, Pratt, Navajas, and Germán 
Gullón that Spain was indeed a modern nation that was undergoing a rapid industrialization and 
secularization at the beginning of the 20th century.   
 To argue that Spain was a modernizing nation and that Unamuno should be included 
within the context of literary modernism is not an attempt simply to validate the country or the 
author but rather to situate the country and Unamuno within the appropriate historical and 
literary context.  Simply put, by understanding the interrelated changes that modernization 
brought about, we can understand the reactions and responses to them and the struggle to 
represent and question them.  Although Spain was not the axis of revolutions associated with 
modernity – the French, the Scientific, and the Industrial – (Iarocci xiii) and did not experience 
modernity the way the European powers that defined themselves as “modern” against nations 
like Spain, by the 20th century it was a country that had already been rapidly modernizing.  
Blanco Aguinaga (1998) points out that economically Spain was experiencing a boom in foreign 
investment and was producing steel, textiles, and mining coal at a rate that exceeded that of 
England and France at the end of the 19th century.34  Politically, Spain had written and repealed 
                                                           
34Blanco Aguinaga writes that “entre 1864 y 1875 la producción española de hierro fue dos veces inferior a la de 
Francia y cincuenta veces inferior a la de Inglaterra.  Cuando se presta atención exclusiva a estos datos se olvida, sin 
embargo, que mientras entre 1864 y 1876 el aumento de la producción de hierro en España es de un 400 por cien, en 
Inglaterra es de un 50 por cien y en Francia nulo.  Se encuentran desarrollos paralelos en la industria textil, en la del 
carbón y en la entonces minúscula de acero” (“between 1864 and 1875 the production of iron in Spain was two 
times less than it was in France and fifty times less than in England.  When one pays attention exclusively to this 
data, one forgets, however, that while between 1864 and 1876 the increase in iron production in Spain is 400 
percent, in England it is 50 percent and null in France.  One finds parallel developments in the textile industry, in the 
coal industry, and in the then tiny steel industry”; Juventud 56).  He also emphasizes the urbanization of this time 
period: “Todo ello va acompañado e impulsado por el crecimiento de la red de ferrocarriles y, entre 1860 y1890, por 
un espectacular índice de crecimiento de las ciudades clave: Barcelona, Madrid, Bilbao, Sevilla” (“All of this is 
accompanied and driven by the growth of the railroad and, between 1860 and 1890, by a spectacular growth rate of 
key cities: Barcelona, Madrid, Bilbao, Sevilla”; Juventud 56). 
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six constitutions between 1812 and 1936, experienced two republics, the Revolution of 1868 and 
its subsequent Bourbon Restoration, and the Carlist wars.  Culturally, and most importantly for 
this dissertation, it produced writers like Unamuno who recognized that these political and 
economic changes affected religious beliefs and experiences and that one of his tasks as a writer 
was how to address these changes and their effects. 
 Further, basing the argument that Spain was or was not modern on its economic growth, 
political upheavals, and cultural production assumes a rather traditional definition of modernity.  
However, such definitions, like the ones above, can be useful despite the ideological baggage the 
term “modernity” carries.  Fredric Jameson, in A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of 
the Present (2002), writes that “when exclusively applied to the past, ‘modernity’ is a useful 
trope for generating alternate historical narratives…” (214).  In this way, definitions of 
modernity such as Peter Childs’ (2007) – “a way of living and experiencing life which has arisen 
with the changes wrought by industrialisation, urbanisation, and secularisation” (16) – can be 
helpful in recovering a history that Spain has been denied and in contextualizing Unamuno’s 
works.  Iarocci takes this principle a step further by explaining that, within the term “modernity,” 
are “the notion of historical agency (as opposed to the passive reception of ‘History’), an intense 
awareness of historical change (as opposed to the affirmation of unwavering tradition), and a 
dynamic sense of historical flux (as opposed to the image of historical stasis)” (43).  
Understanding modernity this way and applying it to Spain’s past allows for a much different 
picture than the backwards medieval nation whose cultural production was merely imitative of 
cultural movements in which it never fully participated.  It reveals a story in which Spain is an 
agent of history and one in which the writings of Unamuno demonstrate an acute awareness of 
historical change within Spain, the rest of Europe, and the Americas. Finally, it allows for an 
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appreciation of Unamuno’s agency as a writer; he did not just passively note historical changes 
in his works or imitate others’ styles but actively sought to renovate literature and, through these 
renovations, engage with questions about religion and secularization that writers, philosophers, 
and sociologists still grapple with in our postmodern or postsecular (or however we are 
classifying our current age) condition in the western world.35 
According to such definitions, Spanish society can also be seen as having undergone a 
long secularization process.  With disenchantment, the compartmentalization of social spheres, 
and the privatization of religion, came the decline of religious institutions.  The changes in the 
Spanish constitutions from 1812 to 1931 reveal this declining importance of religion in the state.  
In a relatively short period of time the Spanish constitution changes from declaring Catholicism 
as the official religion of Spain in 1812 to stating that Spain has no official religion in 1931.36  
                                                           
35Pericles Lewis observes how others have traced the origins of the “postmodern condition” to literary modernism: 
“The philosophical debate over modernity vs. postmodernity, notably in the works of the philosophers Jürgen 
Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard, came also to dominate discussion of literary modernism and postmodernism.  
The noted critic Fredric Jameson acknowledged the origins of the postmodern “crisis of representation” in literary 
modernism in his influential foreword to Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (1984).  The geographer David 
Harvey took up the phrase in his Condition of Postmodernity (1990), once again tracing the crisis to literary 
experiments beginning in the mid-19th century.  Thus the philosophical attempt to define an age after modernity 
acknowledged its origins in the literary work of modernism, with its critique of traditional modes of representation” 
(Cambridge xix).  
John A. McClure (2007) defines postsecularism as “a mode of being and seeing that is at once critical of 
secular constructions of reality and of dogmatic religiosity” (ix).  Tracy Fessenden (2014), James Beckford (2012), 
Gregor McLennan (2010) and others have also explored the “postsecular.”  While Unamuno was critical of both 
secular and religious forms of dogmatism, as I hope will be evident in chapter three, he would have rejected the 
terms “postmodern” and “postsecular” as categorizations on the same basis he questions a rigid distinction between 
“pre-modern” and “modern.” 
 
36This is just one of the dramatic changes in the Spanish constitutions concerning religion.  The Constitution of 1812 
requires representatives and the king to swear an oath to defend Catholicism in Title III, Chapter VI, Article 117 and 
Title IV, Chapter I, Article 173 respectively.  Additionally, Title IX, Chapter I, Article 366 states: “En todos los 
pueblos de la Monarquía se establecerán escuelas de primeras letras, en las que se enseñará a los niños a leer, 
escribir y contar, y el catecismo de la religión católica, que comprenderá también una breve exposición de las 
obligaciones civiles.” (“Primary schools will be established in every town of the Kingdom, in which children will be 
taught to read, write, count, and the catechism of the Catholic religion, that will also include a brief exposition of 
civic duties.”)  The Constitution of 1869 still maintains Catholicism as the religion of Spain in Title I, Article 21 as 
does the Constitution of 1876 in Title I, Article 11 but both allow for the practice of other religious traditions.  The 
most striking changes occur in the Constitution of 1931, that of the Second Republic.  In the preliminary title, 
Article 3 it states that Spain has no official religion and in Title III, Chapter I, Articles 25, 26, and 27 it prohibits any 
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Additionally, religious roles and institutions had declined in importance as evidenced by the 
nationalization of goods and territories held by monastic orders as early as 1767 with the 
expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and the confiscation of their possessions.  Growing 
anticlericalism in the 19th and 20th centuries and the outright hostility and violence towards 
clergy and religious institutions also indicate that the social standing of these roles and 
institutions had long been deteriorating.  Bruce makes a connection between societal divisions 
and the structural changes of secularization: “…in Catholic countries the fragmentation of the 
religious culture that follows from structural and social differentiation tends to take the form of a 
sharp divide between those who remain within the religious tradition and those who openly 
oppose it” (337-38).  Hostility and violence and deep divides along religious lines characterized 
much of the age when Unamuno lived and wrote: the Third Carlist War (1872-76) – the 
backdrop of his first novel, Paz en la guerra (Peace in War) (1895) –, intermittent violent 
uprisings like the Semana Trágica de Barcelona (The Tragic Week of Barcelona) (1909), the 
burning of churches and convents and the killing of clergy during the Second Republic, and, 
eventually, the Spanish Civil War.  While there were certainly political and economic factors at 
play in these conflicts, historians Hilari Raguer (2007) and Stanley G. Payne (2012) have pointed 
to religion as the most polemic element.37  
                                                           
religious order from participating in industry, commerce, and education.  It also prohibits discrimination based on 
religious affiliation and provides for the nationalization of the holdings of monastic orders (Constituciones).     
 
37Raguer writes, “Of all the problems that confronted the Spanish Republic, that of religion was the most thorny.  In 
a memoir written after the Civil War, Jiménez de Asúa enumerated four major tasks that the Republic could not 
evade: military reform (which he characterized as a ‘technical reform’), the Religious Question (a ‘liberal reform’), 
the Agrarian Problem (a ‘delayed/late reform’) and the Regional Problem (a ‘patriotic reform’) and, of these, it was 
the Religious Question that aggravated tension the most and led to the crisis of the regime and the Civil War” (15).  
Stanley G. Payne (2012) states, “With all these precedents [revolutionary civil wars of the early 20th century], 
however, religion defined the Spanish conflict in ways that went beyond any other revolutionary civil war” (111).  
José María Sánchez titled his monograph “The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy” (1987). 
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The growing tension and mounting violence during the end of the 19th century and 
beginning of the 20th in Spain illustrate an extreme example of the crisis of meaning when 
“meaning” is no longer “axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed” as I mention at the 
beginning of this introduction.  This is not to say, however, that there was no meaning at all.  On 
the contrary, both sides clung tightly to metaphysical systems that sanctified their causes, 
whether it was traditional Catholicism or a “religionismo nacionalista o de Estado” (“nationalist 
religionism or State religionsim”; Unamuno, “Nación” 92).38  In addition to what to represent 
and how to represent it in literature, I argue that the texts I study in this dissertation address 
another task, how to form a community out of this very fractured Spain that does not recreate the 
dogmatic thinking of metaphysical systems.  
An Approach 
Writing about religion against the changes brought about by secularization posed 
challenges to Unamuno but it has also presented a challenge to the literary critic.  Scholars have 
acknowledged the lack of appropriate vocabulary and approaches to treat the persistence of 
religion in fiction and to even take it seriously in the academy in general.39  Dennis Taylor, in 
“The Need for a Religious Literary Criticism,” (1998) identifies the insufficiency of current 
literary criticism to address authors who explore religion in their writings.  While this project 
                                                           
38Despite using “nacionalista,” a term that has become interchangeable with “nacional” to refer to the Francoists 
during the Civil War, Unamuno is actually criticizing the newly formed Second Republic.  In the same year, 1931, 
he writes, “…pero no es lo mismo religión del Estado que religión de Estado.  Y ésta, republicana por supuesto, 
empieza a surtir con sus dogmas, sus mitos, sus ritos, su culto, su liturgia y sus supersticiones…” (“…but religion of 
the State is not the same as State religion.  And this – State religion -, republican of course, begins to supply 
dogmas, myths, rites, worship, liturgy, and superstitions…”; “Religión de estado” 99). 
 
39Noël Valis offers a possibility as to why religion has not received serious attention in literary studies: “Under the 
sign of the Enlightenment, however, religion is not simply deracinated; it is frequently dismissed as primitive, 
irrational, prone to violence, conservative if not reactionary, and, in its aesthetic forms, inferior to profane art….  




does not maintain that there needs to exist a “religious literary criticism” that could be used to 
analyze any text, it does agree with Taylor on the following:  
For an adequate reading of the religious dimensions of literary texts, we need languages 
that are critical and passionate, ecumenical and committed, detached and empathic.  Such 
a language needs to enter into productive dialogue with our reigning discourses.  It needs 
to appeal not only to the converted, but also to those with no pronounced commitments, 
and also to be helpful to those who are hostile to religion.  The problem with many of the 
offhand attacks on religious criticism is that they have little to attack except 
fundamentalist simplicities, which makes their own attacks seem simplistic.  The subject 
of religious experience, and of course religion itself, is a profoundly divisive and 
disturbing subject, and for that reason famously avoided in polite conversation.  
Nevertheless, we need to take on these dark currents, and begin to talk about them. (27) 
 
While religious studies scholars have employed literary approaches in their explorations of 
religion, literary critics have been slow to acknowledge the possibilities that religious studies 
offers the study of literature.40 
This dissertation borrows from religious studies and employs terms and language this 
discipline offers for the study of religion in Unamuno’s texts.  While the language used by 
scholars of religion is itself cultural, the terms and ideas of the academic study of religion can 
illuminate the texts of this dissertation in their interdisciplinarity.  Specifically, I draw from the 
cognitive science of religion, an interdisciplinary approach to religion itself, the sociology of 
religion, the psychology of religion, and cultural studies of religion.  In doing so I hope to avoid 
reducing religion to, for example, psychic capacities or social relations.  Because belief and 
experience are central to the stories of enchantment I explore in Unamuno’s works, cognitive and 
psychological approaches are helpful in understanding not only how these beliefs are acquired 
and experiences felt, but also why these beliefs and experiences are set apart from others.  For 
example, a cognitive approach to religion is especially beneficial in understanding the instincts to 
                                                           
40Eric J. Sharpe (1994) reminds that the study of comparative religion “was dominated by Max Müller’s philological 
approach to the material.  The most notable interests, and the most outstanding achievements, of the philologists 
were in the area of mythology, that is, of religion as conceptualized and expressed in words and stories” (47).   
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perpetuate and of self-preservation that Unamuno posits in DST.  Furthermore, it can elucidate 
the relationship between experiences and the beliefs acquired through reflection upon them. 
I use cognitive systems and mechanisms as interpretive categories with which to understand 
belief but cognitive science does not explain all of religion or the lack thereof.  Therefore, I also 
follow Ann Taves (2009), Thomas A. Tweed (2006), Scott Atran (2002), and others in 
considering the mutual influence of cognition and culture.41  Religious concepts are never 
expressed in a vacuum; they are always presented within a context.  Therefore, I employ 
sociological and cultural approaches as lenses to understand how the cultural and socio-historical 
contexts inform and shape these beliefs and experiences in Unamuno’s works.  For example, a 
cognitive approach is useful for explicating the experience that violates the physical properties of 
Apolodoro’s body and embodied mind in AP but why he deems this experience “religious” is 
incomplete without understanding the context within which it happens, namely that, before this 
experience, his father asks him to formulate an idea of the world.  Additionally, and more 
generally, a socio-cultural approach aids in understanding how the narrators and secondary 
characters affect the protagonists changing definitions of religion.  Finally, taking into account 
                                                           
41Taves in Religious Experience Reconsidered (2009) writes: “Because embodied human behaviors incorporate 
cultural meanings and memories in complex ways, we cannot consider them as only biological …or only cultural … 
but as a complex mixture of both biology and culture” (64).  Tweed argues that “[t]he best we can say is that mind 
and culture co-evolved, and that they are – to use Geertz’s apt phrase – ‘reciprocally constructive.’  Religion 
scholars, in turn, can only do their best to acknowledge the complex interactions of organic constraints (neural, 
physiological, emotional, and cognitive) and cultural mediations (linguistic, tropic, ritual, and material)” (65).  Atran 
states in In Gods We Trust (2002) that “… the existence of religion – indeed, of any cultural path – results from a 
confluence of cognitive, behavioral, bodily, and ecological constraints that neither reside wholly within minds nor 
are recognizable in a world without minds.  Theories of religion that concentrate on only one of these factors, 
however correct or insightful in part, can never be thorough or comprehensive” (11).  Jonathan Lanman (2012) 
advocates using a combined cognitive and sociological approach: “The cognitive science of religion can be enriched 
by examining how different environments affect pan-human cognitive mechanisms in the production of religious 
beliefs and the sociology of religion can be enriched by critically examining the psychological assumptions present 
in theories of religion and secularization” (49-50).  Barbara Herrnstein Smith (2009) sees the relation between mind 
and cultural as forming part of cognition: “the continuous mutual process of environmental interaction and organic-





the cultural, historical, and contextual factors in which religious and secular beliefs are expressed 
conveys the contingent and provisional nature of these beliefs.  That it is, this approach does not 
claim to define religion for all time and everywhere but rather according to the specific contexts 
in which they are formulated. 
Sociological and cultural approaches to religion and secularization allow for an 
exploration of these phenomena as they relate to each other and to the contexts in which they are 
expressed which permits a more dynamic view of the two.  However, the problem that has 
plagued the scholarship on religion in Unamuno’s works still partially remains: how do I, as a 
critic and interpreter of Unamuno’s works, avoid bringing my own theological baggage to this 
study?  While I do not pretend that my own cultural background, which includes twelve years of 
Catholic education, does not shape my analysis, I attempt to address this problem by following 
Taves in considering how and why people or, in this dissertation, characters, narrators, and 
authors “deem” an experience “religious” and how and why these experiences are “set apart” 
from others.42  “Deeming” is part of the ascriptive model Taves uses that claims “that religious 
or mystical or spiritual or sacred ‘things’ are created when religious significance is assigned to 
them” and that “… subjects have experiences that they or others deem religious” (Experience 
17).  Using such an approach in an attempt to understand Unamuno’s works allows me to 
explore what he and his characters consider religious, why they might do so, and how they set 
apart what is religious from other phenomena.  Also, by employing this approach, I will make no 
                                                           
42Taves uses Émile Durkheim’s definition of a religion as a starting point in understanding why people ascribe 
characteristics to certain things and what are the causal explanations they attribute to them.  Durkheim defines a 
religion as the following: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a 
Church, all those who adhere to them” (44).  Here, Durkheim attempts to define a religion but within a religion he 
gives the constituent parts of religion as Taves points out: “Sacred things and beliefs and rites related to them are 
separable from religions and at the same time provide the fundamental raw material that people use to construct 




claims as to the authenticity or “truthfulness” of what Unamuno or his characters view as 
“religious” as those critics who employed an autobiographical approach and theological method 
had done before. 
In my analysis of experiences deemed religious in Unamuno’s work, I continue to follow 
Taves and employ an “attributional approach” to explore how experience, cognition, and context 
interact with each other in shaping belief.  This method allows for an expansive view of belief by 
looking at the interrelation of four factors: “1.) the attributor; 2.) the attributor’s context; 3.) the 
event being explained; and 4.) the event’s context” (qtd. in Experience 94).  These four elements 
coupled with Taves’ suggestion “to be more sensitive to experiences that are genuinely creative 
and generate new insights and, in some cases, entirely new meaning systems” (Experience 99) 
permit an understanding of how, when, and why Unamuno and his characters explain their 
experiences the way they do and how these explanations create beliefs.43  Such an approach is 
especially useful in an examination of religion in Unamuno’s fiction.  Narrative provides a space 
in which attributors can be primary and secondary characters, character development provides 
the context of the attributor, and narration supplies the context of events.  In Unamuno’s works, 
his reliance on dialogue and monologue supply a site in which characters attempt to explain their 
experiences and develop beliefs through these explanations.  Finally, his stories contextualize 
experience and belief and illustrate how context also informs how the mind interprets experience 
and shapes belief. 
Writing about religion in fiction has been especially problematic due to the pervasive 
scholarship that has held that the novel is a secular form of literature.  There is little agreement as 
                                                           
43Taves’ suggestion responds to Benard Spilka, Phillip Shaver, and Lee A. Kirkpatrick’s article, “A General 
Attribution Theory for the Psychology of Religion” (1985).  Taves writes that the authors “predicted that the 
attributor would invoke the most readily available meaning system and would turn to less-available alternatives only 
if the explanation arising out of the first meaning system was unsatisfactory” (Experience 94). 
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to the relationship between the novel and religion.  Georg Lukács’ (1885-1971) famously 
declares in The Theory of the Novel (1916) that “[t]he novel is the epic of a world that has been 
abandoned by God” (88).  James Wood in The Broken Estate: Essays on Literature and Belief 
(2000) writes of modern fiction: “… despite its being a kind of magic, it is actually the enemy of 
superstition, the slayer of religions, the scrutineer of falsity” (xi).  Amardeep Singh supports 
Wood and, in Literary Secularism: Religion and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Fiction (2006), 
views secularization “as a story that unfolds primarily within literature, but in parallel with 
philosophical, cultural, and political phenomena” (5).  Opposing these views, Conrad Ostwalt, in 
Secular Steeples: Popular Culture and the Religious Imagination (2003), writes, “Literature has 
and can provide an outlet for religious yearning just as it provides a medium for the expression 
of love, passion, horror, awe, and beauty” (98).  Gabriel Josipovici argues that the novel as a 
genre began as a response to the disenchantment of the world: “[Don Quixote] dramatizes the 
way we as readers collude in this game because we want, for the duration of our reading, to be 
part of a realised world, a world full of meaning and adventure, an enchanted world.  It is no 
coincidence that the novel emerges at the very moment when the world is growing disenchanted” 
(34).44  Noël Valis maintains that literature, including the novel, is not so secular as to eliminate 
discussion about religion.45  She goes on to say that modern fiction is shaped by its attempt to 
respond to a secularizing world (15).  This project will agree with Valis.  It will make no claim 
that Unamuno’s novels are engines of secularization in the sense that they participate in the 
                                                           
44Josipovici’s emphasis. 
 
45Addressing the role of religion in fiction Valis writes: “It is also commonplace to see Spanish Catholicism, once a 
vibrant imaginative-moral force in literature and the arts, as spent and largely dead in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, as, in a word, a vestige, irrelevant to modernity and to modern artifacts like the novel.  This view, which 
remains for the most part unexamined among literary critics, is not mine” (5).  She continues that “[i]t is the intricate 




distancing of the divine.  While his novels, by inviting their readers to suspend belief or believe 
conditionally in their worlds, do challenge readers’ conceptions of the createdness of the world 
external to the texts, they may weaken belief in a transcendent other but do not destroy it.  
Rather, Unamuno’s novels create uncertainty and slide between belief and doubt in this other.  I 
will argue in chapter four that this uncertainty constitutes a story of enchantment.  However, I 
will not argue that Unamuno’s novels serve as secular substitutes for religion.  His novels, with 
their experimentations with form and content, rather than being a replacement for religion or 
engine of secularization, provide ideal sites for reflections on religion. Through modernist 
techniques such as reliance on dialogue, fragmented descriptions, and multiple narrators, to name 
a few, his novels provide a space for the examination of a secularizing world and what that 
means for religion.  Finally, I will argue that Unamuno’s novels, products of language and, as 
such malleable stories, problematize “religion” and “secularization” as stable categories by 
distorting and combining religious and secular accounts of the world. 
Summary of Chapters 
This dissertation explores these distorted stories in five sections.  In chapter one, “Losing 
Religion,” I respond to the prevailing criticism on religion in Unamuno’s works that has held that 
his exploration of religion stems from a personal crisis of belief, a crisis that has been termed 
“the crisis of 97.”  I consider secularization in three related ways: 1.) as the disappearance of 
religion; 2.) as the transference of religion to other domains of life and; 3.) as the continuation of 
Christianity through twisting narratives.  In an examination of DST, AC, and some of Unamuno’s 
shorter essays, I argue that secularization in the first two senses presents a crisis in that, with the 
supposed disappearance or transference of religion, other powerful substitutes, such as 
scientificism and politics, recreated the dogmatic thinking they purportedly disavowed.  I then 
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consider secularization in Unamuno’s works through the lens of Gianni Vattimo’s concept 
Verwindung to understand how the twisting and distorting of both religious and secular 
narratives might constitute a way of weakening dogmatic thinking without recreating a new 
metaphysical system.  From there, I suggest that these twists and distortions constitute stories of 
enchantment in Unamuno’s works.   
Chapter two, “Learning Religion,” explores the story of how religious belief is acquired 
and represented in Unamuno’s works.  It begins with an examination of the two instincts 
Unamuno posits in DST: a self-preservation instinct, which gives man intuitive knowledge, and a 
perpetuation instinct, which gives man language and consciousness.  I argue that the knowledge 
given to man by the second instinct violates the knowledge given to him by the first and results 
in a violation of the physical properties of the body.  I maintain that these experiences are 
counterintuitive and, as such, are set apart from other experiences and deemed religious.  I then 
consider how counterintuitive experiences of love, compassion, and suffering lead to the positing 
of a superhuman agent in his essays.  Finally, I explore the manifestations of counterintuitive 
experiences in Unamuno’s fiction.   
Chapter three, “Locating Religion,” explores the possibilities of enchantment in locating 
religion in counterintuitive experiences.  It argues that these experiences break down the 
dichotomies of nature/society, primitive/modern, and religious/secular.  I contend that the 
collapse of these dichotomies brings a rationalized, transcendent god into the immanent realm of 
“el hombre de carne y hueso” and the characters of Unamuno’s fiction.  Finally, I consider how 
this story of enchantment constitutes a subversion of the perceived compartmentalization of 
social life and privatization of religion of the secular script.   
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Chapter four, “Relating Religion,” examines uncertainty as a possibility of enchantment.  
I argue that, through the metafictional mode, intertextuality, and literary devices such as 
fragmented dialogues and ellipses, Unamuno’s works invite the reader to participate in the telling 
of stories.  I continue by exploring the implications that this obscuring of the boundaries between 
creator and creation has in Unamuno’s fictional worlds and those external to them.  I contend 
that this uncertainty serves to weaken dogmatic thinking and, thus, serves as a subversion to 
secular and religious narratives alike.  Lastly, I examine one last flip of the secular script, “living 
religion,” in which I consider the possibility of action based on living a story of uncertainty in a 
modern age. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I examine how a story of uncertainty subverts both the secular 
script and religious narratives and I return to the idea of community to explore how, through 
their readership, Unamuno’s stories might constitute a community of weak believers in a Spain 








CHAPTER 1: LOSING RELIGION: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 
 
In the introduction I outlined some of the tenets of the secular script: disenchantment, the 
compartmentalization of social life into different spheres, and the privatization of religion.  In 
this chapter I continue exploring the secular script by considering different but related versions 
of secularization and Unamuno’s essays and fiction as responses to and reformulation of these 
versions.  First, secularization viewed as the disappearance of religion in the West in Unamuno’s 
texts presents a crisis in that, with its loss, there was no longer a system or an entity that 
anchored meaning.  Second, in the search for meaning, space was created for secular substitutes 
that could not adequately respond to questions that religion previously answered (Pecora 17).  
Furthermore, this transference of religion to other domains of life such as science and politics 
poses a crisis in Unamuno’s writings in that these domains recreated dogmatic thinking and a 
tyranny of thought that did not allow for any claims to truth outside of their metaphysical 
systems.  Lastly, viewed through Unamuno’s theory of interpretation, secularization does not 
present a crisis nor is it antagonistic to religion but rather provides possibilities to make new 
meanings and serves as a constant reformulation of the Christian tradition.  Hermeneutics, in 
Unamuno’s works, functions as a means of responding to the crises of secularization posed in the 
first two senses by offering ways to interpret and re-interpret, combine, and distort both religious 
and secular narratives and, thus, weaken the original message but allow for its continuation.   
Problems 
As I briefly mentioned in the introduction, critics of Unamuno’s work identify a crisis in 
his work but maintain that it was a personal one and not a crisis of representing in literature the 
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crisis of meaning and faith that the secular script posed to writers.  An elaboration on this 
criticism here is necessary to compare it with what Unamuno writes in his essays.  These critics 
often refer to Unamuno’s “Diario íntimo,” written in 1897, in which he describes waking up one 
night in terror at death and nothingness.  This “crisis de 1897,” as they came to term it, became 
the departure point of any analysis of crisis in Unamuno’s works.  Frances Wyers (1976), whose 
examination of religion in Unamuno’s works begins at this point, notes, “…critics who have 
discussed the contradictory nature of his writings have either explained it in terms of a 
rationalist/mystical dichotomy in his personality, attributable to a biographical event (the loss of 
faith during his university years) or have spoken of hypocrisy and inauthenticity….  I think a 
more accurate description would be of a self-deceiving consciousness that does not recognize the 
true roots of its despair” (xvii).1  While the case could be made that Unamuno’s personal crisis 
was a reflection of what was happening more broadly in Spain and Europe, Wyers and Shaw 
claim the crises that Unamuno sees in country and continent are his own projected outward.2  
Wyers writes, “Unamuno saw Spain as a metonymical extension of himself” (xv) and Shaw 
holds that, not only Unamuno but all writers of the so-called Generation of 98 “saw the national 
problem as the collective form of their own private dilemma and hence projected on to it their 
own hoped-for solution” (Generation 10).3  This focus on personal crisis and its projection onto 
                                                           
1Antonio Sánchez Barbudo, in “La formación del pensamiento de Unamuno, una experiencia decisiva: La crisis de 
1897” (“The Formation of Unamuno’s Thought, a Decisive Experience: The Crisis of 1897”), very much cemented 
in the criticism of religion in Unamuno’s works the idea of a personal crisis. Other notable critics that focus on the 
“crisis de 1897” and who often refer back to Sánchez Barbudo are: Luis Granjel (1957), Retrato de Unamuno (A 
Portrait of Unamuno) (151-55); D.L. Shaw (1975), The Generation of 1898 in Spain (46-47) and; E. Inman Fox 
(1988), Ideología y política en las letras de fin de siglo (1898) (Ideology and Politics in Turn-of-the 
Century Writing (1898)) (235). 
 
2As I have already mentioned, Álvarez Castro does make the connection between Unamuno’s personal crisis and a 
secularizing world but continues to treat “crisis” as something personal. 
 
3Shaw sees the problem of Spain in sociological and economic terms and criticizes the so-called Generation of 1898 
writers because they “continued to think in terms of spiritual salvation instead of temporal reorganization” 
(Generation 10).  While I agree with Shaw that these writers did not put forth any concrete solutions for economic 
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Spain neglects the effects of a rapidly changing world on individual consciousness and how 
Unamuno’s narratives responded to it.  Discussing crisis only in personal terms has political and 
historical implications too.  It skews a picture of what was happening in Spain at the turn of the 
century and paints a picture of a nation that could be “una, grande y libre,” (“one, great, and 
free”) with “libre” being “free” from subversive ideas and cultural practices.  According to this 
kind of criticism, Spain could remain the devout, Catholic nation it had always been said to be 
and any Spanish writer questioning, playing with, or freely interpreting Catholicism was dealing 
with his own personal religious crisis.   
Unamuno’s depiction of Spain is very different from that of a uniformly Catholic 
country.  Six years before the publication of DST, he pens a small article titled, “La cuestión 
religiosa” (“The Religious Question”) (1907), in which he states, “Todo el mundo ha estado 
creyendo y repitiendo que España es un país no ya eminente, sino hasta fanáticamente católico y, 
sin embargo, nada más lejos de la verdad” (“Everyone has been believing and repeating that 
Spain is not only eminently, but even fanatically Catholic and yet nothing could be further from 
the truth”; 77).  This description of Spain remains constant throughout his work.  During the 
Second Republic and only months before his death he writes “Acción religiosa y acción política” 
(“Religious Action and Political Action”) (1936) in which he alludes to the Bishop of 
Salamanca’s attempts to call the working-class Spaniard back to the Catholic Church:  
Y es que ese pueblo no profesa ya la fe católica.  Ni nuestro pueblo, ni el urbano, ni el 
campesino, la profesa desde hace mucho.  Para él ser cristiano era estar registrado en la fe 
de bautismo, casarse por la Iglesia y enterrarse según su rito.  Mas el registro civil, el 
matrimonio civil y el entierro civil como actos dentro de la comunidad civil han venido a 
demostrar que una gran parte, acaso la mayoría, de nuestro pueblo, de lo que se llama 
pueblo, de las clases populares, no es ya católico.  Por lo que ha podido decirse que 
                                                           
problems plaguing Spain at the beginning of the 20th Century, their preoccupation with “the spiritual” and 
“religious” often related to sociological problems such as Church hypocrisy, expropriation of Church possessions 
and religious vs. secular educations.  Also, it should be remembered that the looming Second Republic and the 
consequent Civil War were divided as much along lines of religious belief as they were political affiliation. 
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España ha dejado de ser católica.  Y no ahora, después de la República, sino mucho antes. 
(405) 
And it is that these people no longer practice the Catholic faith.  Not our people, not the 
people of the cities nor those in the country has practiced it for a long time.  For them, to 
be Christian is to be registered in the faith at baptism, get married by the Church, and be 
buried according to its rites.  But civil registry, civil marriage, and civil burial, as acts 
within the civil community, have come to show that a large part, perhaps the majority, of 
our people, what is called a people, of the popular classes, is no longer Catholic.  For that, 
it has been said that Spain has ceased to be Catholic.  And not now, after the Republic, 
but long before. 
 
Unamuno is making a reference here to the President of the Spanish Government Manuel 
Azaña’s speech to the Congreso de los diputados in 1931 when he famously proclaimed that 
“España ha dejado de ser católica” (“Spain has ceased to be Catholic”; “Artículos”).  Azaña 
would go on in his speech to say that “…desde el siglo pasado el catolicismo ha dejado de ser la 
expresión y el guía del pensamiento español” (“since the last century, Catholicism has ceased to 
be the expression and guide of Spanish thought”; “Artículos”).  While Azaña’s remarks may be 
politically motivated, it is notable that Unamuno, who, as I will explain, was sympathetic to 
religious beliefs, shares in the same depiction of Spain in the 1930s and that both writer and 
politician see Spain change from a Catholic nation to a more secular one well before the 
proclamation of the Second Republic. 
 The loss of or changes in belief is clearly more than a personal matter and even more than 
a Spanish concern.  Certainly his own personal struggles influenced his writings but his essays 
and fiction clearly speak to conditions affecting Spain and the rest of Europe and explore the 
condition of the modern European and not just his alone.  He directs his two most famous essays, 
Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombre y los pueblos and La agonía del cristianismo, to 
the western world in general and Spain in particular.  The former’s title speaks to the more 
universal nature of the work and the latter, written while in exile in France, treats Christianity 
and its relation to Europe and the Americas.   
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 The changes in Spanish society that I outline in the introduction and those to which 
Unamuno alludes clearly illustrate the declining importance of religion in Spanish society, but 
they do not speak to individual consciousness and how it interprets religion in a secularizing 
society.  The modernist inward turn and subsequent outward projection of Unamuno’s works 
provides a space in which individual consciousness engages with its context.  Throughout his 
works, a change in history brought about by the modernization of Spain leaves him and his 
characters questioning the absolute ideals and values to which they believed the western world 
had adhered.  In DST, Unamuno contemplates what this change means for the individual: 
Todo eso nos ha traído el Renacimiento y la Reforma, y luego la Revolución, su hija, y 
nos han traído también una nueva Inquisición: la de la ciencia o la cultura, que usa por 
armas el ridículo y el desprecio para los que no se rinden a su ortodoxia.  [...]  Hay otra 
más trágica Inquisición, y es la que un hombre moderno, culto, europeo – como lo soy, 
quiéralo o no –, lleva dentro de sí.  Hay un más terrible ridículo, y es el ridículo de uno 
ante sí mismo y para consigo.  Es mi razón, que se burla de mi fe y la desprecia. (304-05) 
All this, I say, is due to the Renaissance and the Reformation, and to what was the 
offspring of these two, the Revolution, and to them we owe also a new Inquisition, that of 
science or culture, which turns against those who refuse to submit to its orthodoxy the 
weapons of ridicule and contempt.  […] …there is another, more tragic Inquisition, and 
that is the Inquisition which modern man, the man of culture, the European – and such 
am I, whether I will or not – carries within him.  There is a more terrible ridicule, and that 
is the ridicule with which a man contemplates his own self.  It is my reason that laughs at 
my faith and despises it. (229)4 
 
Although the secularization of society does not necessarily mean a secularization of 
consciousness as sociologist of religion Peter Berger once held, it can change the conditions of 
belief as philosopher Charles Taylor posits in A Secular Age (2007).5  Taylor, like Bruce, 
maintains that secularization consists in the declining importance of religion in the function of 
                                                           
4Unless noted otherwise, all translations of DST are from J.E. Crawford Flitch.  Each translation is followed by the 
page number of the original and then the page number of the translation. 
 
5Peter Berger in The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (1967) suggests that “As there 
is a secularization of society and culture, so is there a secularization of consciousness” (108).  Martin Riesebrodt and 
Mary Ellen Konieczny in their chapter “Sociology of Religion” in The Routledge Companion to the Study of 
Religion, note that Berger no longer holds this view (151).  
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institutions and the declining importance of religious organizations but, unlike Bruce, Taylor 
suggests another sense in which secularization might be understood that considers the 
continuation of religion in a society where religious belief is just one option among many.  He 
summarizes the change in the conditions of belief that the shift to secularity implies as “the 
massive change in the whole background of belief or unbelief, that is, the passing of the earlier 
‘naïve’ framework, and the rise of our ‘reflective’ one” (14).  Understanding secularization as the 
decline in importance of religion in society and in public manifestations of religious beliefs is 
useful in Unamuno’s works in that, by “decline,” it suggests a historical change but does not 
imply the total elimination of religion.  By additionally understanding secularization as a change 
in the condition of belief, it does not have to be comprehended as a linear process that ends in the 
wholesale demise of religion.  Certainly this change in background or condition is what 
Unamuno perceives in DST as the new “more tragic Inquisition,” the one that modern man 
carries within himself.  In Unamuno’s fiction, too, the changes in the condition or context of 
belief pose problems for the characters’ consciousnesses: in AP, Apolodoro’s and Fulgencio 
Entrambosmares’ religious beliefs are problematized by science and reflective thinking; Niebla’s 
Augusto and SMBM’s Ángela, prompted by fiction, constantly reflect upon their beliefs and; 
conversely, AP’s Avito’s belief in Positivism and SMBM’s Lázaro’s “ideas progresistas” 
(“progressive ideas”) are complicated by experiences suggestive of a Christian god and reflection 
upon the tension between belief and experience.  In both essay and fiction belief is no longer 
unproblematic and unchallenged; in the changed context of their modern worlds, religious belief 
will always be subjected to secular science and art and secular beliefs will always be subjected to 
a persistent religious imagination and both believers will be forced to reflect upon their beliefs in 
relation to the other.  In other words, cultural context exercises a powerful influence on the 
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individual’s consciousness and shapes his beliefs.  This reflective thought is indeed what 
characterizes the “tragic sense of life:” “Es, pues, la filosofía también ciencia de la tragedia de la 
vida, reflexión del sentimiento trágico de ella” (“Philosophy, therefore, is also the science of the 
tragedy of life, a reflection upon the tragic sense of it”; DST 321; 241).  In this sense, DST must 
be read not as a philosophy of religion in general applicable everywhere and to all times or as a 
private struggle but rather as a modern philosophy contending with the persistence of religious 
belief against the changes in the condition of that belief.  
As is evident in AP’s Avito, science constitutes a belief system but not one that “out 
explained” Christianity. Rather, it attempted to usurp its divine authority by providing 
explanations of reality.  Throughout Unamuno’s narratives this secular understanding of 
religion’s transference to other spheres creates a double crisis: the transference of religion’s 
sacred ability to bestow meaning on the world can only account for the continuation of 
experiences suggestive of a Christian god in private life and these secular spheres of meaning 
reconstructed the dogmatism of Christianity. Furthermore, as these substitutes were considered 
higher modes of understanding in a world purportedly evolving toward some sort of progress, 
belief in a Christian god was judged “quaint” at best and “primitive” and “backwards” at worst 
(Jenkins 15).  Apparent in the quote above, it is the usual suspects that contributed to the 
supposed loss and consequent search for alternatives in Unamuno’s works: the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, and the French Revolution.  Toward the end of DST he writes: “En el cuarto de 
estos ensayos os hablé de la esencia del catolicismo.  Y a desesenciarlo, esto es, a descatolizar a 
Europa, han contribuido el Renacimiento, la Reforma y la Revolución, sustituyendo aquel ideal 
de una vida eterna ultraterrena por el ideal del progreso, de la razón, de la ciencia” (“In the fourth 
of these essays I spoke of the essence of Catholicism.  And the chief factors in de-essentializing 
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it – that is, in the de-Catholicizing Europe – have been the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the 
Revolution, which for the ideal of an eternal, ultra-terrestrial life, have substituted the ideal of 
progress, of reason, of science…”; 301; 226-27).  Out of these last three ideals, reason is the 
most problematic.  However, because Unamuno believes that reason is necessary in transmitting 
stories and making them cohere, even religious ones, it might be better said that the primacy of 
reason over anything else has been the greatest contributor to the crisis of secularization.6 
 This primacy of reason gives way to another major contributor to the supposed loss of 
religion in Spain and Europe, the Catholic Church itself.7  Unamuno criticizes the Catholic 
Church for its use of reason in its dogmas and doctrines and, in so doing, making Catholicism 
inaccessible for ordinary people.  He cites Adolf von Harnack in his criticism: 
La labor del Niceno -dice Harnack (Dogmengeschichte, II , I, cap.VII, 3)- fue un triunfo 
del sacerdocio sobre la fe del pueblo cristiano. Ya la doctrina del Logos se había hecho 
ininteligible para los no teólogos. Con la erección de la fórmula nicenocapadocia como 
confesión fundamental de la Iglesia, se hizo completamente imposible a los legos 
católicos el adquirir un conocimiento íntimo de la fe cristiana según la norma de la 
doctrina eclesiástica. Y arraigóse cada vez más la idea de que el cristianismo era la 
revelación de lo ininteligible. (qtd. in DST 93) 
The work of the Nicene Creed, says Harnack (Dogmengeschichte, ii. 1, cap. Vii. 3), was a 
victory of the priesthood over the faith of the Christian people.  The doctrine of the Logos 
had already become unintelligible to those who were not theologians.  The setting up of 
the Niceno-Cappadocian formula as the fundamental confession of the Church made it 
                                                           
6Unamuno notes using reason to tell stories in DST: “Lo que va a seguir no me ha salido de la razón, sino de la vida, 
aunque para trasmitíroslo tengo en cierto modo que racionalizarlo” (“That which follows is not the outcome of 
reason but of life, although in order that I may transmit it to you I shall have to rationalize it…”; 142; 110).  I will 
return to this in chapter four. 
 
7Jane Bennett (2001) emphasizes religion’s ironic role in secularization: “Science is not, however, the sole agent of 
disenchantment.  Religion is, oddly enough, an accomplice.  In general, modern religions have been moving away 
from magic and toward ethical strategies of salvation – in other words, away from erratic gestures and theatrical 
performances that seek to ‘coerce spirits’ and toward practices ‘systematically and unambiguously oriented to fixed 
goals of salvation.’  Such ethical religions view the world as an order responsive to rational attempts to alter and 
control it, an order that is itself rational.  Reality becomes a structure ‘governed by impersonal rules’ and inhabited 
by humans with ‘the desire as well as the capacity’ for its rational mastery” (61).  Martin Riesebrodt and Mary Ellen 
Konieczny also highlight the same in Max Weber’s thought: “The Western rationalization processes set in motion 
by this religiously motivated ethos contributed to the disenchantment of the world by rejecting all irrational means 
of attaining salvation, and promoted the emergence of rationally organized institutional orders and ethics.” (149). 




perfectly impossible for the Catholic laity to get an inner comprehension of the Christian 
Faith, taking as their guide the form in which it was presented in the doctrine of the 
Church.  The idea became more and more deeply implanted in men’s minds that 
Christianity was the revelation of the unintelligible. (75) 
 
Through this rationalization of faith, religion becomes distant; it is no longer within the reach of 
the common parishioner.  This rationalization also contributed to the further distancing of 
religion from everyday life by making the faithful rely on clergy for the “appropriate” 
understanding of what religion was and, by rationalizing faith, the magicians stripped themselves 
of the magic their followers required of them to communicate with the divine. 
 Unamuno treats this “elimination of magic” in chapters four, “La esencia del 
catolicismo” (“The Essence of Catholicism”) and eight, “De Dios a Dios” (“From God to God”), 
in DST and the retreat of religion assumes of very familiar form.8  In both chapters he traces the 
evolution of Christianity from polytheism, when “[l]os dioses no sólo se mezclaban entre los 
hombres, sino que se mezclaban con ellos” (“…gods not only mixed among men but intermixed 
with them”; 137; 132) to the one Hebrew god outside the world and eventually to a rationalized 
god that evaporated into idea.  The consequences of the rationalization of religion ultimately 
would end in fewer and fewer adherents.  As the Church tried to rationalize its practices and 
beliefs, it caused more contradictions and confusion for the believer.  The example of 
transubstantiation makes this clear: “No basta creer que al tomar la hostia consagrada se toma el 
cuerpo y sangre de Nuestro Señor Jesucristo; hay que pasar por todo eso de la 
transustanciación…” (“It is not enough to believe that in receiving the consecrated Host we 
receive the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ; we must needs negotiate all those 
                                                           
8Max Weber similarly traces a development in religious history that eliminated magic in Protestantism: “The great 
historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of magic from the world which had begun with the 
old Hebrew prophets and in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical means to 




difficulties of transubstantiation…”; DST 92-93; 75).9  Unamuno later points to how this 
rationalization in Catholic dogma causes skeptics and eventually atheists: “Exígeseles que crean 
o todo o nada, que acepten la entera totalidad de la dogmática o que se pierda todo mérito si se 
rechaza la mínima parte de ella” (“It demands from them that they shall believe all or nothing, 
that they shall accept the complete totality of dogma or they shall forfeit all merit if the least part 
of it be rejected”) and the result of which is passing from “rechazar el papismo al absoluto 
ateísmo…” (“ rejecting Popery to absolute atheism…”; DST 95; 76). The danger here is that, for 
the believer, there no longer exists any means to salvation.  The Reformation and the 
Renaissance seemed to push god further outside of the world to make room for reason and any 
attempt to reconcile the two resulted in contradiction and confusion.  The epistemological 
consequence for the individual was that the only tool available, reason, for understanding god’s 
reality further distanced her from that reality.  
 Weber explored the Reformation’s elimination of magic as a means to divinity and its 
role in the tale of disenchantment in Protestantism but, can the same be said to have affected 
Spain as a historically Catholic nation?  Unamuno’s view of Spain’s relation to the rest of 
Europe takes on some curious forms throughout his writings but the comparisons and contrasts 
he makes between country and continent reveal another crisis engendered by the changing 
background of belief.  In his early works, he calls for an Europeanization of Spain and later a 
Spanishization of Europe.  For example, in En torno al casticismo (1895), he writes, “Tenemos 
que europeizarnos y chapuzarnos en pueblo” (“We have to Europeanize ourselves and immerse 
                                                           
9It is interesting to note here that, where Unamuno sees an elimination of magic in transubstantiation, Weber sees 
the doctrine as a very much a sign of magic: “The rationalization of the world, the elimination of magic as a means 
to salvation, the Catholics had not carried so far as the Puritans (and before them the Jews) had done….  The 
[Catholic] priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation, and who held the key to eternal 




ourselves in the people”; 265) and, later in DST, he criticizes Joaquín Costa for demanding the 
same (310).10   In DST, sometimes he appears to be writing about a quintessential Spanish 
philosophy in his interpretation of Don Quixote and yet calls is it “la tragicomedia europea 
contemporánea” (“the contemporary European tragi-comedy”; 300; 226).  Sometimes Spain 
serves as the antithesis to the Renaissance, Reformation, and French Revolution in a dialectic 
with Europe and sometimes it is a major contributor to all three.  In DST, the Counterreformation 
serves to temper the Reformation: “Sin la Contra-Reforma no habría la Reforma seguido el curso 
que siguió; sin aquélla, acaso ésta, falta de sostén del pietismo, habría perecido en la ramplona 
racionalidad de la Aufklaerung, de la ilustración” (“Without the Counter-Reformation, the 
Reformation would not have followed the course that it did; without the Counter-Reformation, 
perhaps the Reformation, lacking the support of pietism, would have perished under the vulgar 
rationality of the Aufklärung, of the Enlightenment”; my trans.; 309).  Later, during the Second 
Republic, Unamuno claims that the Counterreformation was in itself a Reformation:  
Más de una vez se ha suscitado la vana cuestión de si en España hubo o no Renacimiento, 
si hubo o no en ella Reforma, como si España hubiese vivido o hubiese podido vivir 
separada espiritualmente de Europa.  …en cuanto a Reforma lo que se ha llamado la 
Contra-Reforma…, ¿qué fue sino la otra cara de la Reforma, su complemento dialéctico? 
(“El liberalismo español” 161-62) 
More than once the vain question has arisen of whether there was or not a Renaissance in 
Spain, whether or not there was Reformation in Spain, as if Spain had lived or could live 
spiritually separated from Europe.  …as far as the Reformation there was what has been 
called the Counter Reformation…, what was that if not the other side of the Reformation, 
its dialectical complement? (“Spanish Liberalism”) 
                                                           
10In En torno al casticismo (1895), Unamuno is consistently clear that Spain’s future depends on its 
Europeanization: “¿Está todo moribundo? No, el porvenir de la sociedad española espera dentro de nuestra sociedad 
histórica, en la intra-historia, en el pueblo desconocido, y no surgirá potente hasta que le despierten vientos ó 
ventarrones del ambiente europeo” and later “España está por descubrir, Y sólo la descubrirán españoles 
europeizados” (“Is everything dying?  No, the future of Spanish socity is waiting within our historical socity, in the 
intra-history, in the unknown people, and it will not emerge powerful until winds or breezes from Europe awaken 
it”) and later (“Spain is still to be discovered”; 263).  Four years later in “De la enseñanza superior en España” (“On 
Higher Education in Spain”) (1899), Unamuno writes that Spain should “europeizarse” (“Europeanize itself”) and 
“intraespañolizarse” (“intra-Spanishize itself”; O.C. 3: 97-98).  With “intraespañolizarse” (“intra-Spanishize itself) it 





Sometimes he states that all three took on different forms in Spain and that Spain herself led the 
charge in liberalism.  In “El liberalismo español” he cites Cervantes as an example of the 
Renaissance in Spain, Juan de Valdés as an example of the Reformation, and Spanish guerillas of 
the War of Spanish Independence as an example of their own Revolution.11  He continues that 
liberalism as Europe knew it was given birth at the Cortes de Cádiz in the Constitution of 1812.12 
 These contradictions in Unamuno’s essays reveal an opposition to dogmatism and 
fanaticism and a questioning of any metaphysical system claiming to be the sole bearer of truth.  
The Renaissance, Reformation, and Revolution were not dangers in themselves.  In fact, 
Unamuno views them rather positively at times in that they opened up science, religion, art, and 
politics to free examination but, brought to their extremes, they represented a dogmatism of 
reason, progress and science that silenced questioning and dismissed claims to truth by any other 
measures including, and especially, those of religion.   
The parallel that Unamuno tries to establish by equating the “nueva Inquisición” and the 
Spanish Inquisition, during which the Catholic Church demanded an unquestioning faith of its 
parishioners and dogmatically claimed to be the only truth, underscores the former’s equally 
tyrannical demands and creeds.  The crisis of secularization as the substitution of one system of 
metaphysical thought for another presents a danger for the free-thinking European.  In 
                                                           
11In addition to Juan de Valdés, Unamuno believes that “nuestros místicos españoles del siglo XVI preludiaron una 
verdadera Reforma española, indígena y propia, que fue ahogada en germen luego por la Inquisición” (“our Spanish 
mystics from the 16th century ushered in a true Spanish Reformation, indigenous and our own, that was drowned 
from the beginning by the Inquisition”; O.C. 4: 847). 
 
12The Constitution of 1812 was widely held as liberal for the time.  While it established the sovereignty of the 
nation, a constitutional monarchy, and a division of powers, it remained conservative in terms of religion.  Title II, 
Chapter II, Article 12 states: “La religión de la Nación española es y será perpetuamente la católica, apostólica, 
romana, única verdadera. La Nación la protege por leyes sabias y justas, y prohíbe el ejercicio de cualquiera otra” 
(“The religion of the Spanish Nation is and will be perpetually the Catholic Apostolic Roman and only true faith.  
The Nation protects it with wise and just laws and prohibits the practice of any other”; Constituciones). 
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Unamuno’s essays, liberalism serves as an answer to the dogmatic thinking of both Christianity 
and the new inquisitors.  In En torno al casticismo, he calls for an Europeanization of Spain to 
wake up its inner “pueblo,” which he goes on to describe as liberal and individualistic.  In this 
early essay he underscores how the cultural context produced by the fanaticism of the Inquistion 
contributed to the stagnation of Spain’s collective consciousness: “…la miseria mental de España 
arranca del aislamiento en que nos puso toda una conducta cifrada en el proteccionismo 
inquisitorial que ahogó en su cuna la Reforma castiza é impidió la entrada á la europea” (“…the 
mental misery of Spain originates from the isolation that was put upon us by a behavior codified 
in inquisitorial protectionism that drowned the Spanish Reformation in its infancy and prevented 
entrance into the European Reformation”; 268).  By “Europeanizing” Spain he hopes that the 
free examination of religion realized in the rest of Europe would awaken its own latent yet 
present “castiza” Reformation to throw off the residual shackles of the fanaticism and dogmatism 
of the Inquisition.  In DST, Unamuno alludes to this and defines very simply what it means to be 
“liberal”: “El verdadero pecado…es el pecado de herejía, el de pensar por cuenta propia.  Ya se 
ha oído aquí, en nuestra España, que ser liberal, esto es, hereje, es peor que ser asesino, ladrón o 
adúltero” (“The real sin…is the sin of heresy, the sin of thinking for oneself.  The saying has 
been Heard before now, here in Spain, that to be a liberal – that is, a heretic – is worse than being 
an assassin, a thief, or an adulterer”; 89; 72-72).  In “El liberalismo español” (“Spanish 
Liberalism”), published nineteen years after DST, we get a better idea of what Unamuno means 
by “liberalism” as he praises the freedom that the kind of thinking the Renaissance, Reformation, 
and Revolution brought to Europe: “…la religión de la libertad es lo que llamamos el 
liberalismo, aquél que, según nuestro Sardá y Salvany y los jesuitas que le jalearon, es pecado, es 
el gran pecado moderno, la síntesis de todas las herejías surgidas del libre examen del 
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Renacimiento, el erasmiano, y de la Reforma, el luterano” (“…the religion of liberty is what we 
call liberalism, that which, according to our Sardá y Salvany and the Jesuits who cheered him on, 
is a sin, it is the great modern sin, the synthesis of all heresies that emerged from the free 
examination of the Renaissance, the Erasmian, and the Reformation, the Lutheran”; 160).  The 
back and forth between Spain and the rest of Europe in Unamuno’s works provides insights 
about the change or changing background of belief.  First, it is clear that Spain was undergoing 
the same changes as the rest of Europe, albeit unevenly.  Second, he was not hostile to the 
historical events and movements that promoted independent and free thinking.  Despite affecting 
the individual’s consciousness “agonically” and “tragically,” this change in the background of 
belief is a welcomed condition.  Third, his appeal to liberalism as characteristically Spanish, 
sometimes latent and sometimes inventive, seems to respond to the fragmentation of social life 
of the secular script.  It simultaneously allows for the individual’s free-thinking yet this very 
characteristic of the individual unites her to the fellow citizens of Spain.  Finally, dogmatism, 
again, is the real crisis. 
 “La fe del carbonero” (“The coal-heaver’s faith”), throughout Unamuno’s essays serves 
in contrast to liberalism and as a trope to criticize the blind acceptance of dogmatic thinking.  He 
refers to it as “fe vacía” (“empty faith”; 225) in En torno al casticismo in 1895 and, in 1936, the 
year of his death, he clarifies for his readers what this means:13 
…fe implícita es la de aquel que profesa creer, por obediencia y no por convicción, lo que 
otro le enseña y aun sin entenderlo.  Y se le llama del carbonero por aquella fábula – o lo 
que sea – de un carbonero, que al preguntarle qué era lo que creía, respondió: “Lo que 
                                                           
13Apparently, some of Unamuno’s readers asked him to explain what he meant by this. In “Hinchar cocos” 
(“Exaggerating Boogeymen”) he responds with an explanation of the origin of the expression “fe del carbonero:” 
“Ahora se me vienen unos lectores circunstanciales – no de mis habituales, de los míos – con la embajada de que les 
exponga qué es eso de la fe implícita o del carbonero y todo lo que con ello vengo relacionando” (“And some 
circumstantial readers come to me – not my usual ones, the ones that are mine – with the charge that I explain to 




cree y enseña nuestra Santa Madre la Iglesia.”  Y al preguntarle: “¿Y qué es lo que cree la 
Iglesia?”, replicó: “Lo que creo yo.” (O.C. 16: 941)14 
…implicit faith is that which one professes to believe, because of obedience and not 
because of conviction, what another teaches him without understanding it.  And it is 
called “the coal-heaver’s” because of that fable – or whatever it is – about a coal-heaver, 
who, upon being questioned about what he believed, responded: “What the Holy Mother 
Church believes and teaches.”  And, upon being questioned: “And what is it that the 
Church believes?”, he replied: “What I believe.” 
 
Although the expression is most often used to condemn the blind adherence to Church teachings, 
especially the Jesuits and their vow of obedience, Unamuno employs it to criticize absolute 
devotion to the supposed secular substitutions of religion.  As with the parallel between the old 
and new inquisitions, “la fe del carbonero” serves to illustrate the absence of free thinking in 
both the uncritically religious and the unreflective cientifista (“scientifist”).15   
Unamuno is engaging in larger conversations happening in Europe about religion and its 
supposed secular substitutes through his parody of cientifismo (“scientificism”) in AP and 
throughout DST.  These conversations about religious transference in themselves are already 
rather secular treatments of what religion was thought to be.  Religion, rather than being a system 
                                                           
14As I mention in the body of this dissertation, Unamuno uses this expression often in his essays.  It appears in the 
following: En torno al casticismo (225); “La leyenda del eclipse” (O.C. 10: 86); “Sobre el fulanismo” (O.C. 3: 644); 
“La fe” (O.C. 16: 105); “Los naturales y los espirituales” (O.C. 3: 835); “Los maestros de escuela” (O.C. 8: 398); 
“Educación e instrucción” (O.C. 9: 952); “A los cabreros y no a los carboneros” (O.C. 10: 932); “Las animas en 
pena” (O.C. 16: 879); “Eso no es revolución” (O.C. 11: 679); “Enseñanza religiosa laica” (O.C. 16: 904); “Pedreas 
infantiles de antaño” (O.C. 10: 1050-51); “Hinchar cocos” (O.C. 16: 941) and; “Abolengo liberal” (O.C. 10: 1053). 
Although he reproaches his readers in “Hinchar cocos” (“Exaggerating Boogeymen”) for not consulting an 
encyclopedia, the expression does not seem as common as Unamuno might have thought it was.  The entry for Fides 
carbonāria, in A Dictionary of Latin and Greek: Quotations, Proverbs, Maxims and Mottos (1909) states the 
following: “‘The coal-heaver’s faith,’ or ‘belief.’  A comparatively modern expression, said to have originated in the 
following circumstance: A coal-porter, being asked what he believe, made answer, ‘What the Church believes;’ and 
on being asked what the Church believed, replied, ‘What I believe.’  According to some of the French authorities, it 
means, ‘A simple, blind, unreasoning faith’” (514).   
 
15Unamuno’s criticism of the Jesuits in AC serves as an example: “Su doctrina de la obediencia pasiva, de los tres 
grados de obediencia, tal como la expuso Íñigo de Loyola en su célebre carta a los Padres y Hermanos de Portugal, 
es una doctrina anticristiana, y en el fondo, anticivil.  Con ese género de obediencia, la civilización se haría 
imposible.  Y se haría imposible el progreso” (“Their doctrine of passive obedience, of the three degrees of 
obedience, as Ignatius of Loyola explained in his famous letter to the Fathers and Brothers of Portugal, is anti-
Christian, and at bottom, anti-civil.  With this kind of obedience, civilization would be impossible.  Progress would 
be impossible”; 90-91). 
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of beliefs and practices predicated on something revealed and recorded in scripture, is treated as 
a psychological, anthropological, or sociological need (Pecora 22).  We see the idea of 
transference in the rant of Nietzsche’s madman.  In addition to epitomizing the tale of 
disenchantment by proclaiming the death of god at our hands, he asks a series of critical 
questions: 
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun?  Whither is it moving 
now?  Whither are we moving?  Away from all suns?  Are we not plunging continually?  
Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions?  Is there still any up or down?  Are we 
not straying as through an infinite nothing?...  How shall we comfort ourselves, the 
murderers of all murderers?...  What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we 
have to invent? (Gay Science 224) 
 
His first several questions summarize the crisis of meaning at the turn of the century that the 
supposed death of god implied: how does modern man orient himself without the metaphysical 
certainty that Christianity gave him?  The last two questions suggest that, in a search for this 
orientation, man will need a guiding principle and something to fill the god-shaped hole. 
 The exploration of different phenomena that were held to either be the next religion or at 
least be the recipient of what was transferred over structures much of DST.  Almost as if 
checking off a list of substitutes, Unamuno addresses art, philosophy, science, and metaphysics 
in general.  In doing so, through points of comparison, he questions the compartmentalization of 
life into different and competing spheres of the secular script. 
 One prevailing idea at the turn of the century that religion might be replaced by 
something else was that of art.  Poet Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) wrote, “…most of what now 
passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry” (6) signaling in 1880 a 
substitution thesis with art in its broadest sense.  What is implicit in such a thesis is that art is its 
own autonomous sphere, something Unamuno rejects outright.  He states, “Y han hecho del arte 
una religión y un remedio para el mal metafísico, y han inventado la monserga del arte por el 
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arte.  Y no les basta” (“And they have made a religion of art, a cure for the metaphysical evil, 
and invented the meaningless phrase of art for art’s sake.  And it does not suffice them”; DST 70: 
59).  He goes on to say that art, even “art for art’s sake,” is a vain attempt to achieve some sort of 
immortality through the subsistence of the work.  Art, as an autonomous sphere of life and as a 
substitution, fails because it very much forms part of the Christian desire for immortality for 
Unamuno.  Furthermore, “art for art’s sake” can never truly exist as its production is still tied to 
the reality of the time, even if it is only a rejection of the time itself.16  He continues to develop 
how art forms part of religion: “En el arte, en efecto, buscamos un remedo de eternización.  Si en 
lo bello se aquieta un momento el espíritu, y descansa y se alivia, ya que no se le cure la congoja, 
es por ser lo bello revelación de lo eterno, de lo divino de las cosas…” (“We seek in art an image 
of eternalization.  If for a brief moment our spirit finds peace and rest and assuagement in the 
contemplation of the beautiful, even though it finds therein no real cure for its distress, it is 
because the beautiful is the revelation of the eternal, of the divine in things…”; DST 213; 161).  
Rather quickly Unamuno rejects art as an autonomous phenomenon and possible substitution for 
religion and thus questions the compartmentalization of the secular script.  
This cursory treatment of art as something that is created within the realm of religion has 
a sort of ripple effect on how Unamuno treats other phenomena.  Philosophy and metaphysics, 
for example, are more like poetry than anything else in Unamuno’s essay.  “Cúmplenos decir, 
ante todo, que la filosofía se acuesta más a la poesía que no a la ciencia” (“It behoves us to say, 
before all, that philosophy lies closer to poetry than to science”; 22; 25) and later, “…poeta y 
                                                           
16Unamuno seems to be taking aim at modernist poetry in particular here.  Lewis similarly holds that “[d]espite the 
more radical experiments of the literary avant-garde, however, literature in general clung stubbornly to reality.  
Although writers might stress the importance of the sounds of words or the visual organization of words on the page, 





filósofo son hermanos gemelos, si es que no la misma cosa…” (“…poet and philosopher are twin 
brothers, if not even one and the same…”; 27; 29).  He rejects philosophy as an autonomous 
sphere on the same grounds as he rejects “art for art’s sake;” they are always some sort of means 
to an end.  He asks, “…¿para qué se filosofa?, es decir, ¿para qué se investiga los primeros 
principios y los fines últimos de las cosas?  ¿Para qué se busca la verdad desinteresada?” (“And 
now, why does man philosophize? – that is to say, why does he investigate the first causes and 
ultimate ends of things?  Why does he seeks the disinterested truth?”; 47-48; 43) and maintains 
that “[e]n el punto de partida, en el verdadero punto de partida, el práctico, no el teórico, de toda 
filosofía, hay un para qué” (“[i]n the starting-point of all philosophy, in the real starting-point, 
the practical not the theoretical, there is a wherefore”; 49; 44).  Finally, referencing Shadworth 
H. Hodgson’s Time and Space, a Metaphysical Essay (1865), he quotes, “La metafísica no es, 
propiamente hablando, una ciencia, sino una filosofía; esto es, una ciencia cuyo fin está en sí 
misma…” (“Metaphysics is, properly speaking, not a science but a philosophy – that is, it is a 
science whose end is in itself”; 49; 44) and questions the Englishman’s logic believing that any 
metaphysics is predicated on a “¿para qué?” (“for what?”).  Unamuno works commutatively in 
dismissing philosophy and metaphysics as autonomous spheres separate from what he thinks is 
religion: metaphysics is philosophy, philosophy is poetry, and poetry, as an art form, seeks an 
answer to a “¿para qué?”  Positioning art within religion’s domain allows him to bring these 
other supposed substitutions under the term “religion” and again questions the fragmentation of 
life according to the narratives of secularization. 
Another substitution theory at the turn of the century was that science would replace 
religion with Max Weber’s “Science of Vocation” exemplifying this strain of thought.  Weber 
held that the intellectualization and rationalization of science meant “that principally there are no 
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mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master 
all things by calculation” (Essays 139).17  This view of science is problematic for Unamuno 
because it already makes an absolute claim about the nature of reality; it is calculable.  For 
Unamuno, “true science” is a method: “[L]a verdadera ciencia, la ciencia investigativa, escéptica 
en el sentido primitivo y directo de este término, que no camina a una solución ya prevista ni 
procede sino a ensayar una hipótesis” (“true science, investigative science, skeptical in the 
primitive and direct sense of this term, that which does not head toward an already expected 
solution or procede to do anything but to test out a hypothesis”; my trans.; DST 109).  Science in 
this sense is wholly positive because it serves as a means of questioning.  Unamuno’s 
juxtaposition of science to dogma, which he equates with “advocacy,” illustrates this: “La 
verdadera ciencia enseña, ante todo, a dudar y a ignorar; la abogacía ni duda ni cree que ignora” 
(“True science teaches, above all, to doubt and to be ignorant; advocacy neither doubts nor 
believes that it does not know”; DST 110; 88).18  But science, rather than a means of questioning 
claims to truth about reality turns into a metaphysical end that sought to explain the world only 
in rational, “scientific” terms.  Once science changed, it developed a converse relationship with 
religion; where religion waned, science waxed.  Unamuno laments, 
Y en la segunda mitad del pasado siglo XIX, época infilosófica y tecnicista, dominada 
por especialismo miope y por el materialismo histórico, ese ideal se tradujo en una obra, 
no ya de vulgarización, sino de avulgaramiento científico – o más bien seudocientífico – 
                                                           
17This is part of Weber’s explanation of what he means by intellectualization and rationalization: “Let us clarify 
what this intellectualist rationalization, created by science and by scientifically oriented technology, means 
practically” (Essays 139).  He will go on to say, “This means the world is disenchanted” (Essays 139).   
 
18“La teología parte del dogma, y el dogma, δογμα, en su sentido primitivo y más directo, significa decreto, algo 
como el latín placticum, lo que ha parecido que debe ser ley a la autoridad legislativa.  De este concepto jurídico 
parte la teología.  Para el teólogo, como para el abogado, el dogma, la ley, es algo dado, un punto de partida que no 
se discute sino en cuanto a su aplicación y a su más recto sentido” (“Theology proceeds from dogma, and dogma, 
δογμα, in its primitive and most direct sense, signifies a decree, something akin to the Latin placticum, that which 
has seemed to the legislative authority fitting to be law.  This juridical concept is the starting-point of theology.  For 
the theologian, as for the advocate, dogma, law, is something given – a starting-point which admits of discussion 
only in respect of its application and its most exact interpretation”; DST 109; 87). 
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que se desahogaba en democráticas bibliotecas baratas y sectarias.  Quería así 
popularizarse la ciencia como si hubiese de ser ésta la que haya de bajar al pueblo y 
servir sus pasiones, y no el pueblo el que debe subir a ella y por ella más arriba aún, a 
nuevos y más profundos anhelos. (DST 301) 
And in the second half of the 19th century, an age essentially unphilosophical and 
technical, dominated by a myopic specialism and by historical materialism, this ideal 
took practical form, not so much in the popularization as in the vulgarization of science – 
or, rather, of pseudo-science – venting itself in a flood of cheap, popular, and 
progagandist literature.  Science sought to popularize itself as if it were its function to 
come down to people and subserve their passions, and not the duty of the people to rise to 
science and through science to rise to higher heights, to new and profounder aspirations. 
(227) 
 
Science transforms from a method to an abstract ideal and, for Unamuno, reaches it most 
divinized form in Positivism which poses the same crisis as rationalized religion: dogma and 
unquestioning adherents to what it purports as truth. 
 In his case for religion as a means, but not the only means, to create truths, Unamuno 
attacks his cientifista and political adversaries with a charge of tu quoque, or “you, too!”  
Barbara Herrnstein Smith explores the use of this rhetorical device in disagreements among 
believers and non-believers: “…the local priest may accuse the local atheist – just as the atheist 
accuses religionists – of mindless conformity to received ideas” (22).  While often used to avoid 
discussion, Unamuno employs the device effectively to call attention to the similarities between 
a traditional religious system and that of a “religionized” science or “divinized” state.  Nine years 
before the publication of DST, he writes a small essay titled, “Intelectualidad y espiritualidad” 
(“Intellectuality and Spirituality”) (1904), in which an unnamed man sits contemplating in a state 
of “dispersión espiritual” (“spiritual distraction”).  Eventually he has a spiritual awakening and 
feels penetrated by the world around him and remarks, “Pero esto son metáforas, nada más que 
metáforas…. ¿Metáforas? Y ¿qué no es metáfora?  La ciencia se construye con lenguaje, y el 
lenguaje es esencialmente metafórico….  Cuando los que se tienen por positivistas tratan de 
barrer las metáforas de la ciencia, bárrenlas con escoba metafórica, y vuelven a llenarla de 
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metáforas” (But these are metaphors, nothing more than metaphors….  Metaphors?  And what is 
not metaphor?  Science is constructed with language and language is essentially metaphorical....  
When those who take themselves as Positivists try to sweep away metaphors from science, the 
sweep them away with a metaphorical broom and come back to fill the space with metaphors”; 
O.C. 3: 707-08).  He will go on to charge both Herbert Spencer and Nietzsche and their First 
Principles (1862) and theory of eternal recurrence respectively with tu quoque calling their 
language more mythological than the creative action of god.  Language, in Unamuno’s works, 
plays a central role as a point of comparison between religious myth and secular narrative, a 
subject on which I will elaborate in chapter four.  Here, I will refer to Longhurst who 
summarizes the utility and inefficiency of language: “Language, as Unamuno repeatedly 
declared, both helps us to formulate our thoughts and gets in the way of revealing them.  For 
language has the capacity to create its own reality.  It is not a consequence of some pre-existing 
reality but rather constitutes its own reality” (Theory 102).  Language is the same 
epistemological tool, and an unreliable one, in creating both scientific and religious accounts of 
the world. 
 Unamuno takes tu quoque a step further and levels it at political systems.  He applies “la 
fe del carbonero” to both the religiously devout and the fanatically political as a “you too!” 
calling attention to the hypocrisy of both.  In the prologue to the Spanish edition of Historia de la 
guerra (History of War) (1915), by Gabriel Hanotaux, Unamuno bemoans the unquestioning 
obedience of Germans to the state: 
Es cosa tristísima que hijos de Alemania, la patria de Martín Lutero, del que combatió a 
todo ahinco la fe implícita de la Iglesia Romana, la fe del carbonero, la que dice: “Creo lo 
que cree y enseña nuestra Santa Madre la Iglesia Católica, Apostólica, Romana”, aun sin 
saber lo que esta Iglesia cree y enseña, hayan hecho confesión de fe en el Estado, 
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declarando: “Creo y afirmo lo que cree y afirma el Sacro Imperio Germánico”.  ¡Y éstos 
son los hijos del libre examen! (O.C. 7: 347)19 
It is an extremely sad thing that the children of Germany, the homeland of Martin Luther, 
who, with full effort, fought the implicit faith of the Roman Catholic Church, the faith of 
the coal-heaver, the one that says: “I believe what the our Holy Mother, the Roman 
Apostolic Catholic Church believes and teaches,” even without knowing what the Church 
believes and teaches, they have made a confession of faith in the State, declaring: “I 
believe and affirm what the Holy Germanic Empire believes and affirms.”  And these 
people are children of free thought! 
 
By drawing parallels between Christianity and its supposed secular substitutes, the crisis of 
secularization again becomes evident: new creeds, whether political or scientific, merely 
reproduce a tyranny of thought that these new systems sought to overcome by “liberating” 
Europe from the illusions of religion. 
 Through points of comparison between religion and its supposed secular substitutes and 
accusing their espousers of being guilty of the very thing they criticized religion for, Unamuno is 
able to isolate what he believes the essence of religion to be. After ticking off one by one the 
failed substitutes, he can finally arrive at what religion can do that science cannot: “…la ciencia 
no satisface nuestras necesidades afectivas…” (“…science does not satisfy the needs of our 
heart…”; DST 120; 95). Religion, then, is reduced to “the affective” and feeling and experience 
become the core of all that Unamuno deems religious.  Even though manifestations of artistic 
expression, science, and politics might fall under “religion” for Unamuno and, in this view, 
                                                           
19Later, in an essay titled, “Sentido histórico” (“Historic Sense”) (1936), the comparisons become more explicit as 
Spain is about to enter into civil war.  Again, it is rigid dogmatic thinking at which Unamuno takes aim: “El 
socialismo que deja de ser cátedra para hacerse de plazuela y de partido no es ya una doctrina ni una fe en ella, sino 
que es una iglesia con su disciplina.  ¡Y cómo se parece su historia a la historia de las primitivas comunidades 
cristianas que dieron origen a la Iglesia Cristiana y a la Católica!  ¡Las mismas legomaquias, la misma mística, la 
misma liturgia!  La misma en el fondo de su forma, ya que la forma tiene fondo.  El mismo horror a la herejía y a la 
crítica y al escepticismo y al libre examen” (“The socialism that ceases to be from the pulpit and that becomes 
something of the streets and of a political party is no longer a doctrine nor faith in a doctrine but rather a church with 
its discipline.  And how similar its history is to that of primitive Christian communities that gave the Christian and 
Catholic Church its origin! The same disputes over words, the same mysticism, the same litugy!  The same form at 






question the compartmentalization of the secular script, what he deems religious is informed by 
this script more than he might like to admit.  Although I will maintain that Unamuno’s narratives 
about experience have the power to enchant and that they blur the lines between the private and 
the social, his locating the essence of religion in experience is conditioned by a secular change in 
the background of belief.  Anne Taves writes that liberal and modernist thinkers in the 19th and 
20th centuries “turned to the concept of religious experience as a source of theological authority 
at a time when claims based on other sources of authority – ecclesiastical, doctrinal, and biblical 
– were increasingly subject to historical critique” (Experience 3-4).  As the Catholic Church’s 
authority came under attack much in the same way Unamuno criticizes it in DST, experience 
came to be a way of still being religious and the authority of that experience became subjective.20  
Religion, then, seems to become a private matter and the community that once shared beliefs and 
appealed to an institution for its legitimization seems to fall apart.21 
 The structure of the novels I treat in this dissertation revolve around experiences deemed 
religious and their interplay with secular substitutions.  The most salient example of this 
interplay between secular substitutes and experience is found in AP.  Avito Carrascal, the 
                                                           
20In addition to the examples above about the rationalization of Catholicism, Unamuno writes in chapter three of 
DST, “El hambre de inmortalidad” (“The Hunger of Immortality”), “Esa sed de vida eternal apáganla muchos, los 
sencillos sobre todo, en la Fuente de la fe religiosa, pero no a todos es dado beber de ella.  La institución cuyo fin 
primordial es proteger esa fe en la inmortalidad personal del alma es el catolicismo; pero el catolicismo ha querido 
racionalizar esa fe haciendo de religión teología…” (“This thirst for eternal life is appeased by many, especially by 
the simple, at the fountain of religious faith; but to drink of this is not given to all.  The institution whose primordial 
end is to protect this faith in the personal immortality of the soul is Catholicism; but Catholicism has sought to 
rationalize this faith by converting religion into theology…”; 75; 63). 
 
21Steve Bruce highlights the variety of religious beliefs in secularization and holds that, in the face of this variety, 
the believer “confines one’s faith to a particular compartment of social life” and continues that “[w]ith the 
compartmentalization comes privatization – the sense that the reach of religion is shortened to just those who accept 
the teachings of this or that faith” (342).  Richard King (1999) points to the Enlightenment as the beginning of the 
privatization of religion: “…the consequences of the Enlightenment dichotomy between public and private has been 
not only the delegitimization of institutional religion (i.e. religion as a social and political phenomenon) but also the 
increasing tendency to locate religion within the private sphere, thereby separating or excluding it from the realm of 




protagonist, rejects religion and all of its manifestations yet, even as the positivist par excellence, 
he still cannot rid himself of metaphorical language and the use of symbols in the worship of his 
science.  After bringing his son Apolodoro home for the first time, the narrator gives a 
description of the “microcosmo racional” that is Avito’s house: “Y hay en ella su altar, su rastro 
de culto, hay un ladrillo en que está grabada la palabra ciencia, y sobre él una ruedecita montada 
sobre su eje, toda la parte que a lo simbólico, es decir, a lo religioso, como él dice, concede don 
Avito” (“And it has its own altar, its vestige of devotion, and a tile on which the word Science is 
engraved, and over it a small wheel mounted on its axis; as Don Avito says, it’s the only 
concession that he makes to the symbolic, which is to say the religious, side of things”; AP 62; 
39).22  As the novel progresses, Avito’s faith in science allows him to move about his world and 
explain it rationally more or less effectively despite some compromises with his Catholic wife, 
Marina.  It is not until the end that Avito’s experience in uniting with his wife in common 
suffering at the death of their son does he turn to religion.  As in DST, science cannot explain this 
experience and it is placed properly within the domain of religion.   
 Niebla provides another example of isolating experience and science’s inadequacy to 
explain it.  The protagonist, Augusto Pérez, falls in love with Eugenia and immediately attributes 
this experience to divine intervention but, as he rationally contemplates the experience 
throughout the novel he becomes confused, again illustrating how context shapes belief.  In one 
parodic vignette in the story he decides to visit Antolín S. Paparrígopulos, researcher and 
specialist in “la psicología femenina” (“feminine psychology”) to try to understand his 
experience.  Antolín’s “scientific” starting point is whether or not women have souls and 
Augusto comes to find out that Antolín, because of his shyness, has never had a relationship with 
                                                           
22Unless noted otherwise, all translations of AP are from Michael Vande Berg. 
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a woman and has only studied them in books.  The parody elucidates why in DST Unamuno 
rejects the notion of a divinized science.  Anotlín’s method becomes his metaphysical system for 
understanding the world; although he knows nothing about the experience of having a 
relationship, his system allows him to explain this reality in principle.  Unamuno’s use of satire 
in Niebla again points to experience as that which only religion can serve to explain. 
Possibilities 
 Thus far in this chapter I have presented secularization as a crisis to which Unamuno 
responds in different ways; he questions the compartmentalization of life that underlies the idea 
of the transference of religion by drawing parallels between these supposed spheres and 
endeavors to show that the substitutes for religion merely dressed religious dogmatism in secular 
clothes.  However, the secular crisis characterized by Nietzsche’s madman’s series of questions 
about what will replace god now that we have killed him paradoxically presents possibilities for 
the continuation of religion in Unamuno’s works.  The claim that god was dead, heralding in the 
loss of religion, does bring with it a crisis of meaning in Unamuno’s works but it also ushers in a 
freedom to make meaning in other ways and opens up the world to different interpretations, 
including religious ones.  What Unamuno knew and what Gianni Vattimo (2005) has explicitly 
stated is that Nietzsche’s “There are no facts, only interpretations” “too is ‘only’ an 
interpretation” (Future 43).  If the world has indeed broken its tether to the sun and nothing is 
anchored to a fixed horizon, all meaning is not lost.  It may mean the opportunity to search for 
new anchors, revisit old ones and even the scary prospect of embracing the drift itself.  In 
Unamuno’s works this freedom to create new meaning and negotiate and adjust old ones too lies 
in interpretation.   
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Unamuno does not advocate for a return to the metaphysical certainty of a medieval 
Christianity nor does he attempt to supplant any metaphysical system with yet another strain of 
thought.  To do so would simply be another form of dogmatic expression and suppress the free 
examination of truth claims of the liberalism he so fervently supported.  Any new system would 
merely recreate the tyranny of thought that it was supposed to eliminate.  Unamuno, however, 
will not argue for the wholesale dismissal of metaphysics nor will he sustain a forgetting of 
Spain’s and Europe’s metaphysical past.  Rather, his works are a constant return to and 
reworking of stories in the attempt to create new interpretations and revise old ones.   
 Through interpretation, secularization takes on yet another meaning in Unamuno’s works.  
Rather than an age following an era of Christianity, it is a coterminous process of interpretation 
always transforming Christianity. In “Intelectualidad y espiritualidad” (“Intellectuality and 
Spirituality”) which, generically speaking, is somewhere between an essay and short story, 
Unamuno uses the unnamed man’s ruminations to expound upon a theory of interpretation: 
[The unnamed man] [r]ecordó a San Pablo y aquella su clasificación de los hombres en 
carnales, intelectuales y espirituales, que así le placía traducirlo, o, por mejor decir, así lo 
interpretaba.  Porque hubo tiempo en que se aficionó a la exégesis.  No a una exégesis 
científica; no a escudriñar y rebuscar lo que hubieran querido decir los que escribieron los 
libros sagrados; no a concordarlos lógicamente ni a inquirir, por las ideas y sentimientos 
de la época y el país en que vivieron, cuál fuese su sentir y su pensar; sino a tomar pie de 
aquellos textos, consagrados por los siglos, y en los que ha cuajado tan grande copia de 
tradición, y lanzarse desde ellos a especulaciones libres. (O.C. 3: 709) 
[The unnamed man] remembered Saint Paul and his classification of men as carnal, 
intelectual, and spiritutal, which he liked to translate this way, or, better said, he would 
interpret it this way.  Because there was a time he was interested in exegesis.  Not a 
scientific exegesis; not to scrutinize and to search carefully for whatever those who wrote 
holy books might have wanted to say; not to agree with them logically nor to inquire 
about ideas and feelings from the era and country in which they lived, whatever were 
their thoughts and feelings; but rather to gain strength from those texts, consecrated for 
centuries, and in those in which such a great tradition has crystallized, to launch himself 




A year later, in another short essay, “Sobre la lectura e interpretación del ‘Quijote’” (“On 
Reading and Interpreting the‘Quixote’”), he echoes these sentiments and lauds the various 
interpretations of the Bible: “Si la Biblia tiene un valor inapreciable, es por lo que en ella han 
puesto generaciones de hombres que con su lectura han apacentado sus espíritus; y sabido es que 
apenas hay en ella pasaje que haya sido interpretado de cientos de maneras, según el intérprete.  
Y esto es un bien grandísimo” (“If the Bible has a priceless value, it is because of what 
generations of men who, with their reading have fed their spirits, have put in it; and it is known 
that there is scarcely a passage in it that has not been interpreted hundreds of ways, according to 
the interpreter.  And this is a great good”; O.C. 3: 849).  Secularization and Christianity intersect 
from the religious tradition’s beginnings through the secular exegesis of the sacred text.  Any 
translation of the Bible necessarily means an interpretation of it and each successive generation 
changes whatever the original message with the stored knowledge of the tradition of its age.   
 According to Unamuno’s hermeneutics, the interpreter builds upon a tradition but, by 
“tomar pie de aquellos textos” (“to gain strength from those texts”) and “lanzarse desde ellos” 
(“launch onself from them”) his interpretation is still very much conditioned by the text.  
Similarly, Vattimo (1987) uses the Heideggarian term Verwindung to describe the simultaneous 
acceptance of the metaphysical past, like Christianity, while at the same time distorting and 
twisting it through interpretation (“Verwindung” 11).23  Verwindung, for Vattimo, is 
                                                           
23Verwindung is a central concept of Vattimo’s “weak thought.”  He continues to explain the term in “Verwindung: 
Nihilism and the Postmodern in Philosophy” (1987): “How then shall we translate Verwindung in the passages from 
Identität und Differenz and, consequently, although with some qualifications, in the other texts in which Heidegger 
uses the term? What we know from the suggestions Heidegger made to the French translator of Vorträge und 
Aufsätze, where the word is used in a text that speaks of the overcoming (Uberwindung) of metaphysics, leads us, on 
the one hand, to think that he is dealing with a surpassing which has the traits of acceptance and of fathoming. The 
lexical meaning of the word in German contains, on the other hand, two additional dimensions: that of 
convalescence (‘eine Krankheit verwinden’ means to cure or heal, to recover from an illness) and that of distortion 
(tied secondarily to winden, to wind or twist) and ‘deviating alteration,’ one of the meanings of the prefix ver-. 
‘Resignation’ is also tied to the connotation of convalescence; one overcomes, recovers from, gets over (verwindet) 
not only an illness but also a loss or a defeat, sorrow or pain.” (12). 
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synonymous with secularization: “The history we recollect has itself the structure of the 
Verwindung of recollection and distortion.  This may appear to be a very abstract generalization, 
but it is no longer so if we translate Verwindung into a term which is much more familiar to 
historians of Western civilization, namely the term ‘secularization’…” (End 179).  In this light, 
Unamuno’s hermeneutics functions as a response to the more traditional narratives of 
secularization while simultaneously participating in it through a twisting of Europe and Spain’s 
Christian history and supposed secular substitutes.  Interpretation allows for the questioning, 
distorting, and weakening not only of Christianity’s claims to truth but it also applies this same 
twisting to other claims to truth like those of science, politics, and art.   
 The treatment of Christianity and the Bible as a story to be interpreted remains constant 
throughout Unamuno’s works.  At the end SMBM he again maintains the value in the 
interpreter’s distorting stories.  He notes that the narrator, Ángela, has mixed her feelings in with 
the telling of the story which, according to Unamuno, makes her account more novelesque and 
remarks, “…la novela es la más íntima historia, la más verdadera, por lo que no me explico que 
haya quien se indigne de que se llame novela al Evangelio, lo que es elevarle, en realidad, sobre 
un cronicón cualquiera…” (“…the novel is after all the most intimate, the truest history, so that I 
scarcely understand why some people are outraged to have the Bible called a novel, when such a 
designation actually sets it above some mere chronicle…”; 123-24; 68).24  The entire short novel, 
with its multiple Biblical references, becomes a distortion and Ángela’s “confession” serves to 
illustrate the twisting and distorting of messages.  She does not simply relay a message as her 
name might indicate but rather she recounts the life of Don Manuel through memories that she 
admits may not exactly be clear.  As if the narration of the accounts of Valverde de Lucerna were 
                                                           
 
24Unless noted other wise, all translations of SMBM are from Marciano Guerrero. 
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not sufficiently questionable because of our unreliable narrator and her unreliable memory, 
Unamuno further twists the narrative by writing himself into the story and unceremoniously 
remarking that he only changed a few things.  The distorting continues.  Unamuno’s “few 
changes” twist an already twisted, interpreted narration of whatever the original story was. 
 Unamuno’s other fictional works serve as examples of secularizing narratives through 
interpretation.  Abel Sánchez (1917) distorts the Biblical narrative of a jealous brother and La tía 
Tula (1921) twists the archetype of the virgin mother.  Unamuno’s most famous distortion is 
Vida de Don Quixote y Sancho (1914) in which he reinterprets Spanish literature’s most famous 
duo.  His constant references to the Quixote and its author throughout his works shed light on the 
act of reading and retelling stories.  In “Sobre la lectura e interpretación del ‘Quijote’” he writes, 
“Y cada generación que se ha sucedido ha ido añadiendo algo a este Don Quijote, y ha ido él 
transformándose y agrandándose” (“And every generation that has passed has been adding 
something to Don Quixote, and he has been transforming and becoming greater”; O.C. 3: 848).  
Just as the Bible is the foundational text of Christianity, Unamuno seems to want to position the 
Quixote as the foundational text of Spanishness.  In the same way as he identifies liberalism as a 
fundamentally Spanish quality, the Quixote, a work that poses questions as to the fabulization of 
reality and whose protagonist fights for spirits as opposed to ideas, according to Unamuno (DST 
315), serves as an antidote to dogmatic thinking.  Furthermore, by placing the Quixote alongside 
the Bible and applying the same theory of interpretation to both, he reveals the fictionality of the 
stories of the Bible while also designating the foundational text of Spanishness and the modern 
novel as a “holy book.”  Fictional characters and Biblical ones alike undergo a transformation 
and distortion as they are interpreted and reinterpreted throughout generations.   
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Unamuno’s theory of interpretation, applied to history, problematizes the view of the 
disappearance of religion.  The concept of Spanish and European history in his works and his 
treatment of theologians and philosophers suggest that Christianity will not disappear with each 
new wave of thought but rather that each new wave is an interpretation of a Christian tradition 
and wholly contained within it.  In DST, personal memory and that of collective tradition mirror 
the constant building upon the past while being created by it:  
Sin entrar a discutir – discusión ociosa – si soy o no el que era hace veinte años, es 
indiscutible, me parece, el hecho de que el que soy hoy proviene, por serie continua de 
estados de conciencia, de que era en mi cuerpo hace veinte años.  La memoria es la base 
de la personalidad individual, así como la tradición lo es de la personalidad colectiva de 
un pueblo. (28)  
Without entering upon a discussion – an unprofitable discussion – as to whether I am or 
am not he who I was twenty years ago, it appears to me to be indisputable that he who I 
am to-day derives, by a continuous series of states of consciousness, from him who was 
in my body twenty years ago.  Memory is the basis of individual personality, just as 
tradition is the basis of the collective personality of a people. (30)  
  
The tradition of a people, like the memory of a person, never remains static but is always in a 
state of assimilating new thoughts that may or may not cohere with previous ideas but that can be 
nonetheless incorporated into the tradition.  This is not to say that Unamuno’s concept of history 
is a form of Hegelian dialectic.  In Unamuno’s work there is a doubling-back, a moving-forward, 
and sometimes a going-around-in-circles.  
 The story of Christianity through interpretation transforms according to the interpreter 
and her temporal and spatial situatedness and, via this interpretation, the introspection and 
inward turn of the modernist turns outward in an attempt to exercise influence on the world and 
the cultural context that has shaped his beliefs.  DST and AC exemplify this twisting of the story 
of Christianity.  DST begins the story of Christianity not with reference to the Bible but rather to 
polytheism, only later to include the Bible in its evolution.  Unamuno’s interpretation begins 
with an anthropological study of man with a good deal of speculative psychology, then moves on 
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to early Christianity and later manifestations of the religion during the Enlightenment and the 
19th century.  His essay, after weaving together secular thought with religious text, ends with a 
final interpretation of Christianity at the beginning of the 20th century in Spain and Europe.  Not 
surprisingly, it is the Quixote, a work of fiction, and not the numerous encyclicals emanating 
from Rome at the time to which Unamuno refers as he ends his story of Christianity and explores 
its possibilities for modern man.25   
 Likewise, AC weaves together Biblical narrative, fiction, and theological essays.  The 
entire work is a blending of secular and religious stories.  The essay begins by defining 
Christianity as a struggle and seeks to reinforce this definition with references to Abishag’s fight 
to love and be loved by King David, Blaise Pascal’s struggle with doubt, and Père Hyacinthe’s 
desire to be a Catholic priest and father.  The work ends with more allusions to secular and 
religious texts.  In the span of a few pages Unamuno references works ranging from Dante to 
Kant and from St. Paul to Nietzsche.   
 Combining secular texts, such as Père Hyacinthe’s biography, and religious narratives, 
such as that of Abishag, in an attempt to define Christianity highlights the coterminous relation 
of religion and secularization.  It underscores the role of interpretation and creative imagination 
in examining a sacred text and the twisting and distorting of that text through history whether it 
be a remote distortion like Dante’s Divine Comedy or a more recent text at the beginning of the 
                                                           
25In 1907 Pope Pius X writes the Lamentabili sane exitu and the Pascendi Dominici Gregis in response to Catholic 
modernists who advocated for Biblical exegesis in interpreting scripture and understanding Catholic teachings 
within their historical context.  Both encyclicals made clear that any interpretation of the Bible rested in the hands of 
the Church and that questioning Church doctrine was heresy punishable by excommunication, which was the fate of 
Alfred Loisy (1857-1940) and George Tyrrell (1861-1909), two of the most well-known Catholic modernists.  While 
it would seem that Unamuno would be sympathetic to Catholic modernism, he rejected rationalizing religion and 
instead sought to distort and, thereby, continue the story of Christianity through creative and imaginative means, no 




20th century like Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.26  Furthermore, these intersections of 
secular and religious stories again confirm that Christianity, no matter how much a philosopher, 
artist, or scientist seeks to overcome its metaphysical past, proves an impossible bell to unring.  
Finally, DST and AC, when viewed in relation to each other, further attest to the twisting of 
narratives and how cultural and temporal situatedness informs the distortions.  Both works treat 
religion in general and Christianity in particular yet the story changes from one essay to the 
other.  While the intersections of religious and secular narratives remain the same, the times have 
changed and, in AC, the agony of Christianity becomes identified with a post-World War I 
France and a politically tumultuous Spain.   
 The integration of secular stories into religious ones and vice versa and the highlighting 
of the when and where of an interpretation call attention to the plasticity of story-telling.  
Unamuno’s constant reminders that he is telling a story simultaneously emphasize the narrative 
qualities of his essays and shines a critical light on the stories he incorporates into his own by 
revealing their malleability.  As Unamuno develops his story of religion in DST, he momentarily 
disrupts the essay to draw the reader’s attention to its narrative character: “No quiero engañar a 
nadie ni dar por filosofía lo que acaso no sea sino poesía o fantasmagoría, mitología en todo 
caso” (“I do not want to deceive anyone nor give as philosophy what may be poetry or 
phantasmagoria, mythology in any case”; my trans.; 141).  And, as he is about to resume the 
essay, he remarks, “Vamos, pues, a mitologizar” (“Let us, then, mythologize”; 141; 109).  By 
presenting his essay in this way, Unamuno avoids the dogmatic thinking he disavows.  This is 
indeed what distinguishes his philosophy from divinized science, politics, or art.  While the latter 
                                                           
26In his conclusion to AC Unamuno asks, “Pero el de Dostoyevsqui, ¿no es cristianismo?  Los hermanos 





all tried to overcome the ills of a metaphysical system from the top, Unamuno’s weakens it from 
within and acknowledges its “interpretedness.”  His stories are not rigid and fixed but rather 
flexible and adaptable and allow for further distortions.27   
Like his essays, Unamuno’s novels self-consciously confess their “createdness” and 
perform a similar function in inviting interpretation.  In doing so, they encourage the liberal free 
thinking Unamuno so often espoused.  Valis holds that, “[t]he novel was like liberalism itself, for 
presumably suggesting a ‘freedom of thought with no limitation whatsoever politically, morally 
or religiously.’  The thing connecting liberalism and the modern novel, in this view, is the open-
ended character of the imagination” (24).  Also, Longhurst has recently written that “…the 
structure or ‘meaning’ of narrative is created, not unveiled, by the readers…” (Theory 200).  On 
this view, Unamuno’s theory of interpretation and creating meaning parallel the idea of 
secularization inherent in Verwindung; they twist and distort stories but always refer back to 
them.  Interpretation as meaning-making also serves as an antidote to the crisis of secularization 
viewed as disappearance and transference and the subsequent crisis of meaning that Unamuno 
and modernists were tasked to aesthetically represent.  Santiago Zabala (2005) summarizes how 
Verwindung might be considered restorative: “…the Verwindung operated by weak thought 
aspires to a twisting continuation or tracking of the metaphysical tradition, as when an illness 
                                                           
27Unamuno praises Pascal for the flexibility and fluidity of his Pensées in AC: “Nótese, primero, que les llamamos 
Pensamientos y no Ideas.  La idea es algo sólido, fijo; el pensamiento es algo fluído, cambiable, libre.  Un 
pensamiento se hace otro, una idea choca otra.  Podría decirse acaso que un pensamiento es una idea en acción, o 
una acción en idea; una idea es un dogma.  Los hombres de ideas, tenidos por ella, rara vez piensan.  Los 
Pensamientos de Pascal forman una obra polémica y agónica.  Si hubiera escrito la obra apologética que se 
proponía, tendríamos muy otra cosa y una cosa muy inferior a los Pensamientos.  Porque éstos no podían concluir 
nada.  La agónica no es apologética” (“Note, first, that they are called Thoughts and not Ideas. Idea is something 
solid, fixed; thought is something fluid, changeable, free.  A thought becomes another thought, an idea collides with 
another idea.  One could say that a thought is an idea in action or an action in idea; an idea is dogma.  Men of ideas, 
men taken by them, rarely think.  Pascal’s Thoughts form a polemic and agonic work.  If he had written the 
apologetic work he proposed, we would have something very different, very inferior to Thoughts.  Because 




that has been overcome still remains present during the convalescence” (7).28  Considering 
secularization as a treatment, but not a cure, for metaphysical traditions allows for a critical view 
of the ills and violence of Christianity and its secular substitutes while also offering an 
understanding of the possibilities of the future through interpretation.  In his formulation of 
Verwindung, Vattimo explains that the modern European is inextricably tied to Europe’s 
metaphysical past but also that being tied to a metaphysical past “constitutes neither the 
acceptance of its errors nor a critical surpassing which would merely continue that past” 
(“Verwindung” 11).  Likewise, Unamuno’s theory of interpretation in “Intelectualidad y 
espiritualidad” and “Sobre la lectura e interpretación del Quijote” makes clear that we are 
inextricably bound to texts but not paralyzed by them.29  In Unamuno’s works, the secular 
substitutes’ attack on Christianity from above rather than from within attempted a surpassing 
and, in doing so, recreated a metaphysical system that suppressed free-thinking and encouraged 
violence. 
                                                           
28Even more than Heidegger, Vattimo’s theory of secularization relies on a reading of Nietzsche’s European 
nihilism.  Snyder summarizes nihilism in the introduction to End of Modernity (1988): “European nihilism is chiefly 
concerned with the resolution and dissolution of truth into value, which takes the form of human belief and opinion, 
or, as Nietzsche puts it, the form of the will to power.  What this means, simply put, is that the philosophy of 
nihilism aims to dissect and dissolve all of the claims to truth of traditional metaphysical thought, in a process that 
stops only when it reaches the point where these supposed ‘truths’ – such as God or the soul – are revealed to be no 
less subjective values, and no less ‘errors,’ than any other human beliefs or opinions” (xi-xii). 
 
29Vattimo’s thought is a “postmodern” philosophy looking back upon modernity.  By employing his theory of 
Verwindung as secularization I make no claim that Unamuno does the same.  Rather, I use it as a lens to examine the 
past in general in Unamuno’s works and the twisting narratives he tells.  I will argue in chapter three that 
“premodern,” “modern,” and “postmodern” are ill-fitting categories with which to explore experiences deemed 
religious in his works.  There are, however, several similarities between Unamuno’s writings and what has been 
termed “postmodern thought.”  Zavala notes, “Dentro de ese circuito de anticipaciones, sus [los de Unamuno] 
ensayos, comentarios, preceden la estrategia de la postcrítica, y esboza, y anticipa asimismo, el proyecto de la teoría 
postestructuralista…” (“Within this circuit of anticipations, Unamuno’s essays, commentaries precede the postcritic 
strategy and he outlines and anticipates the project of poststructuralist theory”; 149).  Gonzalo Navajas (1992) 
maintains, “Aunque Unamuno antecede cronológicamente a la eclosión posmoderna, participa de la doble oposición 
de la posmodernidad a la referencialidad y el logocentrismo” (“Even though Unamuno predates the postmodern 




 Unamuno’s treatment of the Reformation in AC, on the other hand, characterizes the 
acceptance of Europe’s Christian history while at the same time opening it up to further 
interpretation and, thus, weakening its strong claims to truth.  He writes, “La Reforma, que fué la 
explosión de la letra, trató de resucitar en ella la palabra; trató de sacar del Libro el Verbo, de la 
Historia el Evangelio, y resucitó la vieja contradicción latente” (“The Reformation, which was 
the explosion of the letter, tried to revive the word in the letter; it tried to take the Word from the 
Book, from the History of the Gospel, and revive the old latent contradiction”; 43) and later that 
“La Reforma quiso volver a la vida por la letra, y acabó disolviendo la letra.  Porque el libre 
examen es la muerte de la letra” (“The Reformation tried to return to life through the letter and 
ended up dissolving it.  Because free examination is the death of the letter”; 45).  The tyranny of 
thought of the dead letter and the unquestioning faith of the adherents to its message were freed 
not by an overcoming or rejection of the message but rather by interpretation.  This is further 
apparent in Unamuno’s admiration of Pascal’s thought: “Todas las ortodoxias empezaron siendo 
herejías.  Y el repensar los lugares comunes, el crearlos, el hacer de las ideas pensamientos, es el 
mejor modo de librarse de su maleficio” (“All orthodoxies began as heresies.  And rethinking 
common places, creating them, making ideas into thoughts, is the best way to free onself from 
their evils”; AC 110).  Pascal does not make any attempt at a new metaphysical system and nor 
does Unamuno.  Their freeing themselves from falsehoods and emancipating the Verbo from the 
Letra, consists of continually distorting and twisting the Letra through new interpretations.  In 
this sense, what is needed to allay the ills of secularization and the dogmatism of Christianity is 
not a new metaphysical system nor a total rejection of past systems nor a cementing of religious 
doctrine but rather more secularization.  Secularization in this sense does not mean the loss of 
religion but rather it alters the way the story of religion is told and both the secular and the 
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religious change and transform as the stories the interpreter tells distort and twist.  In Unamuno’s 







CHAPTER 2: LEARNING RELIGION:  
EL HOMBRE DE CARNE Y HUESO ES TAMBIEN HOMBRE DE CARNE Y SESO  
(THE MAN OF FLESH AND BONE IS ALSO A MAN OF FLESH AND BRAINS) 
 
In chapter one I explored how experience and the twisting of narratives respond to and 
question the secular script in Unamuno’s works.  In this chapter I examine how Unamuno 
distorts a secular account of religious experience and tells a story about how religion is learned.  
This story of learning in Unamuno’s works builds upon and distorts naturalist approaches to 
religion and anticipates more contemporary cognitive methods by positing mental tools and 
instincts not to show that, through cognitive development, humans mistakenly created a 
superhuman agent but rather that these tools might be employed to posit its real existence.1    
Furthermore, the story of learning’s reappropriation of this secular account of a superhuman 
agent questions the privatization of religion by reimagining man’s relation to fellow man and to 
the world around him. 
Unamuno writes, “Pero la fe, que es al fin y al cabo algo compuesto en que entra un 
elemento conocitivo, lógico o racional juntamente con uno afectivo, biótico o sentimental, y en 
rigor irracional, se nos presenta en forma de conocimiento” (“But faith, which afterall is 
something compound, comprising a cognitive, logical, or rational element together with an 
                                                           
1Herrnstein Smith has shown that, despite some cognitivists’ claim to be revolutionary, much of their thought, 
especially about anthropomorphism, has already been expressed by Hume and Nietzsche, two philosophers, with 
whose work Unamuno was well acquainted (33-37, 41-43).  By claiming that Unamuno “builds upon” and “distorts” 
naturalist approaches, I am not categorizing him as a naturalist fitting somewhere in between the “old” and “new 
naturalists,” as Herrnstein Smith calls them.  Unamuno seems intentionally unclear as to whether experience and 
cognition opens us to intuit an already-existing god or to create god.  Whether god creates humans in its likeness or 
if humans create it in theirs is not a paradox that Unamuno seeks to resolve but rather to exacerbate.  I explore this in 




affective, biotic, sentimental, and strictly irrational element, is presented to us under the form of 
knowledge”; DST 200; 151).  Faith in his view is not belief in the unseen but rather consists of 
some kind of knowledge.  My main objective in this chapter is to understand how religious belief 
becomes a form of knowledge and how that knowledge can be learned in Unamuno’s works.  To 
begin, I follow cognitive scientist of religion Justin Barrett (2011) in an attempt to add to the 
discussion of religious belief in Unamuno’s essays and fiction by widening the definition of 
belief to mean mental representations that affect thoughts and actions and I consider the literary 
contexts in which such beliefs take shape, are expressed, and are learned.2  Through the lens of 
the cognitive science of religion, I show how Unamuno’s representations of experiences through 
the body and interpreted by the mind constitute a learning of religious beliefs.  I begin this 
chapter with a brief overview of the cognitive science of religion and explain how Unamuno 
isolates cognition as a means of acquiring religious beliefs across cultures and through time and 
human development.  I then move on to explore the connection of mind and body in DST and 
argue that the base of religious beliefs in the story of learning is found in the interaction of two 
instincts that Unamuno posits: an instinct of self-preservation and an instinct to perpetuate.  The 
first instinct offers up tacit assumptions of man’s physical world and gives him intuitive 
knowledge of how that world works.3  The second instinct, I maintain, violates these intuitions 
and, because they are counterintuitive, they are set apart from other experiences and deemed 
religious.  Next I examine how these counterintuitive experiences lead to the positing or intuiting 
                                                           
2Barrett defines belief as “an instance of mentally representing something as being the case in the generation of 
further thought and action” (Cognitive 40). 
 
3Barrett develops a theory of how humans form tacit assumptions about the world based on intuition in Cognitive, 
especially in chapter four.  I will refer to this throughout the body of this chapter of the dissertation.  
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of superhuman agents with counterintuitive properties and, finally, I explore the manifestations 
of these experiences in Unamuno’s fiction. 
Because the cognitive science of religion is a relatively new field and approach to 
religion, a brief overview is helpful here.  The cognitive science of religion is a multidisciplinary 
approach to the study of religion that pulls from such diverse fields as anthropology, psychology, 
biology, religious studies, artificial intelligence, linguistics, and philosophy.  Although scholars 
from many different departments of the modern university compose this group, there are several 
principles that undergird their approach to religion.  Cognitive scientists maintain that processes 
of the mind inform and constrain religious belief and that the mind is not a blank slate onto 
which just anything can be written (Barrett, Cognitive 22).  According to E. Thomas Lawson the 
cognitive science of religion seeks to address three main questions: “1.) how do human minds 
represent religious ideas?; 2.) How do human minds acquire religious ideas?; 3.) What forms of 
action do such ideas precipitate?” (344). To answer these questions cognitive scientists rely on 
what they call intuitive ontologies, cognitive systems that classify phenomena into certain 
categories.  Once the mind intuitively and automatically assigns a phenomenon to a category, it 
supplies a host of non-reflective beliefs about whatever is being classified (Barrett, Cognitive 
59).  For example, if I see a book, I intuitively know that, as a solid object, it cannot pass through 
another object; if I see my friend, I intuitively know that, as a person, he cannot pass through 
solid objects, that he is self-moving, and that he has a conscious mind.  Related to intuitive 
ontologies and characteristic of the cognitive science of religion is the idea of counterintuitive 
concepts.  A concept is counterintuitive when it breaches intuitive, non-reflective beliefs or 
transfers a property of one category to another (Barrett, Cognitive 68).  For example, a book that 
can go through walls is counterintuitive because, as a simple solid object, my intuition tells me 
76 
 
that it should not pass through other objects; or a friend who can study with me and be at a party 
at the same time is counterintuitive because, as a person and solid object, my intuition tells me 
that he can only be in one location in time and space.  According to the cognitive science of 
religion these counterintuitive concepts are the best candidates for superhuman agents and that 
minimally counterintuitive concepts are the most easily acquired and transmitted (Barrett, 
Cognitive 104-05).  For example, the idea of a book that can talk is more easily acquired and 
transmitted than that of a napkin that can read minds, rains on Thursdays, and gives birth to 
puppies.  The talking book concept only minimally violates intuition – attributing mentality to an 
inanimate object – whereas the napkin is a cognitively heavy concept that violates multiple 
categories.4  In addition to these characteristics, detecting agency and anthropomorphizing agents 
are fundamental to the cognitive science of religion. When I detect an agent, it is not just a 
nebulous “something” but an agent with intentions and desires.  Anthropologist Pascal Boyer 
summarizes this: “…we tend to interpret even very faint cues in terms of human traits; we see 
faces in the clouds and human bodies in trees and mountains” (143).   
To understand the cognitive structures and the cultural and fictional contexts that inform 
religious beliefs in Unamuno’s texts, I begin by exploring how religion is set apart as a cultural 
and cognitive phenomenon.  Unamuno identifies various religions across cultures and that each 
religion serves as an ultimate truth for that particular culture.  He also posits religion as 
something that has always existed: “La religión, desde la del salvaje que personaliza en el fetiche 
al Universo todo, arranca, en efecto, de la necesidad vital de dar finalidad humana al Universo, a 
Dios, para lo cual hay que atribuirle conciencia de sí y de su fin, por lo tanto” (“Beginning with 
the savage’s personalization of the whole Universe in his fetich, religion has its roots in the vital 
                                                           




necessity of giving human finality to the Universe, to God, and this necessity obliges it, 
therefore, to attribute to the Universe, to God, consciousness of self and of purpose”; DST 228 
172).  What makes Unamuno stand out against many thinkers of his age is that he does not use 
cultural comparisons or evolution to claim that religion had reached its most civilized and 
evolved state in Christianity.  Instead, Unamuno expresses a relativism regarding religious belief.  
In SMBM, Don Manuel expresses this sentiment to Lázaro: “¿Religión verdadera?  Todas las 
religiones son verdaderas en cuanto hacen vivir espiritualmente a los pueblos que las profesan, 
en cuanto les consuelen de haber tenido que nacer para morir, y para cada pueblo la religión más 
verdadera es la suya, la que le ha hecho” (“As for true religion, all religions are true as long as 
they give spiritual life to the people who profess them, as long as they console them for having 
been born only to die.  And for people the truest religion is their own, the religion that made 
them…”; 96; 36).  Unamuno’s references to “the savage” and his use of terms such as “pagana” 
and “primitiva” in classifying non-Abrahamic religions does not exactly make him appear to be 
sympathetic to other religions.  Despite his language, however, Unamuno sees in early man a 
coherent worldview and believes that modern man is not all that far removed from his ancestors.  
In referencing Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), who says that modern man has distanced himself 
so far from nature that he cannot understand his early ancestors, Unamuno asks, “Mas ¿es esto 
cierto?  ¿No seguimos viviendo de las creaciones de su fantasía, encarnadas para siempre en el 
lenguaje, con el que pensamos, o más bien el que en nosotros piensa?” (“But is this certain?  Do 
we not continue to live by the creations of their imagination, embodied for ever in the language 
with which we think, or, rather, the language which thinks in us?”; DST 158; 122).  Evolution for 
Unamuno does not mean the teleological “progress” of simpler forms to more complex ones but 
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rather a continuity of cognition found in our early ancestors.5  This remains constant throughout 
Unamuno’s works from DST to SMBM.  In the former he asks, “Pero ¿dónde acaba la religión y 
empieza la superstición, o tal vez dónde acaba ésta para empezar aquélla?  ¿Cuál es el criterio 
para discernirlas?” (“But where does religion end and superstition begin, or perhaps rather we 
should say at what point does superstition merge into religion?  What is the criterion by means of 
which we discriminate between them?”; 227; 172).  This difficulty or impossibility to distinguish 
one from the other reappears again in SMBM when Don Manuel speaks to Lázaro about 
continuing the “mission” of having the faithful of Valverde de Lucerna believe in something: 
“¡Es tan difícil hacerles comprender dónde acaba la creencia ortodoxa y dónde empieza la 
superstición!  Y más para nosotros.  Déjalos, pues, mientras se consuelen.  Vale más que lo crean 
todo, aun cosas contradictorias entre sí, a no que no crean nada” (“It’s difficult enough making 
them understand where orthodox belief leaves off and where superstition begins.  It’s hard 
enough, especially for us.  Leave them alone, then, as long as they get some confort. …It’s better 
for them to believe everything, even things that contradict one another, than to believe nothing”; 
103; 44).  By blurring the lines between what is held to be “superstition” and what is “religion,” 
Unamuno shows a continuity of acquiring belief in something and that the only thing that has 
changed is the terminology used to describe such belief. 
Unamuno also uses the mind of a child to postulate that the mind contains structures to 
acquire religious beliefs.  In AP Don Avito, the father who is determined to create a genius son 
by only instructing him in the ways of science, tries to justify his wife’s attempt to instill 
                                                           
5Ann Taves, in her plenary address to the American Academy of Religion in 2010, addresses stage theories of 
evolution as opposed to neo-Darwinian ones.  She says, “Where bio-cultural stage theories depicted primitive 
thought as something that could and should be superseded by civilized modes of thought, genetic evolution 
conceives the human brain in terms of interactive levels of processing that range from the non-conscious to the 
highly reflective” (20).  While Unamuno could certainly not be classified as a neo-Darwinian, there are similarities 
between his thoughts and this group.  Evolving from rapid, non-conscious thinking to more reflective modes of 
thought is one such similarity. 
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Christianity in their child: “Su madre le hará fetichista – se dice -.  ¡No importa!  Como la 
especie, tiene el individuo que pasar por el fetichismo; yo me encargaré de él” (“‘His mother’s 
going to make him a fetishist,’ he says to himself; ‘What does it matter!  As with the species, the 
individual has to pass through fetichism; I’ll look after him’”; 69; 46).  However, what happens 
is that Avito’s son, Apolodoro, does not pass through any “stage” of belief but is shown to be 
capable of acquiring religious beliefs through experience.  This parody of positivism continues in 
Avito’s belief that his son can be educated according to how he thinks humans evolved.  He 
contemplates allowing Apolodoro to write using hieroglyphs before writing in Spanish.  Again, 
acquiring beliefs in Unamuno’s work is something that exists naturally through history and 
human development and that the only variance is found in the terms – fetish, superstition, and 
religion – that are used to describe this belief.  
  By positing religion as a “something” that exists cross-culturally and throughout time, 
Unamuno is able to make comparisons and search for a common origin.  This search does not 
lead him to discuss religion in terms of eruptions of the sacred but rather to telling a story of how 
mental processes and cultural factors come to shape religion.   
Reading Minds and Bodies 
 Unamuno makes explicit the connection between the mind and the context within which 
it works.  The mind informs what it perceives but that “something out there” also acts upon the 
mind.  In DST he writes, “¿Pero es que hay algo fuera de nuestra mente, fuera de nuestra 
conciencia que abarca a lo conocido todo?  Sin duda que lo hay.  La materia del conocimiento 
nos viene de fuera.  ¿Y cómo es esa materia?  Imposible saberlo, porque conocer es informar la 
materia, y no cabe, por tanto, conocer lo informe como informe” (“But is there anything outside 
of our mind, outside of our consciousness which embraces the sum of the known?  Undoubtedly 
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there is.  The matter of knowledge comes to us from without.  And what is the mode of this 
matter?  It is impossible for us to know, for to know is to clothe matter with form, and hence we 
cannot know the formless as formless”; 195; 148).  He insists later in the essay that all 
knowledge is contained in the mind: “Cuanto conozco o puedo conocer está en mi conciencia” 
(“Everything that I know or can know is within my consciousness”; 208; 158).  Knowledge, 
then, is the informing and shaping of external stimuli and the idea that one creates of the world is 
found in this constant interaction between the mind and its context.  
 Unamuno grounds the formation of any knowledge, religious or not, in what he sees as 
the human being’s two natural instincts: the instinct of self-preservation and the instinct of 
perpetuation.  In the second chapter of DST, titled “El punto de partida” (“The Point of 
Departure”), Unamuno begins with the knowledge acquired though the instinct of self-
preservation: “[e]l conocimiento está al servicio de la necesidad de vivir, y primariamente al 
servicio del instinto de conservación” (“[k]nowledge is employed in the service of the necessity 
of life and primarily in the service of the instinct of personal preservation”; 43; 40).  He also 
makes plain that there exist two types of knowledge that arise from these two instincts: 1.) non-
reflective knowledge that humans have to survive, of which they are not consciously aware and; 
2.) reflective knowledge, or conscious knowledge.  Non-reflective knowledge “nos da el 
conocimiento directo e inmediato, y que en cierto sentido… podría llamarse conocimiento 
inconciente…” (“gives us direct and immediate knowledge, and which in a certain sense might 
be called…unconscious knowledge…”; DST 41; 38).  He then distinguishes between the two: 
“[e]l instinto de conservación, el hambre, es el fundamento del individuo humano; el instinto de 
perpetuación, el amor, en su forma más rudimentaria y fisiológica, es el fundamento de la 
sociedad humana….  Hay un mundo, el mundo sensible, que es el hijo del hambre, y hay otro 
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mundo, el ideal, que es hijo del amor” (“[t]he instinct of preservation, hunger, is the foundation 
of the human individual; the instinct of perpetuation, love, in its most rudimentary and 
physiological form, is the foundation of human society….  There is a world, the sensible world, 
that is the child of hunger, and there is another world, the ideal world, that is the child of love”; 
DST 45; 41).  The two instincts and the knowledge they provide, however, are not diametrically 
opposed, as some critics would have it, but rather mutually constructive. 
Malvido Miguel recognizes that these two types of knowledge do interact with each 
other, as opposed to Oromí (1943) who sees each in a separate domain without interacting, but 
he erroneously equates knowledge from the instinct of survival with reason. He writes, “De 
acuerdo con los dos instintos, y a su servicio, Unamuno señala dos modos de conocimiento, dos 
facultades humanas.  Una es la razón y la otra es la fantasía” (“According to the two instincts, 
and their service, Unamuno points out two modes of knowledge, two human faculties.  One is 
reason and the other is fantasy”; 168).6  Sarasa, whose analysis follows closely that of Malvido 
Miguel, also opposes reason to fantasy and believes reason and rational thinking to be a product 
of the instinct of preservation (166-67, 208, 294).  The confusion seems to stem from considering 
reason and fantasy as warring concepts, where reason is equated with a scientific mind and 
fantasy with feeling and imagination.  Unamuno does at times oppose the two but also shows 
their interdependency.  Not only does he write that reason is a product of the imagination but that 
both are borne of the same instinct of perpetuation, an instinct that Unamuno considers “social” 
                                                           
6Malvido Miguel further distinguishes between the two knowledges: “En los escritos unamunianos estas 
denominaciones se suelen sustituir por otras equivalents.  Así, en vez de ‘razón’ nos encontramos con nombres 
como: Conocimiento científico, la lógica, la cabeza, la inteligencia, la ciencia, la filosofía, la mente, la 
sensualidad…  Y en lugar de ‘fantasía’ estos otros: la cardíaca, la fe, la religión, la facultad de intuimiento, el 
corazón, el amor, la poesía, el sentimiento, la pasión, la mística, la sabiduría, la imaginación…” (“In Unamuno’s 
writings these denominations tend to be substituted with other equivalents.  Thus, instead of ‘reason’ we find names 
like: scientific knowledge, logic, head, intelligence, science, philosophy, mind, sensuality…  And instead of 
‘fantasy’ these other nouns: heart, faith, religions, faculty of intuition, love, poetry, feeling, passion, mysticism, 
wisdom, imagination…”; 168). 
82 
 
because it propels human beings to join others in the formation of society: “La razón, lo que 
llamamos tal, el conocimiento reflejo y reflexivo, el que distingue al hombre, es un producto 
social” (“Reason, that which we call reason, reflex and reflective knowledge, the distinguishing 
mark of man, is a social product”; DST 45; 41).  This concept of reason as a social product is 
intimately related to his concept of language:  
Debe su origen acaso al lenguaje.  Pensamos articulada, o sea reflexivamente, gracias al 
lenguaje articulado, y este lenguaje brotó de la necesidad de trasmitir nuestro 
pensamiento a nuestros prójimos.  Pensar es hablar consigo mismo, y hablamos cada uno 
consigo mismo gracias a haber tenido que hablar los unos con los otros….  El 
pensamiento es lenguaje interior, y el lenguaje interior brota del exterior.  De donde 
resulta que la razón es social y común. (DST 45) 
It owes its origin, perhaps, to language.  We think articulately – i.e. reflectively – thanks 
to articulate language, and this language arose out of the need of communicating our 
thought to our neighbours.  To think is to talk with oneself, and each one of us talks with 
himself, thanks to our having had to talk with one another….  Thought is inward 
language, and the inward language originates in the outward.  Hence it results that reason 
is social and common. (41) 
 
Later in the same chapter Unamuno reiterates that reason is a product of the instinct of 
perpetuation: “Y es que ese sentido social, hijo del amor, padre del lenguaje y de la razón y del 
mundo ideal que de él surge, no es en el fondo otra cosa que lo que llamamos fantasía o 
imaginación.  De la fantasía brota la razón” (“And it is true that this social sense, the creature of 
love, the creator of language, of reason, and of the ideal world that springs from it, is at bottom 
nothing other than what we call fancy or imagination.  Out of fancy springs reason”; DST 47; 
42).  It is clear from what Unamuno writes that reason cannot be equated with the instinct of self-
preservation and any analysis that does does not adequately explain the interplay of the 
knowledges borne of the two instincts.  Other analyses, such as Fernández’s (1961), do correctly 
identify reflexive thought or reason with the instinct of perpetuation but, because they see the 
“ideal world” that the instinct of perpetuation creates as a religious domain, they leave the other 
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instinct untreated.7  By not addressing one instinct and solely focusing on the other, these critics 
do not take into account the intersections of the two and the possibilities that these intersections 
have for acquiring beliefs. 
The knowledge from the two instincts Unamuno describes interact in the learning of 
religious concepts; what is given to man by his instinct to perpetuate violates what is given to 
him by his instinct for self-preservation and these violations, then, are set apart as anomalous 
experiences in need of explanation.  It is up to the interpretive ability of the embodied mind to 
explain this violation. 
The way Unamuno conceives of the mind prefigures how many cognitive scientists of 
religion have theorized it; it is not just a sponge that absorbs information but rather an 
interpretive system working with cognitive tools to shape what it receives.8  He grounds these 
tools in man’s need to live and his survival instinct: “esta necesidad y este instinto han creado en 
el hombre los órganos del conocimiento, dándoles el alcance que tienen” (“This necessity and 
this instinct have created in man the organs of knowledge and given them such capacity as they 
possess”; DST 43; 40).  According to Taves, “[m]eaning in this view [of mental schemata] is 
neither fixed nor infinitely variable…” (Experience 65).  Similarly, in Unamuno’s works, the 
“organs” that he posits limit and shape what can be known and learned.  They give man 
knowledge of the material, sensible world and offer up tacit assumptions that are readily 
available without reflexively thinking about them or specifically endorsing them.9 The self-
                                                           
7Hipólito Fernández explains the two instincts and the knowledge they give humans in a scheme where the instinct 
of perpetuation gives fantasy, language, and reason (55).  
 
8Barrett addresses the “sponge” or “blank slate view of the mind in chapter 2 (Cognitive 22, 30, 35, and 38) and 
Boyer in chapter 1 (3). 
 
9Barret distinguishes between reflective and nonreflective beliefs and elaborates on the tacit assumptions 
nonreflective beliefs offer (Cognitive 47-53).  
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preservation instinct, through the senses, gives human beings an understanding of their physical 
world.  Unamuno writes that “[l]os sentidos están al servicio del instinto de conservación…” 
(“[t]he senses are devoted to the service of the instinct of preservation…”; DST 167; 128) and 
that knowledge from this instinct “se nos muestra ligado a la necesidad de vivir y de procurarse 
sustento para lograrlo” (“[is] bound up with the necessity of living and of procuring the 
wherewithal to maintain life”; DST 42; 39).  This knowledge as “conocimiento inconciente” 
(“unconscious knowledge”), as he puts it, placed at the service of survival, suggests that it is 
information used for quick thinking, about which one would not have to consciously reflect.  
Man, in his struggle to survive, must think quickly and act just as quickly in order to acquire 
food and avoid predators.   
 Barrett elaborates on the sort of two-system view of cognition that Unamuno advances in 
DST and distinguishes unconscious knowledge from reflexive beliefs: 1.) intuitive – fast, 
automatic, effortless, and emotional; 2.) reasoning system – slow, controlled, effortful, flexible, 
and less emotional (Cognitive 46).  He goes on to describe how this fast, automatic thinking 
gives man intuitive ontologies in which “[b]asic objects can be thought of as falling in one or 
more of five basic categories: Spatial Entities, Solid Objects, Living Things (that do not appear 
to move themselves), Animates, and Persons” (Cognitive 61).  When humans assign an object to 
one of these categories, a whole set of expectations are elicited.  Barrett suggests that these 
categories “are distinguished by characteristic sets of expectations or assumptions.  The key 
expectation sets here are Spatiality, Physicality, Biology, Animacy, and Mentality” (Cognitive 
61).  These expectation sets in turn offer up their own intuitive expectations. The set I focus on in 
understanding bodies in Unamuno’s works is Physicality.  Barrett asserts that this expectation set 
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elicits expectations of visibility, tangibility, solidity, cohesion, continuity, and contact (Cognitive 
62).   
The story of learning begins with a story of man and his body and the tacit assumptions 
that arise through the body as a physical object. Throughout DST, Unamuno insists that the man 
he is referring to is one of “carne y hueso” (“flesh and bone”) and not some philosophical 
abstraction and, thus, he continually underscores man’s physicality.  He writes, “Y ser un 
hombre es ser algo concreto, unitario y sustantivo, es ser cosa, res” (“To be a man is to be 
something concrete, unitary, and substantive; it is to be a thing – res”; DST 26; 28).10  He 
continues defining man as a physical being with intentions and desires who acts according to 
them:  
Y lo que determina a un hombre, lo que le hace un hombre, uno y no otro, el que es y no 
el que no es, es un principio de unidad y un principio de continuidad.  Un principio de 
unidad primero, en el espacio, merced al cuerpo, y luego en la acción y en el propósito.  
Cuando andamos, no va un pie hacia adelante y el otro hacia atrás….  En cada momento 
de nuestra vida tenemos un propósito, y a él conspira la sinergia de nuestras acciones. 
(DST 28) 
That which determines a man, that which makes him one man, one and not another, the 
man he is and not the man he is not, is a principle of unity and a principle of continuity.  
A principle of unity firstly in space, thanks to the body, and next in action and intention.  
When we walk, one foot does not go forward and the other backward….  In each moment 
of our life we entertain some purpose, and to this purpose the synergy of our actions is 
directed. (29) 
 
This definition will play a role in what he sees as superhuman agents as he anthropomorphizes 
them, but first it is important to understand what man as a concrete, substantive, physical object 
indicates.  Explicit in Unamuno’s conception of man as a thing is physicality, animacy, and 
mentality; the unity of man’s body means that he moves as a connected whole going from one 
space to another, he is self-propelled ideally by putting one foot in front of the other, and he has 
                                                           




mental states that guide his actions.11  One of the intuitive expectations that arises from this view 
of the body is solidity.  Non-reflective knowledge about the body, from the instinct of self-
preservation, allows man to go about every-day activities in the present and not just hunting or 
avoiding sabre tooth tigers.  For example, before putting one foot in front of the other, el hombre 
de carne y hueso (“the man of flesh and bone”) does not have to consciously endorse or reflect 
upon a belief that his foot will not pass through the floor boards.  Later in DST, the body can 
activate other intuitive expectations: “Por sentirme sustancia, es decir, permanente en medio de 
mis cambios, es por lo que atribuyo sustancialidad a los agentes que fuera de mí, en medio de sus 
cambios, permanecen.  Del mismo modo que el concepto de fuerza, en cuanto distinto del 
movimiento, nace de mi sensación de esfuerzo personal al poner en movimiento algo” (“It is 
because I feel myself to be substance – that is to say, permanent in the midst of my changes – 
that I attribute substantiality to those agents exterior to me, which are also permanent in the 
midst of their changes – just as the concept of force is born of my sensation of personal effort in 
putting a thing in motion”; 100; 81).  There are a number of tacit assumptions here: 1.) other 
agents are physical beings that, despite physical or mental changes, have an essence that anchors 
their personalities; 2.) man is a self-propelled being that can exercise force on other objects and; 
3.) as a physical object, he does not pass through those objects he puts in motion nor can he 
occupy the same space as the objects, thus, signifying their solidity.  Chapter nine of DST 
                                                           
11To avoid confusion it should be noted that Unamuno uses “continuidad” differently than Barrett uses the intuitive 
expectation of “continuity.”  Barrett writes that “[c]ontinuity bears on movement as well [as solidity].  It captures 
the idea that objects do not teleport, but objects move from point A to point B by traversing the immediate space” 
(Cognitive 62).  Unamuno’s use of “continuidad” has to do with man being the same person throughout time.  His 
conception of individual memory and the tradition of a people, already cited above, makes this clear: “Y un 
principio de continuidad en el tiempo.  Sin entrar a discutir – discusión ociosa – si soy o no el que era hace veinte 
años, es indiscutible, me parece, el hecho de que el que soy hoy proviene, por serie de continua de estados de 
conciencia, del que era en mi cuerpo hace veinte años” (“Without entering upon a discussion – an unprofitable 
discussion – as to whether I am or am not he who I was twenty years ago, it appears to me to be indisputable that he 
who I am to-day derives, by a continuous series of states of consciousness, from him who was in my body twenty 
years ago”; DST 28; 30). 
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provides another example of classifying things into categories and the expectations these 
classifications imply: “¿Cómo sabéis que un hombre que se os está delante tiene una conciencia 
como vosotros, y que también la tiene, más o menos oscura, un animal y no una piedra?  Por la 
manera como el hombre, a modo de hombre, a vuestra semejanza se conduce con vosotros, y la 
manera como la piedra no se conduce para con vosotros, sino que sufre vuestra conducta” (“How 
do you know that the man you see before you possesses a consciousness like you, and that an 
animal also possesses such a consciousness, more or less dimly, but not a stone?  Because the 
man acts towards you like a man, like a being made in your likeness, and because the stone does 
not act towards you at all, but suffers you to act upon it”; 207; 157).  Unamuno’s rhetorical 
question to his reader suggests that he wants her to reflect on a belief that she does not 
consciously endorse but simply “knows.”  His answer indicates that when categorizing oneself as 
a person, the expectation set of mentality is activated in that man has a conscience.  He also 
identifies a rock as an inanimate object without a conscience that only moves as an animate 
being acts upon it.  Again what is tacitly assumed when acting upon a physical object is that, 
because of the solidity of the agent and the rock, they will not pass through each other or occupy 
the same space.  The knowledge of the world given to man through his senses and the quest for 
survival gives him his sense of matter and he understands this world to be one of impermeable 
bodies in which nothing passes through anything else. 
 Inherent in Unamuno’s formulation of man is that he has mental states or states of 
consciousness with beliefs and intentions and that these states inform his action.  In other words, 
his hombre de carne y hueso (“man of flesh and bone”) is also an hombre de carne y seso (“man 
of flesh and brains”).  The terms Unamuno uses throughout DST vary when referring to “the 
mental” or the mind.  “Mind” seems to be the equivalent of “consciousness” when he asks, 
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“¿Pero es que hay algo fuera de nuestra mente, fuera de nuestra conciencia que abarca a lo 
conocido todo?” (“But is there anything outside of our mind, outside of our consciousness which 
embraces the sum of the known?”; DST 195; 148) and it is also the “soul” when he asserts that 
“Lo que llamamos alma no es nada más que un término para designar la conciencia individual en 
su integridad y su persistencia” (“The designation ‘soul’ is merely a term used to denote the 
individual consciousness in its integrity and continuity”; DST 97; 79).  Whatever the term he 
uses, all are used to refer to mental states that anchor a person’s essence.  It is what makes one 
person distinct from another.  Also consistent throughout his formulations of the mind is that it is 
inseparable from the body and not just a nebulous something or ethereal nothing floating around 
above people’s heads.  Thoughts, desires, and feelings are all part of the concrete man of “carne 
y hueso”: “…la verdad inmediata es que pienso, quiero y siento yo. Y yo, el yo que piensa, 
quiere y siente, es inmediatamente mi cuerpo vivo con los estados de conciencia que soporta. Es 
mi cuerpo vivo el que piensa, quiere y siente ¿Cómo? Como sea” (“…the immediate truth is that 
I think, will, and feel.  And I – the I that thinks, wills, and feels – am immediately my living 
body with the states of consciousness which it sustains.  It is my living body that thinks, wills, 
and feels.  How?  How you please”; DST 101; 82). Unamuno insists later on the inseparability of 
the body and mind: “Las células todas de nuestro cuerpo cospiran y concurren con su actividad a 
mantener y encender nuestra conciencia, nuestra alma” (“All the cells of our body combine and 
co-operate in maintaining and kindling by their activity our consciousness, our soul”; DST 164; 
126).  For Unamuno, a mind divorced from the body, or vice versa, cannot exist and is an 
abstraction that has no real meaning for man in the world.  Because Unamuno conceives of the 
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mind as a substance and inseparable from the body, it maintains the same properties of 
physicality and solidity.12 
 Man becomes aware of consciousness or spirit through the second instinct, the instinct to 
perpetuate.  Unamuno calls this a “social instinct” because it is what drives man to interact and 
relate with others.  As noted above, one of the consequences of man joining fellow man is his 
ability to reason, which, according to Unamuno, is a product of thought yielded by the language 
needed to communicate.  This social instinct also gives rise to feelings and experiences primarily 
through love.  Love, in Unamuno’s works, takes on various forms but he begins by addressing it 
as carnal love: “...el instinto de perpetuación, el amor, en su forma más rudimentaria y 
fisiológica, es el fundamento de la sociedad humana” (“…the instinct of perpetuation, love, in its 
most rudimentary and physiological form, is the foundation of human society”; DST 45; 41).  He 
explains how this kind of love becomes a spiritual love through the story of two people who give 
birth to a sickly child who dies.  In their individual sadness and misery at the death of their child, 
they come to realize that the other is suffering too and they feel compassion for each other.  
Compassion, Unamuno writes, “…es, pues, la esencia del amor espiritual humano, del amor que 
tiene conciencia de serlo, del amor que no es puramente animal, del amor, en fin, de una persona 
racional.  El amor compadece, y compadece más cuanto más ama” (“…is the essence of human 
spiritual love, of the love that is conscious of being love, of the love that is not purely animal, of 
the love, in a word, of a rational person.  Love pities, and pities most when it loves most”; DST 
153; 118).  The instinct to perpetuate accounts not only for feelings and experiences in man but 
also an awareness of these feelings and experiences.  It is love, compassion, pain, and suffering 
                                                           
12R. L. Predmore (1955) explores Unamuno’s uses of words like alma (“soul”), ánimo (“mood”), and espíritu 
(“spirit”) and maintains that he substantializes what seem like abstract concepts by tying them to more concrete 




as shared experience that which gives man consciousness.  Unamuno explains this 
etymologically: “[c]onciencia, conscientia, es conocimiento participado, es consentimiento, y 
con-sentir es com-padecer” (“[c]onsciousness (conscientia) is participated knowledge, is co-
feeling, and co-feeling is com-passion”; DST 155; 120).13  Consciousness, in Unamuno’s 
explanation of how humans go from carnal love to spiritual love through compassion and pain, 
connotes a consciousness of something.  I follow Taves here in understanding this sort of 
consciousness of something as a category of experience (Experience 62).14  In the example of the 
death of a child, the suffering parent has an awareness of something happing in the body and 
through experience with another body and represents in thought.  
Unamuno, fond of telling stories within stories in his fiction, relates the story of the two 
suffering parents as a micro-story in the essay which then connects to a macro-story, the story of 
how human beings might connect to others and the world more generally.  As in this example of 
the suffering parents, other experiences generated by the instinct of perpetuation present 
themselves as a disturbance of the physical limits of bodies and minds, which, again, are 
inseparable according to Unamuno.  These experiences marked by feelings of love, compassion, 
suffering, and pain all point to some fusion or extension of the bodies involved.  Carnal love, the 
most rudimentary result of the instinct to perpetuate, involves one such union of bodies: “Y todo 
acto de engendramiento es un dejar de ser, total o parcialmente, lo que se era, un partirse, una 
                                                           
13Unamuno, of course, is emphasizing the Latin prefix “com-” meaning “with” to that make obvious that, 
“consentir” and “compadecer” are not simply understood as “to agree, permit, or approve” and “to pity or feel sorry 
for” respectively but rather as “to feel with or together” and “to suffer with or together” in their etymological senses. 
 
14Taves distinguishes between intransitive and transitive consciousnesses where intransitive consciousness is “a state 
of being” and transitive consciousness as “consciousness of something” (58).  She elaborates that “[w]e can 
experience things at different levels of consciousness.  Primary or first-order consciousness, which we share with 
other animals, lacks meta-awareness (awareness of awareness).  At this level, we experience things without thinking 
about what we are experiencing.  When we think about what we are experiencing we move to a higher level of 
consciousness” (Experience 62). 
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muerte parcial. [...] En su fondo el deleite amoroso sexual, el espasmo genésico, es una sensación 
de resurrección, de resucitar en otro, porque sólo en otros podemos resucitar para perpetuarnos” 
(“And every act of generation consists in a being’s ceasing to be what it was, either wholly or in 
part, in a splitting up, in a partial death. […]  In its essence, the delight of sexual love, the genetic 
spasm, is a sensation of resurrection, of renewing our life in another, for only in others can we 
renew our life and so perpetuate ourselves”; DST 149; 116).  Unamuno writes later that the social 
instinct not only makes man desire to perpetuate himself but “invadir a todos los otros, a ser los 
otros sin dejar de ser él” (“to invade all other beings, to be others without ceasing to be itself”; 
DST 219; 165).  Spiritual love gives way to the same kind of experiences of confusing physical 
properties: “…y quien a otro ama es que quiere eternizarse en él” (“…and whosoever loves 
another wishes to eternalize himself in him”; DST 58; 53).  Experiences of love are encounters in 
which man is conscious of some sort of confusion of his physical nature as a body.  To invade 
others and resurrect and eternalize oneself in them obscures where one body begins and the other 
ends. 
 In addition to words like “invade,” “resurrect,” and “eternalize,” Unamuno employs 
“dominate” as another means of confusing physical limits.  The way he uses the term suggests a 
sort of forceful possession of an “other” through knowing him or her: “No hay, en efecto, más 
perfecto dominio que el conocimiento; el que conoce algo, lo posee.  El conocimiento une al que 
conoce con lo conocido.  ‘Yo te contemplo y te hago mía al contemplarte’; tal es la fórmula” 
(“There is, in fact, no more perfect dominion than knowledge; he who knows something, 
possesses it.  Knowledge unites the knower with the known.  ‘I contemplate thee and in 
contemplating thee I make thee mine’ – such is the formula”; DST 244; 184).  He echoes this 
sentiment later instructing his reader, “Entrégate, pues, a los demás, pero para entregarte a ellos, 
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domínalos primero.  Pues no cabe dominar sin ser dominado.  Cada uno se alimenta de la carne 
de aquel a quien devora.  Para dominar al prójimo hay que conocerlo y quererlo” (“Give yourself 
then to others, but in order to give yourself to them, first dominate them.  For it is not possible to 
dominate except by being dominated.  Everyone nourishes himself upon the flesh of that which 
he devours.  In order that you may dominate your neighbour you must know and love him”; DST 
283; 213).  In getting to “know” others, man in Unamuno’s essay assigns them to the same 
category “person” as himself and, in doing so, elicits expectations and operates on a set of 
intuitions about them.  They are physical beings with mental states whose actions are informed 
by desires, perceptions, and beliefs.   
Barrett refers to this ability as “theory of mind” and explains that humans regard “others 
as having minds and mental states, and [understand] how mental states relate to each other and to 
actions…” (Cognitive 75).15 In addition to viewing others as having mental states similar to ours 
is the ability to exercise “metarepresentation.”16  In other words, we can think about thinking and 
even think about thinking about thinking.  In the example of the suffering parents in DST, the 
two metarepresent the beliefs of the other in a reading of minds and bodies and, by 
metarepresenting what each other believes, they can also feel what the other feels.   
                                                           
15“Theory of Mind (ToM)” is often referred to as “folk psychology.”  Barrett prefers to use “theory of mind” and 
describes the basics of how adults use it: “People have conscious mental states that include beliefs, desires (wants), 
emotions, memories, and percepts.  Action is driven by desires and modulated through percepts and beliefs” 
(Cognitive 75).  Boyer opts for the term “intuitive psychology”: “The spontaneous interpretation of other people’s 
behavior is consistently directed by implicit principles concerning motivation, intentions, memory, reasoning, and so 
on” (107).  Taves employs “theory of mind” in using an attributional approach in understanding experience.  She 
writes, “[t]heory of mind is a key aspect of what researchers refer to as ‘folk psychology,’ the set of very basic, 
cross-culturally stable assumptions that we use to predict, explain, or understand the everyday actions in terms of the 
mental states we presume to lie behind them” (Experience 13). 
 
16Barrett explains “metarepresentation” as the ability to have beliefs about beliefs and holds that beliefs are 
representational and can be false (Cognitive 75-76). 
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 In Unamuno’s narratives, man comes to “know” his fellow man through the exercise of 
metarepresentation and the emotion that representing others’ thoughts and feelings incite.  
Although he writes that “carnal love” is the genesis of all other love, and from there suffering 
and compassion, he suggests in places that suffering precedes love.  According to Unamuno, 
man by his very nature suffers because he knows that he is going to die and does not want to. 
Here the micro-story of the suffering parents prefigures the re-imaginged relationship of humans 
more generally.  Believing that others suffer, man can recognize the same suffering in others and 
deduce that they must be miserable too: “Los hombres encendidos en ardiente caridad hacia sus 
prójimos, es porque llegaron al fondo de su propia miseria, de su propia aparencialidad, de su 
nadería, y volviendo luego sus ojos, así abiertos, hacia sus semejantes, los vieron también 
miserables, aparenciales, anonadables, y los compadecieron y los amaron” (“Men aflame with a 
burning charity towards their neighbours are thus enkindled because they have touched the depth 
of their own misery, their own apparentiality, their own nothingness, and then, turning their 
newly opened eyes upon their fellows, they have seen that they also are miserable, apparential, 
condemned to nothingness, and they have pitied them and loved them”; DST 152; 118).  He 
reiterates this position again in his essay: “La miseria propia es tanta, que la compasión que hacia 
mí mismo me despierta se me desborda pronto, revelándome la miseria universal” (“My own 
misery is so great that the compassion for myself which it awakens within me soon overflows 
and reveals to me the universal misery”; 221; 167).  Whether love precedes suffering, or the 
other way around, the act of metarepresenting others’ thoughts allows man to recognize these 
emotions in others and functions as a means of connecting man to fellow man.  Knowing what an 




Counterintuitive Experiences and Agents 
Experiences that breach bodily limits serve as a starting point for what Unamuno and his 
characters deem “religious” in the story of learning.  The kind of intimate knowing of others and 
the obscuring of boundaries between each other are in themselves “religious”: “Mi esfuerzo por 
imponerme a otro, por ser y vivir yo en él y de él, por hacerle mío – que es lo mismo que 
hacerme suyo -, es lo que da sentido religioso a la colectividad, a la solidaridad humana” (“My 
endeavour to impose myself upon another, to be and live in him and by him, to make him mine – 
which is the same as making myself his – is that which give religious meaning to human 
collectivity, to human solidarity”; DST 283; 213-14).  This, of course, is not the whole story of 
religion but rather the genesis of other concepts deemed “religious.”  The ability to read minds 
and bodies and feel what others feel primarily leads to the easy attribution of mentality to 
nonliving entities in Unamuno’s work.  Man goes from feeling compassion for others to feeling 
it for inanimate beings:  
Y de los demás hombres, tus semejantes, pasando por los que más semejantes te son, por 
tus convivientes, vas a compadecer a todos los que viven, y hasta a lo que acaso no vive, 
pero existe.  Aquella lejana estrella que brilla allí arriba durante la noche, se apagará 
algún día y se hará polvo, y dejará de brillar y de existir.  Y como ella, el cielo todo 
estrellado.  ¡Pobre cielo! (DST 154) 
And this compassionate feeling for other men, for your fellows, beginning with those 
most akin to you, those with whom you live, will expand into a universal pity for all 
living things, and perhaps even for things that have not life but merely existence.  That 
distant star which shines up there in the night will some day be quenched and will turn to 
dust and will cease to shine and cease to exist.  And so, too, it will be with the whole of 
the star-strewn heavens.  Unhappy heavens! (119) 
 
Compassion and love, and the understanding of suffering implied in these feelings, cause man to 
animate the inanimate and, in doing so, to attribute to them human characteristics.  We can 
already anticipate here with the animation of the star and the sky that we are soon to arrive at the 
concept of god.  Effectively, this is the next step in creating it: “Y a esta Conciencia del 
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Universo, que el amor descubre personalizando cuanto ama, es a lo que llamamos Dios” (“And 
this Consciousness of the Universe, which love, personalizing all that it loves, discovers, is what 
we call God”; DST 155; 120).17  It seems like a rather simple formula: we feel love, suffering, 
and compassion and, because we recognize others as humans due to their similarity to us, we 
know that they have the same feelings and attribute to them the same consciousness; soon we 
begin to attribute consciousness to nonliving things and, finally, to the universe itself and, by 
anthropomorphizing it, we get god, if the parts add up.  Not so simple, however, is what makes 
experiences of love, suffering, and compassion so special that they give “sentido religioso” to 
human collectivity.  What is also not so clear is why these experiences lead to the positing of a 
superhuman agent. 
 Implicit in experiences deemed religious in Unamuno’s works are the crossing of 
boundaries mediated by feelings of love, suffering, and compassion that position physical beings 
within and through others.  Experiences of someone or something within bodies drive the 
impulse to animate nonliving things: “Para amarlo todo, para compadecerlo todo, humano y 
extrahumano, viviente y no viviente, es menester que lo sientas todo dentro de ti mismo, que lo 
personalices todo.  Porque el amor personaliza todo cuanto ama, todo cuanto compadece” (“In 
                                                           
17In DST Unamuno sometimes writes that love is responsible for the creation or discovery of god.  In other places he 
writes that it is suffering: El amor nos hace creer en Dios” (“Love makes us believe in God”; 212; 160); El amor, la 
compasión, lo personaliza todo y personalizándolo todo, personaliza también al Universo mismo, que también sufre, 
y nos descubre a Dios” (“Love, pity, personalizes everything, we have said; in discovering the suffering in 
everything and in personalizing everything, it personalizes the Universe itself as well – for the Universe also suffers 
– and it discovers God to us”; 215; 163); “El dolor nos dice que existimos; el dolor nos dice que existen aquellos que 
amamos; el dolor nos dice que existe el mundo en que vivimos, y el dolor nos dice que existe y que sufre Dios…” 
(“Suffering tells us that we exist; suffering tells us that those whom we love exist; suffering tells us that the world in 
which we live exists; and suffering tells us that God exists and suffers…”; 218; 165). Feeling the one always implies 
feeling the other and they are both intimately entwined with compassion: …el amor es doloroso, es compasión…” 
(“love is suffering, it is compassion”; my trans; 215); “El amor y el dolor se engendran mutuamente, y el amor es 
caridad y compasión, y amor que no es caritativo y complaciente, no es tal amor” (“Love and suffering mutually 
engender one another, and love is charity and compassion, and the love that is not charitable and compassionate is 




order to love everything, in order to pity everything, human and extra-human, living and non-
living, you must feel everyting within yourself, you must personalize everything.  For everything 
that it loves, everything that it pities, love personalizes”; DST 154; 119).  Consciousness of 
others’ consciousness as feelings of them within our bodies and the consequent personification 
of things external to the body is indeed what Unamuno deems “divine:” “No fue, pues, lo divino, 
algo objetivo, sino la subjetividad de la conciencia proyectada hacia fuera, la personalización del 
mundo.  El concepto de divinidad surgió del sentimiento de ella, y el sentimiento de divinidad no 
es sino el mismo oscuro y naciente sentimiento de personalidad vertido a lo de fuera” (“The 
divine, therefore, was not originally something objective, but was rather the subjectivity of 
consciousness projected exteriorly, the personalization of the world.  The concept of divinty 
arose out of the feeling of divinity, and the feeling of divinity is simply the dim and nascent 
feeling of personality vented upon the outside world”; DST 172 132).  Once this personality has 
been created with all the attributes of a person, including a body, Unamuno holds that a union 
with this person is religion: “Y a la relación con Dios, a la unión más o menos íntima con Él, es a 
lo que llamamos religión” (“And this relation with God, this more or less intimate union with 
Him, is what we call religion”; DST 226; 171).  Another illustration of deeming bodies becoming 
part of other bodies as “religious” is Unamuno’s conception of the Catholic sacrament of 
Communion.  He stresses that the sacrament of the Eucharist is “el más específicamente 
religioso” (“the most specifically religious”; DST 85; 70).  We see later that what makes this 
sacrament “the most specifically religious” is a dissolving of bodily limits: 
Han apresado el Verbo en un pedazo de pan material, y lo han apresado en él para que 
nos lo comamos, y al comérnoslo nos lo hagamos nuestro, de este nuestro cuerpo en que 
el espíritu habita, y que se agite en nuestro corazón y piense en nuestro cerebro y sea 
conciencia.  Lo han apresado en ese pan para que, enterrándolo en nuestro cuerpo, 
resucite en nuestro espíritu. (DST 225) 
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The Word has been imprisoned in a piece of material bread, and it has been imprisoned 
therein to the end that we may eat it, and in eating it make it our own, part and parcel of 
our body in which the spirit dwells, and that it may beat in our heart and think in our 
brain and be consciousness.  It has been imprisoned in this bread in order that, after being 
buried in our body, it may come to life again in our spirit. (169-70) 
 
Although Unamuno’s Catholic heritage undoubtedly plays a role in deeming the sacrament of the 
Eucharist as the most specifically religious, he appears to suggest that it is in itself religious and 
not deemed so merely because it is a Catholic rite, or a practice of a religion.  This further 
suggests that the confounding of the physical nature of bodies is the essence of what he deems 
religious and that, through consciousness of this experience and reflection upon it, religious 
belief can be learned. 
 By deeming experiences in which bodies permeate other bodies as “religious” or “divine” 
Unamuno sets them apart from other experiences.  Taves writes that in setting things apart from 
other things, including experiences, the “religious” or the “divine” “are treated as qualities that 
manifest themselves in (anomalous) things; people recognize and respond to these qualities as to 
something that exists apart from themselves, even when they are manifest through their own 
bodies” (Experience 40).  She continues that “[w]hen they respond to such qualities, people 
believe they respond because these qualities exist as such independent of them and have the 
power to passively elicit a response in them” (Experience 40).  While Taves treats what some 
people deem “mystical” experiences here, her approach is helpful in understanding the 
intercorporeal and intracorporeal experiences in Unamuno’s work.  They are intracorporeal in 
that they are experiences of feelings and thoughts that manifest themselves in the body and 
intercorporeal in that others’ feelings, thoughts, and sometimes the body itself are felt as 
occupying, absorbing, passing through, and uniting with other bodies.  Ascribing a religious or 
divine character to these kinds of experiences means recognizing what such experiences might 
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look like or, more appropriately, feel like.  The divine or religious quality of the experience may 
then be seen as the cause of the experience and not the effect and, therefore, something that 
exists external to the body.  To understand this more clearly, we can consider again “el más 
específicamente religioso” sacrament of Communion.  By identifying the religious or the divine 
as qualities in themselves, Catholics can seek out and experience these qualities on Sundays.   
 Experiences that Unamuno deems religious are intimately tied to an agent.  Taves 
proposes that there are experiences suggestive of agency.  In such occurrences “people may 
postulate the presence of an agent to whom they then can attribute the power to act and affect 
things” (Experience 41).18  This may certainly clarify to some degree how Unamuno moves 
quickly from experience to animating inanimates and then to positing a superhuman agent but 
what still remains unclear is from what these experiences are set apart, why they are anomalous, 
and how some experiences can be suggestive of agency.  Setting things apart requires that there 
be other things against which the first set of things are distinguished and, if what is set apart is 
deemed religious, there must be things that are not necessarily so.  Relatedly, viewing some 
things or experiences as “anomalous” supposes that there are other things and experiences that 
are usual or ordinary.   
 Unamuno’s conception of man’s two instincts and the ontological categories and their 
subsequent intuitive expectations outlined above provide insight into what might be ordinary and 
what might be considered anomalous.  In DST, the example of man acting upon other physical 
objects and the story of the suffering parents illuminate the interrelatedness of the two instincts 
and the beliefs that can be learned through their interaction.  In Unamuno’s example of man 
acting upon a rock, his body operates according to how his non-reflective, intuitive knowledge 
                                                           
18Taves reaffirms this: “When people interpret feelings, perceptions, or sensations that are suggestive of agency as 
evidence of the presence of an actual agent, they attribute the experience to an external source” (Experience 41). 
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tells him it should.  The solidity and cohesion of the body and the rock, as impermeable physical 
objects, means that they cannot pass through each other and occupy the same space at the same 
time.  There is nothing special about it; everything functions the way his knowledge from the 
instinct of self-preservation dictates.  In the story of suffering parents, however, bodies and 
minds pass through each other and occupy the same space.  The two parents’ bodies, having 
come together through their instinct of perpetuation and, then, metarepresentations and 
communal suffering, do not operate as they intuitively should.  In short, these experiences are 
counterintuitive.  Barrett writes that “…ideas may be counterintuitive in two basic ways: either 
by breaching expectations, or by transferring expectations from one ontological category to 
another” (Cognitive 68).  In the example of the suffering parents, their union breaches spatiality 
and physicality and, therefore, are set apart.  What sets apart experiences deemed religious 
throughout Unamuno’s works are these sorts of breaches and transferences that make them 
counterintuitive.  Love, suffering, and compassion, as intracorporeal and intercorporeal 
experiences brought about by man’s instinct to perpetuate, violate or breach the intuitive 
expectations given to him by his instinct of self-preservation in two related ways.  Invading, 
possessing, and knowing other people and resurrecting, living, and being in them violates the 
expectations of physicality and spatiality, as in the example above. The subsequent attribution of 
consciousness to inanimate beings, such as the star or the sky, transfers expectations of one 
category to another; it transfers animacy from the categories of “persons” and “animals” to 
spatial entities.   
Gods Almost Like Us 
 In DST counterintuitive experiences give rise to counterintuitive agents.  When things run 
counter to intuitive expectations, Unamuno’s man of carne y hueso posits or intuits an agent as a 
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way of coping with the ambiguity and anomaly of counterintuitive experiences.19  Robert 
McCauley and Emma Cohen write that, “… when humans confront anomalous phenomena, i.e., 
phenomena that violate their intuitive expectations, they generate counter-intuitive 
representations in order to make sense of the state of affairs” (783).  These representations in 
Unamuno’s essay take the form of belief in superhuman agents, beings that are human with a 
little bit more.  In addition to reminding his reader throughout his work that its subject is a man 
of flesh and bone, Unamuno reiterates that the god that man posits or apprehends is also a man.   
 God in Unamuno’s thought exists for two related reasons: 1.) we cannot help but detect 
agency everywhere because of our cognition and language and; 2.) we need it for explanations of 
counterintuitive experiences.  Unamuno gives an example of the first reason by explaining that 
man, with very little information, detects agency: 
Ahí está una masa informe; parece una especie de animal; no se le distinguen miembros; 
sólo veo dos ojos, y ojos que me miran con mirada humana, de semejante, mirada que me 
pide compasión, y oigo que respira.  Y concluyo que en aquella masa informe hay una 
conciencia.  Y así, y no de otro modo, mira al creyente el cielo estrellado, con mirada 
sobrehumana, divina, que le pide suprema compasión y amor supremo, y oye en la noche 
serena la respiración de Dios que le toca en el cogollo del corazón, y se revela a él.  Es el 
Universo que vive, sufre, ama y pide amor. (DST 208) 
Here is a formless mass; it appears to be a kind of animal; it is impossible to distinguish 
its members; I only see two eyes, eyes which gaze at me with a human gaze, the gaze of a 
fellow-being, a gaze which asks for pity; and I hear it breathing.  I conclude that in this 
formless mass there is a consciousness.  In just such a way and none other, the starry-
eyed heavens gaze down upon the believer, with a superhuman, a divine, gaze, a gaze 
that asks for supreme pity and supreme love, and in the serenity of the night he hears the 
breathing of God, and God touches him in his heart of hearts and reveals Himself to him.  
It is the Universe, living, suffering, loving, and asking for love. (157) 
 
                                                           





In this example, not only do we see the easy attribution of agency to a “shapeless mass,” but also 
the immediate anthropomorphization of whatever the mass may be by giving it mentality.20  Man 
moves quickly from identifying something that seems like an animal species that looks, asks for 
compassion, and breathes to determining that this something has a conscience.  From here, he 
makes a comparison between this shapeless mass and the starry sky signifying the easy and 
immediate attribution of agency and mentality to something once man categorizes it as an 
animate or person. 
 Unamuno’s concept of language as knowledge learned through social interaction also 
gives form to counterintuitive agents.  Language constrains how something like a “formless 
mass” is perceived and beliefs about it acquired.  He writes, “El sentimiento del mundo, sobre el 
que se funda la comprensión de él, es necesariamente antropomórfico y mitopeico….  Debajo de 
la Naturaleza y del mundo, palpitaban creaciones míticas, antropomórficas.  La lengua misma lo 
llevaba consigo” (“Our feeling of the world, upon which is based our understanding of it, is 
necessarily anthropomorphic and mythopeic….  Beneath nature and the world, mythical and 
anthropomorphic creations throbbed with life.  They were implicated in the structure of language 
itself”; DST 159; 122).  His use of “palpitaban” and “llevaba” in the imperfect does not indicate, 
however, that language used to constrain humans’ perceptions and now it does not.  He 
continues: “Y nada sirve querer suprimir ese proceso mitopeico o antropomórfico y racionalizar 
                                                           
20Barrett (2007 and 2011) adds the “mental tool” of hypersensitive agency detection device as part of cognitive 
systems.  This tool is posited as an evolved mechanism that detects agency everywhere.  Barrett suggests that 
humans developed such a device for survival.  The reasoning is that it is safer to assume that an agent is behind 
some inexplicable event or phenomenon than not to.  For example, if I am walking home from the library late at 
night, it is better from a survival standpoint to assume that a moving dark mass is a rabid dog than to assume it is 
merely the wind blowing the leaves of a bush.  If I assume the former and avoid the mysterious mass, I live whether 
I am right or wrong but, if I assume the latter and head in the direction of the shadow, I may live if I am right but, if 
not, the decision could be fatal.  Unamuno, however, does not posit agency detection as some sort of evolved, 
adaptive strategy; he simply postulates through examples like the one above that man detects agency and attributes 
animacy without saying why.  
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nuestro pensamiento, como si se pensara sólo para pensar y conocer, y no para vivir.  La lengua 
misma, con la que pensamos, nos lo impide.  La lengua, sustancia del pensamiento, es un sistema 
de metáforas a base mítica y antropomórfica” (“And it avails us nothing to seek to repress this 
mythopeic or anthropomorphic process and to rationalize our thought, as if we thought only for 
the sake of thinking and knowing, and not for the sake of living.  The very language with which 
we think prevents us from doing so.  Language, the substance of thought, is a system of 
metaphors with a mythic and anthropomorphic base”; DST 160; 123).  Here Unamuno, as he so 
often does, subtly reminds his reader that he is reading a story constructed with an imprecise 
tool.  He simultaneously criticizes rational attempts to explain superhuman agents and says that 
they ultimately fail because the same language early humans used in explaining their world 
functions the same way in modern man while he also self-consciously sheds a critical light on his 
own story of man’s two instincts.  Language, however, as a system of metaphors, according to 
Unamuno, enables humans to understand things in relation to other things and relates one 
unknown field of knowledge to a known one.21  If, for example, one feels as if the physical 
properties of his or her body are violated and there is no intuitive explanation for it, he or she 
may explain this unknown experience relating it to something familiar.  In DST, Unamuno 
explains the unknown experience of a superhuman agent by relating it to the familiar experience 
of human agents: “Creo en Dios como creo en mis amigos, por sentir el aliento de su cariño y su 
mano invisible e intangible que me trae y me lleva y me estruja, por tener íntima conciencia de 
una providencia particular y de una mente universal que me traza mi propio destino” (“I believe 
                                                           
21Tweed (2006) treats metaphors in defining religion and remarks that “…it is not surprising that the religious would 
turn to tropes, especially analogical utterances, to talk about suprahuman forces and ultimate horizons, since those 





in God as I believe in my Friends, because I feel the breath of His affection, feel His invisible 
and intangible hand, drawing me, leading me, grasping me; because I possess an inner 
consciousness of a particular providence and of a universal mind that marks out for me the 
course of my own destiny”; 207; 156-57).  In Unamuno’s example of how he believes in god, 
language relates god, the unknown field, to friends, the known or familiar.  The religious concept 
“god” is constrained in his explanation by the language that he uses and the relational field.  God 
is human but also superhuman in that it possess counterintuitive characteristics such as being 
invisible and omnipresent. 
 But, why a superhuman agent?  Why can’t the concepts of love, compassion, and pain be 
enough to explain why one physical object passes through and occupies the space of another?22  
The answer is simple: concepts and ideas do not do anything.  Only agents with mentality have 
the ability to act and cause things to happen.  God becomes man not only because our cognitive 
tools and language cannot help but anthropomorphize it but because a “person” is the most 
complicated thing we can think of.  According to Barrett, “[a]ppealing to the activity of an 
average person (let alone a super person) can account for a greater variety of things than to the 
average rock…” (Cognitive 106).  And, to borrow a term from Boyer, “persons” have much 
more “inferential potential” than anything we can think of.  If we add to the category of “person” 
one or a few counterintuitive elements such as being invisible or being able to be in more than 
                                                           
22Here is one of the major differences between Unamuno’s thought and that of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872).  
Feuerbach maintains that god is man’s own nature projected outward: “Man – this is the mystery of religion – 
projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus 
converted into a subject…” (29-30). He goes on to write, “Love is God himself, and apart from it there is no God” 
(48).  And finally, Feuerbach advocates for focusing on love: “…thus love is a higher power and truth than deity.  
Love conquers God” (53).  For Unamuno, love and other feelings, especially suffering, can serve to intuit god but 
Unamuno never maintains that man creates god or that god creates man but rather that they mutually create each 




one place at one time, the “inferential potential” of such an agent is that much more far reaching 
(Cognitive 106-07). 
 The first reason as to why God must necessarily be a person connects to the second 
reason, giving explanations as to why things happen.  Unamuno juxtaposes an Idea-God with his 
“Dios cordial” (“God of the heart”) to highlight how god as an idea is a meaningless concept.  
Using evolutionary psychology he explains how god as an idea has taken shape: primitive man 
believed in a personal, anthropomorphic god but, throughout the centuries, reason stripped this 
god of its human attributes and it evaporated into an idea.  The problem for Unamuno is that an 
idea does not have mental states with desires and cannot act on these desires.  The moment it 
does, it is no longer simply an idea but something to which mentality and animacy is attributed.23  
More importantly, ideas cannot explain final causes.  Unamuno writes, “[l]a idea de Dios en nada 
nos ayuda para comprender mejor la existencia, la esencia y la finalidad del Universo” (“In no 
way whatever does the idea of God help us to understand better the existence, the essence and 
the finality of the Universe”; DST 175; 134).  A personal, anthropomorphic god that can act in 
any domain of life and intervene in human affairs, on the other hand, does have this ability 
(Barrett, Cognitive 107).  A god with the mentality and animacy of a person plus some 
counterintuitive element such as being omnipresent can explain a wide range of final causes 
(Barrett, Cognitive 106-07).  Counterintuitive experiences of love and suffering, for example, can 
                                                           
23Peter Westh (2013) provides an interesting analysis of experiments about anthropomorphism done by Barrett and 
Frank C. Keil (Barrett and Keil 1996; Barrett 1998).  In the experiment subjects from a variety of religious traditions 
were given eight short narratives with god as a protagonist.  When experimenters asked subjects to recall the story, 
they found that what the majority said was not “theologically correct,” meaning that their description of god in the 
story went against the theology of their tradition.  The experimenters concluded that, under the cognitive pressure of 
performing the comprehension task, subjects anthropomorphized god to understand the stories.  Westh points out 
that god was already anthropomorphized in the task’s prompt.  His analysis speaks to Unamuno’s contention that an 
anthropomorphized god maybe constrained by the stories we tell and the language with which we tell them, whether 





be explained as happening because some agent made it so.  For Unamuno, all counterintuitive 
experiences are teleological.  None of them simply happen and are left with no explanation.  God 
as a superhuman agent is the only source of explanation for these occurrences and the universe 
itself: 
Y esta personalización del todo, del Universo… [e]s el único modo de dar al Universo 
finalidad, dándole conciencia.  Porque donde no hay conciencia no hay tampoco finalidad 
que supone un propósito.  Y la fe en Dios no estriba, como veremos, sino en la necesidad 
vital de dar finalidad a la existencia, de hacer que responda a un propósito.  No para 
comprender el porqué, sino para sentir y sustentar el para qué último, necesitamos a 
Dios, para dar sentido al Universo. (DST 167-68)24 
And this personalization of the all, of the Universe…[is] the only way to give finality to 
the world….  For where there is no consciousness there is no finality, finality 
presupposing a purpose.  And, as we shall see, faith in God is based simply upon the vital 
need of giving finality to existence, of making it answer to a purpose.  We need God, not 
in order to understand the why, but in order to feel and sustain the ultimate wherefore, to 
give a meaning to the Universe. (128) 
 
For Unamuno, there must always be a reason why or “for what” the universe and humans exist 
and this reason is the possibility of immortality.  The possibility of a life after death, according to 
Unamuno, can only be conceived of as being given by a person.  He writes, “[s]e cree a una 
persona y a Dios en cuanto persona y personalización del Universo” (“[w]e believe in a person 
and in God in so far as He is a person and a personalization of the Universe”), and later, “[s]ólo 
se confía en las personas” (“Confidence is placed only in persons”; DST 200-01; 152).  If man 
entertains any concept of a life after death, it can only be promised by a person.  Only a person 
has the ability to promise and humans can only trust a person because anything other than a 
person lacks mentality and thus the ability to believe, desire, or promise anything and the ability 
to act on these beliefs, desires, and promises.   
 
 
                                                           
24The italics are in the original emphasizing Unamuno’s teleology. 
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Counterintuitive Experiences and Agents in Fiction 
 While experiences deemed religious in DST are largely ones suggestive of agency, in 
fiction these experiences are directly attributed to a superhuman agent.  Taves distinguishes 
between these two types of experience.  During experiences suggestive of agency, as in DST, 
people can postulate a superhuman agent and attribute qualities to it.  During experiences that are 
directly attributed to an agent, however, “an agent is presumed to exist and something is 
attributed to the presumed agent based on people’s knowledge of or beliefs about the agent in 
question” (Experience 41).  In other words, in this second type of experience an agent already 
exists or is already postulated to which actions can be attributed.   
As in DST, Unamuno’s fiction presents experiences of love, suffering, and pain as 
violations of intuitive expectations of physicality and spatiality.  In AP, the first experience of 
love as a violation of physical limits occurs when Avito Carrascal meets Marina, his future wife 
and mother of Apolodoro and Rosa.  Although he intends to ask Leoncia to marry him after 
reasoning that she is the best candidate to give birth to his genius son, he meets Marina and is 
immediately struck.  He begins to feel something but the good positivist is not sure how to 
classify it: “Pero ¿qué es esto?, ¿qué es esto que me pasa?, ¿qué me pasa?” (“But what is this?  
What’s going on?  What’s happening to me?”; AP 46; 25).  Physical symptoms start to manifest 
and an interior voice speaks to him: “Y al observarlo Carrascal oye una voz que en su interior le 
dice: ‘¡Alma primitiva, protoplasmática, virginal!  ¡Corazón inconsciente!’, a la vez que su 
corazón, consciente y todo, empieza a acelerar su martilleo” (“And when Carrascal sees this he 
hears a voice from his interior which says to him: ‘A primitive soul, protoplasmic, virginal!  An 
unconscious heart!’ at the very moment that his own heart, conscious and all, begins to beat 
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faster”; AP 47; 26).  Avito decides to think over the event in his sleep and comes to the 
conclusion rather quickly that he is in love with Marina.   
In addition to Avito’s own thoughts on his experience, the narrator’s comments and 
Avito’s dialogue with Marina provide clarification for this event that Avito’s “¿qué me pasa?” 
suggests needs explanation.  After concluding that he must be in love, the narrator gives a 
description of Avito’s inner struggle: “... agítansele ondulantes las oscuras entrañas espirituales; 
el elemento plutoniano del alma amenaza destruir la secular labor de la neptuniana ciencia, tal 
como así lo concibe, en geológica metáfora, el mismo Carrascal, escenario trágico del combate.  
‘Ha entrado en juego el Inconciente’, se dice a cada paso” (“…his darkest, innermost spiritual 
depths shake him in waves; the Plutonian part of his soul is threatening to undo the secular labor 
carried out by Neptunian science – thus, in geological metaphors, does Carrascal, the tragic 
setting of the conflict, conceive of it. ‘The Unconscious has entered the game,’ he says to himself 
at every new turn”; AP 48; 27).  The narrator attributes this experience to some sort of spiritual 
awakening but Avito himself, as a man of science, stops short of declaring the battle over in 
favor of the soul and the unconscious.  After Marina accepts Avito’s proposal to marry, they 
meet again and Avito goes off on tangents trying to give a scientific explanation for the 
formation of habits and how bees make their queen.  Marina responds with a “¡Dios mío!” to 
each of Avito’s digressions, something she continues to do throughout the novel.  Avito’s 
reaction to Marina’s exclamation during this second meeting suggests that their love encounter 
might have something to do with a religious experience: “¿Por Dios?  ¿Dios?...  Bueno…, sí…, 
todo es cuestión de entenderlo…  Acabarás por hacerme creer en él” (“For God’s sake?  
God?...all right…it’s all a question of how you look at it…you’ll end up making me believe in 
him…”; AP 52; 31).  His answer to Marina reveals two things: 1.) the possibility that a 
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superhuman agent is behind these inexplicable feelings and; 2.) his context, having shaped his 
belief, does not allow him to accept god as a possible explanation at this moment.  From the 
beginning of the novel, the narrator describes Avito Carrascal as a man who believes that 
science, both natural and social, can explain everything.  Because of his belief in science he 
rejects any religious explanation for his anomalous experience upon meeting Marina. 
Avito’s son, Apolodoro, will have an experience similar to that of his father but his 
attributions will differ.  Like his father, Apolodoro meets a girl, Clarita, who has a profound 
physical effect on him that he cannot explain: “El pobre corazón le toca a rebato, ¿qué es esto?” 
(“His poor heart sounds the alarm: what is this?”; AP 115; 92).  He finally meets Clarita again at 
the house of his art teacher, Don Epifanio, who is also Clarita’s father.  The same physical 
effects that Avito experienced when meeting Marina affect Apolodoro; his heart beat quickens, 
blood rushes to his head, and he cannot seem to put together a sentence.  Also like his father, 
Apolodoro continues to experience these effects while thinking before bed but the narrator’s 
description of Apolodoro’s feelings more markedly points to a dissolution of the self and 
violations of space: “Y Apolodoro siente de noche, en la cama, como si se le hinchase el cuerpo 
todo y fuera creciendo y ensanchándose y llenándolo todo, y, a la vez, que se le alejan los 
horizontes del alma y le hinche un ambiente infinito” (“And at night in his bed, Apolodoro feels 
as if his whole body were swelling and growing and filling out and filling everything up, and at 
the same time, it’s as if his soul’s horizons were receding from him, as if he were being filled by 
an infinite expanse”; AP 124; 99).  While Apolodoro does not directly attribute this dissolution to 
a superhuman agent, he does immediately begin to pray: “Esta noche sorpréndese Apolodoro con 
que las oraciones que de niño anidara en su memoria la madre le revolotean en torno a la cabeza, 
rozándole los labios a las veces con sus tenues alas.  Y tras un ‘¡Pobre padre!’ susurrado 
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mentalmente, encuéntrase con el padrenuestro en la boca” (“Tonight Apolodoro is surprised that 
the prayers his mother had nested in his memory when he was a child are flying about his head, 
at times grazing his slips with their soft wings.  And after a mentally whispered ‘Poor father!’ he 
finds himself with the paternoster on his lips”; AP 125; 100).  That Apolodoro “surprises 
himself” and “finds himself” thinking about and saying the Our Father suggests that this 
unintended behavior relates to a positing of a superhuman agent non-reflectively. 
The son’s experience parallels that of the father but they account for it quite differently.  
The two analogous experiences that the characters set apart as something in need of explanation 
highlight how both cognition and context shape belief.  In both cases they undergo physical 
changes in the body that affect their minds.  They both feel violations of themselves as connected 
wholes and impermeable bodies and both, rather quickly, believe themselves to be in love.  
However, because their contexts vary so greatly, they have very different reactions to 
comparable experiences.  On the one hand, the narrator gives a detailed description of Avito as a 
man who does not remember being a child and who believes that religion is nothing but fantasy 
and superstition.  On the other, Apolodoro is described as being a product of the opposing forces 
of his religious mother and positivist father.25  Apolodoro’s praying after his experience is not 
just an example of the triumph of his religious education at the hands of his mother over the 
scientific one of his father.  His father’s request that he form a conception of the world sets the 
context for his experience.  At the very moment Apolodoro is to form a notion of the world, 
                                                           
25Julia Barella summarizes these oppositions in her introduction to AP: “Marina, instinto, amor y ensoñación, 
influye en su hijo Apolodoro, al que bautiza en secreto con el nombre cristiano de Luis y colma de irracionales y 
continuos besos y caricias, mientras don Avito, el padre, la ciencia, procura ir imponiendo en su hijo una formación 
basada en la razón y en la objetividad” (“Marina, instinct, love, and unconsciousness, influences her son, Apolodoro, 
whom she baptizes in secret with the Christian name, Luis, and fills him with irrationalities and continuous kisses 





which has been marked by confusion until this point, he has a sighting of a girl.  The pursuit of 
this girl gives him orientation in life and he feels a connection to the world around him. His 
religious education, however, gives him something to which attribute this anomalous experience.  
Before going to bed, he does not merely contemplate the possibility that a vague superhuman 
agent may have been acting, like his father had done, but rather he prays a very specific prayer to 
a Christian god.   
While Apolodoro’s religious education provides him with a specific agent to whom direct 
his experience of love, Unamuno suggests throughout AP, as he does in DST, that 
anthropomorphizing is simply part of human thought through language.  Before Carrascal 
announces that he is going to be a father he says, “[t]iempo hace que maduro un vasto plan para 
llevar a la prática mis teorías, aplicando mi pedagogía sociológica en tabula rasa…” (“[f]or 
some time now I’ve been working on an important plan so I can put my ideas into practice and 
apply my sociological pedagogy in tabula rasa…”; AP 43; 23).26  However, as the story 
progresses, we see that the human mind is not a blank slate but an interpretive tool that 
constrains thought through language.  Avito decides to send his son to school for a “social 
education” but, when his son explains that the sun tells the planets where to go, he is afraid that 
schooling will undo his plan of educating his son in the sciences: “¡Oh, la escuela, la escuela!  
¡Le están enseñando en ella antropomorfismo!  ¿Que el sol dice?... Y ¿cómo le desarraigo esto?  
¿Desarraigar?  ¿Pero es que tiene raíces?  La lengua misma con que hacemos la ciencia está llena 
de metáforas.  Mientras no la hagamos con álgebra no habrá cosa buena” (“Oh, that school, that 
school!  Now they’re teaching him anthropomorphism there!  The sun tells the planets..?  And 
how am I going to uproot this?  Uproot it?  But does it have roots, then?  Uproot!  The very 
                                                           
26The italics are in the original. 
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language we use to carry out science is full of metaphors.  As long as we don’t do it with algebra 
no good will come of it”; AP 91; 69).  As in DST, anthropomorphization, through language, 
shapes the way man views the world and even science is not safe from metaphorical language.  
Avito himself, while not exactly anthropomorphizing, cannot help but use religious language in 
explaining science.  When his son asks him about the brick with the word “Science” written on it 
next to a little wheel, he cannot contain his excitement at his son noticing his altar to science yet 
he invokes the name of god: “¡Gracias a Dios, hijo, gracias a Dios! […]  Mira, Apolodoro, hay 
que dar algo a la imaginación, sí, hay que dar algo a la imaginación, creadora de las religiones; 
necesita su válvula de seguridad.  Ése es el altar de la religión de la cultura” (“Thank God, my 
boy, thank God! […]  Look, Apolodoro, we must give the imagination something, that’s right, 
we have to give something to the imagination, the creator of religions; it needs a safety valve.  
That little tile is the altar to the religion of culture”; AP 94; 72).  Of course, here and whenever 
Avito strays from purely “scientific” explanations and language, his interior voice reminds him, 
“[c]aíste, caíste, y seguirás cayendo” (“You’ve fallen, you’ve fallen, and you’ll continue to fall”; 
AP 94; 72).  Despite these “transgressions,” however, Avito remains steadfast in his plan to 
educate his son only in the sciences. 
Not until Apolodoro kills himself does Avito abandon science, and even then he does so 
momentarily.  Upon Apolodoro’s suicide, Avito joins his wife in mutual pain: “Aunque la 
congoja ahoga al infeliz Avito y a su mujer, hanse redimido uno y otro en el común dolor; 
Carrascal se ha dormido y Marina ha despertado a tal punto que ha logrado la pobre Materia que 
se arrodille junto a ella la Forma y rece a dúo, elevando su corazón a Dios” (“Although the 
wretched Avito and his wife are choked by grief, both have found redemption in their common 
pain: Carrascal has fallen asleep and Marina has awakened, to such a point that the poor Matter 
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has managed to get the Form to kneel down at her side and to pray with her, raising their hearts 
to God”; AP 174; 148).  Like Unamuno’s example of two parents mourning the death of their 
child in DST, Avito and Marina metarepresent each other’s suffering and the two physical beings 
become one and, from this experience, Avito connects with god.  Given the context provided by 
the narration of the story, it is perhaps understandable or even predictable that Marina would 
pray to god after the death of her child: she is a Christian who has chosen a Christian name for 
her son and has baptized him.  Given the characterization of Avito as a man of science who 
rejects religion as fantasy and superstition, however, his acknowledging a god and praying to it is 
not predictable.  This passage of the novel highlights even more than experiences of love what a 
religious experience might look like.  Death is not the catalyst of a religious experience but 
rather the counterintuitiveness of the violation of physicality upon joining his wife in common 
suffering.  The death of Rosa, Avito and Marina’s daughter, serves to highlight this.  When Rosa 
dies, Avito approaches death biologically rather than religiously.  As he observes his dying 
daughter, he narrates: “Va a concluir el proceso vital; el cianógeno o biógeno que dicen otros, 
pierde su explosividad, estallando, y se convierte en albúmina muerta.  ¿Qué íntimos procesos 
bioquímicos se verifican aquí?” (“The vital process is going to come to an end; the cyanogen, or 
according to others the byogen, loses its explosivity in bursting, and is converted into dead 
albumen.  What intimate biochemical processes are taking place here?”; AP 158; 132).  Avito 
does not share in his wife and son’s suffering and, therefore, does not posit any superhuman 
agent at work because there is, to him, nothing anomalous or counterintuitive to explain.   
Experience follows a very similar pattern in Niebla. Augusto Pérez catches a glimpse of a 
woman, finds out her name, and writes her a letter.  Like Apolodoro, Augusto has not even met 
the woman he is falling for but this foggy sighting has already had a profound effect on him.  In 
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a discussion with his friend Víctor, who notices Augusto’s altered state, he declares that he has 
fallen in love, which does not come as a surprise to Víctor.  Before meeting Eugenia, the woman 
he has fallen in love with, this experience of love violates properties of physicality.  When Víctor 
says “Eugenita,” “Eugenia” in its diminutive form, Augusto contemplates: “¿Por qué el 
diminutivo es señal de cariño? … ¿Es acaso que el amor achica la cosa amada?” (“Why is the 
diminutive a mark of affection? … Can it be that love makes the loved one smaller?”; Niebla 
123).27  As he continues to contemplate Eugenia, he begins to lose himself in her.  He repeatedly 
calls her “mi Eugenia” in an attempt to possess the thing he loves and to make it a part of 
himself. 28   Augusto attributes these feelings to love and surmises that “[e]l amor es un éxtasis; 
nos saca de nosotros mismos” (“Love is an ecstasy; it takes us out of ourselves”; Niebla 130; 
53).29  When he finally meets Eugenia face to face, the physical symptoms of love intensify as he 
is absorbed by her: “… los ojos de Eugenia … dieron como una nueva y misteriosa luz espiritual 
a la escena.  Y Augusto se sintió tranquilo, enormemente tranquilo, clavado a su asiento y como 
si fuese una planta nacida en él, como algo vegetal, olvidado de sí, absorto en la misteriosa luz 
espiritual, que de aquellos ojos irradiaba” (“…the eyes of Eugenia…appeared on the scene and 
seemed to shed upon it a new and mysterious spiritual light.  And Augusto felt himself to be 
quite calm, tremendously calm, fixed to his seat as if he were a plant that had grown there, as if, 
indeed, he were some sort of vegetable, unconscious of himself and absorbed in the mysterious 
                                                           
27I have followed Fite’s translation except for how he uses “achicar.”  His translation of this last question is, “Can it 
be that love makes the loved one childish?”  It seems to me that “achicar” here means “to shrink” or “to make 
smaller.”  Furthermore, this use makes sense in relation to how love seems to change the physical properties of the 
body in both AP and Niebla. 
 
28Robert Spires (1984) points to Augusto’s attempt to claim authority over Eugenia as his own creation (39). 
 
29Unless noted otherwise, all translations of Niebla are from Warner Fite. 
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spiritual light radiating from those eyes”; Niebla 144; 77).  Love again plays a fundamental role 
in violations of physicality and anomalous experience.   
As in AP, the experience of love as a violation of physicality is still in need of further 
explanation.  Augusto’s interior monologues and his dialogues with Víctor and his dog Orfeo 
provide the spaces within which he tries to understand his experiences.  In one of his 
monologues, after only having caught a glimpse of Eugenia, Augusto is quick to attribute his 
experience to a superhuman agent: “¡Gracias a Dios – se decía camino de la avenida de la 
Almeda –, gracias a Dios que sé a dónde voy y que tengo a donde ir!  Esta mi Eugenia es una 
bendición de Dios.  Ya ha dado una finalidad, un hito de término a mis vagabundeos callejeros” 
(“‘Thanks be to God,’ he said to himself as he passed down the Avenida de la Alameda, ‘thanks 
be to God that I know now where I am going and that I have somewhere to go.  This Eugenia of 
mine is a blessing from God.  She has now brought a purpose and a goal into my wanderings 
about the streets’”; Niebla 117; 33-34).  Augusto continues to attribute to god his experiences of 
love.  He believes that falling in love with Eugenia has awakened in him a faculty for loving.  On 
his way to the casino to talk to Víctor he is almost magnetically drawn to three different women 
which causes him to exclaim, “¡Gracias, Señor, gracias; gratias agimus tibi propter magnam 
gloriam tuam!  ¡Tu Gloria es la hermosura de la mujer, Señor!” (“Thanks, O Lord, thanks to 
thee, gratias agimus tibi propter magnam gloriam tuam….  Thy glory is the beauty of woman”; 
Niebla 154; 93).  In both cases, falling in love with Eugenia and then falling in love with all 
women, god serves as a superhuman agent, something posited as existing outside of Augusto that 
can intervene in his affairs, and something to which attribute the anomalous experience of love 
and the violations of physicality that it implies. 
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Like in AP, both violations of cognitive expectations and context plays a role in shaping 
Augusto’s beliefs.  The very first description the narrator gives of the protagonist is someone 
without direction, literally and figuratively.  Upon exiting his house and not knowing where to 
go, he says to himself, “Esperaré a que pase un perro y tomaré la dirección inicial que él tome” 
(“‘I will wait until a dog passes,’ he said, ‘and I will start out in the direction that he takes’”; 
Niebla 110; 22).  This initial description provides the context for Augusto’s experience: he wants 
and is waiting for some kind of orientation and, as Eugenia fortuitously passes by instead of a 
dog, he readily attributes chance “encounter” to the intervention of a superhuman agent.  
Eugenia’s passing by Augusto’s house is not in itself anything remarkable but, when understood 
in relation to his desire for orientation, the timing of such an event becomes an anomalous 
experience and, as such, cause for reflection. Augusto’s disposition here informs his belief: 
Eugenia gives him direction in the streets and in life at the very moment he was searching for it.  
He concludes that because this woman passed by at this moment to fulfill this desire, something 
must have made all of this come together.  Immediately he attributes this to god by thanking it. 
Experiences deemed religious are counterintuitive experiences that violate the spatiality 
and physicality of two people in AP and Niebla.  In SMBM, however, what is deemed religious 
involves counterintuitive experiences that violate the physicality and spatiality of the people of 
an entire town, Valverde de Lucerna, the town where the story takes place.  The first description 
that Ángela, the narrator, gives of her beloved parish priest, Don Manuel, is that of his voice and 
the power it has to unite and move the entire town: “Su maravilla era la voz, una voz divina, que 
hacía llorar.  Cuando al oficiar en misa mayor o solemne entonaba el prefacio, estremecíase la 
iglesia y todos los que le oían sentíanse conmovidos en sus entrañas” (“The marvel of Don 
Manuel was his voice; a divine voice which brought one close to weeping.  Whenever he said a 
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Solemn High Mass and intoned the prelude, a tremor ran through the congregation and all within 
sound of his voice were moved to the depths of their being”; SMBM 71-72; 8).  Don Manuel has 
such an effect that, when he interprets the suffering of Christ on the cross exclaiming “¡Dios mío, 
Dios mío!, ¿por qué me has abandonado?” (“My God, my God, my God, why hast Thou 
forsaken me?”; 71; 8-9), it causes his mother to respond “¡Hijo mío!” (“My child!”) and Blasillo, 
the “village idiot,” to continuously repeat the words of the parish priest.  His mother’s 
exclamation and Blasillo’s echoing in turn cause the entire congregation to cry.  Ángela deems 
his voice “divine” explaining that it had the power to provoke feelings in the townspeople and 
move them to their very core.  Ángela later emphasizes this “holy” union of the town: “Había un 
santo ejercicio que introdujo en el culto popular, y es que, reuniendo en el templo a todo el 
pueblo, hombre y mujeres, viejos y niños, unas mil personas, recitábamos al unísono, en una sola 
voz, el Credo….  Y no era un coro, sino una sola voz, una voz simple y unida, fundidas todas en 
una…” (“He introduced one holy practice to the popular cult; it consisted in getting the whole 
town inside the church, men and women, ancients and youths, some thousand persons; there we 
recited the Creed, in unison, so that it sounded like a single voice….  It was not a chorus, but a 
single voice, a simple united voice…”; SMBM 74; 10-11). The townspeople, in their collective 
experience, metarepresent the thoughts of Don Manuel and each other and are able feel what he 
feels, or at least what they believe he feels.30  They collectively participate in Don Manuel’s pain 
and sadness as they believe he reenacts the anguish of a dying Christ.   
                                                           
30It bears repeating here that metarepresentations can be false.  For example, when Don Manuel exclaims, “Dios 
mío, Dios mío! ¿Por qué me has abandonado?” (“My God, my God!  Why have you abandoned me?”), the 
townspeople may believe that he is channeling the agony of a dying Christ but the reader may believe that the priest 
is expressing his own agony of not being able to believe in a life after death.  I say “may believe” here and not 
“know” because there is no way to be certain.  I will address this uncertainty in chapter four when I discuss 
Unamuno’s metarepresentations of his readers. 
117 
 
 A concept of a superhuman agent active in their affairs already exists for the people of 
Valverde de Lucerna and Ángela, as it does at the beginning of Niebla and for Marina and 
Apolodoro en AP.  Both, at the beginning of Ángela’s confession anyway, believe there is a god.  
Ángela relates the town’s belief in her description of Don Manuel’s preaching: “Jamás en sus 
sermones se ponía a declamar contra impíos, masones, liberales o herejes.  ¿Para qué, si no los 
había en la aldea?” (“In his sermons he never lashed against unbelievers, Masons, liberals or 
heretics.  What for?  There were none in the village!”; SMBM 75; 12).  She reveals her own 
belief in a conversation with Don Manuel:  
Pero tú, Angelita, tú crees como a los diez años, ¿no es así?  ¿Tú crees? 
      Sí creo, padre. (SMBM 98) 
 Angelita, you have the same faith you had when you were ten, don’t you?  You 
believe, don’t you? 
      I believe, Father. (39) 
 
The belief of the townspeople and Ángela, as well as the sermons taking place in a Catholic 
church and the discussions taking place during the Catholic sacrament of confession, create a 
context in which counterintuitive experiences can be attributed to an agent that already exists 
but, in the distorting and mixing of secular and religious narratives in SMBM, the superhuman 
agent takes on a different form.  What makes SMBM stand out from the other two works of 
fiction I treat in this dissertation is that the town itself becomes that agent. Outside the sacred 
space of the church and sacred act of confession, the town collectively takes on agency and acts 
in its people.  When Ángela finally speaks to Don Manuel after finding out that he does not 
believe in a life after death, the priest asks the young girl to absolve him of his sin with the 
authority of the animated town: 
 “Y ahora, Angelina, en nombre del pueblo, ¿me absuelves?” 
     Me sentí como penetrada de un misterioso sacerdote y le dije: 
      “En nombre de Dios Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo, le absuelvo, padre.” (SMBM 100) 
“Now, Angelita, in the name of the people, do you absolve me?” 
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     I felt pierced by a mysterious and priestly prompting and said: 
     “In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, I absolve you, Father.” (41) 
 
Ángela’s narration and response suggest that through the violation of the physicality of her own 
body she can act with the authority that the town has invested in her and that the town has 
metaphorically become the Catholic Trinity.  Valverde de Lucerna as a collective whole becomes 
an anthropomorphized space that can act and that has a soul.   
Don Manuel’s life’s work is to save the soul of his town by keeping its people happy and 
believing in a god that guarantees eternal life, the very thing the tormented priest does not 
believe.  His work keeps the town happy and its soul alive in its unity: 
Yo estoy para hacer vivir a las almas de mis feligreses, para hacerles felices, para 
hacerles que se sueñen inmortales y no para matarles.  Lo que aquí hace falta es que 
vivan sanamente, que vivan en unanimidad de sentido, y con la verdad, con mi verdad, no 
vivirían. (SMBM 96)  
I am put here to give life to the souls of my charges, to make them happy, to make them 
dream they are immortal – and not to destroy them.  The important thing is that they live 
sanely, in harmony with each other, - and with the truth, with my truth, they could not 
live at all. (36) 
 
Later in the novel we see that Don Manuel’s way of living, even though he may not believe in a 
life after death, is what Lázaro deems religious.  After the priest’s death, Lázaro gives advice to 
the priest who comes to replace him and seeks to emulate him: “Poca teología, ¿eh?, poca 
teología, religión, religión” (“Very little theology, Father, very little theology.  Religion, religion, 
religion”; SMBM 115; 58).  Taking into account what Don Manuel preached and how he lived, it 
becomes clear that “religion” means living for and through others. It consists of experiences in 
which solid bodies pass through others and in the animation of the communion of those bodies.  
At the end of Ángela’s confession we see how Don Manuel’s religion lives on in her: 
Y él me enseñó a vivir, él nos enseñó a vivir, a sentir la vida, a sentir el sentido de la 
vida, a sumergirnos en el alma de la montaña, en el alma del lago, en el alma del pueblo 
de la aldea, a perdernos en ellas para quedar en ellas.  Él me enseñó con su vida a 
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perderme en la vida del pueblo de mi aldea, a perdernos en ellas para quedar en ellas….  
No vivía yo ya en mí, sino que vivía en mi pueblo y mi pueblo vivía en mí. (SMBM 118) 
And he taught me to live, he taught us to live, to feel life, to feel the meaning of life, to 
merge with the soul of the mountain, with the soul of the lake, with the sould of the 
village, to lose ourselves in them so as to remain in them forever….  I no longer lived in 
myself, but in my people, and my people lived in me. (62) 
 
Ángela concludes her confession not sure what she believes but knowing that she lives.  The 
entire town of Valverde de Lucerna, through Don Manuel’s, Ángela’s, and Unamuno’s 
enchanting words and their twisting of secular and religious stories, becomes simultaneously a 






CHAPTER 3: LOCATING RELIGION: NOW AND THEN, HERE AND THERE 
  
I have been arguing that what Unamuno and his characters deem religious are 
experiences that violate intuitive expectations and that transfer animacy and mentality to non-
living things.  I have tried to show how Unamuno twists and distorts a secular script in his 
reformulation of religion and that this has structured his narratives.  In this chapter I continue by 
examining how this reformulation might constitute a story of enchantment.  It may seem that any 
naturalistic approach to religion would explain it away by “reducing” it to psychic capacities or 
evolutionary adaptations, among other things, but this may only be the case if it is believed that 
any apprehension of superhuman agents by natural means is done so in error.1 
 Thus far, I have been using the term “superhuman” as opposed to “supernatural” because 
the agents that Unamuno or his characters posit do not exist over and above nature.  They do, 
however, possess counterintuitive characteristics such as being omniscient or omnipresent while 
maintaining human forms which would make them superhuman.  I have also been using the term 
                                                           
1I have employed Barrett’s formulation of a cognitive approach to religion as opposed to others precisely because he 
does not see this approach as being incompatible with theism.  He addresses critics that maintain that approaching 
religion as a process of cognition means explaining it away: “Our cognitive equipment might be fine for finding 
human agency with bodies and the like, but it produces belief in beings that do not exist such as ghosts and fairies 
and so it cannot be trusted when applied to gods.  The difficulty with such a line is that it assumes that we know that 
there are no disembodied or invisible agents, so when our cognitive systems detect one, they do so in error.  Such an 
argument is what is known as ‘assuming facts not in evidence’…” (Cognitive 110).  He later explains the 
compatibility of the Cognitive Science of Religion with theism: “A scientific explanation of how human cognitive 
systems form beliefs in gods only ‘explains away’ gods if you already believe they don’t exist.  For believers, such 
explanations just specify the means by which actual gods are perceived and understood” (Cognitive 150). 
David Leech and Aku Visala (2011) also maintain that a cognitive approach can be compatible with theistic claims: 
“In the case of theism, we can claim that the supernatural reality has set up our cognitive systems in such a way that 
they produce true beliefs about God in certain environments.  The causal connection, in this case, would be there, 
but it would not be direct” (55).  While this claim does not inform my reading of Unamuno’s works, it does show 




“counterintuitive” to interpret experiences and agents in Unamuno’s works but, by using this 
term, I do not claim that the experiences are false or counterfactual.2  When Unamuno posits a 
superhuman agent active in the violations of intuitive expectations in DST or when his characters 
do the same in his fiction, there is no indication that they do so in error.  On the contrary, these 
agents have real meaning and affect the lives of those who have an experience of them.  This 
chapter will examine this story of experience and consider the possibilities for enchantment that 
these counterintuitive experiences deemed religious might have.   
 Locating religion in processes of the mind and its interaction with its environment has the 
power to enchant by collapsing dichotomies of nature/society, primitive/modern, and, finally, 
religious/secular.  These three dichotomies relate to each other in that they separate a spiritual 
realm from a spiritless one and suggest an opposition of immanence to transcendence.  The 
secular founding of these dichotomies, through rationalization, compartmentalization, and 
privatization, distanced the divine, bracketed it off, and crossed it out.  I will argue that the story 
of experience that Unamuno tells problematizes this secular script by locating religion both here 
in immanence and there in transcendence and now in the present and then in the past and future. 
Defining religion often means locating where and when it is or was and this locating it 
often delimits what it can or cannot do.  Freud’s locating religion in human psychology allows 
him to define it as neurosis which, in turn, constrains its function – it deludes rather than 
clarifies.  Durkheim’s locating religion in society permits him to construct it as a collective 
creation that depends on the group’s effervescence to give a totem its power.  Otto’s locating 
religion in mysterium tremendum enables him to locate it in affect but it also makes the Holy 
wholly-other.  As my reference to Taves in chapter one indicates, locating religion in affect and 
                                                           
2Barrett (2004) distinguishes between “counterfactual” with “counterintuitive” in “Counterfactuality in 
Counterintuitive Religious Concepts.” 
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experience was not just the domain of philosophers of religion and theologians like Otto; it also 
became a way for modern man to still be religious without necessarily having to participate in a 
church. 
 This very modern formulation of religion, however, seemed to play into the hands of 
parallel productions of modernity.  As modern man and the church itself continually rationalized 
religion, as Unamuno laments in DST, the further they placed it outside the world.  Randall 
Styers (2004) points out that this purely other-worldly concept of the sacred coupled with 
locating religion in the individual’s private apprehension of it opened up space in public life for 
powerful substitutes: “This domestication of religion, channeling it into a narrow, private realm, 
is an essential step in producing the secular sphere, a nonreligious realm given over to the 
rational control of science, economic markets, and secular political power” (Magic 70) and later 
that “[t]his systematic elaboration of rationalized, transcendent, otherworldly concerns has the 
effect of cordoning the supernatural away from the world of mundane human needs, but this 
cordoning away of the supernatural ultimately facilitates the rational manipulation of the material 
world” (Magic 100).  Ridding the world of the divine and the magical practices enacted to 
apprehend it, the story of the disenchantment of the world followed that, in the formation of the 
modern nation-state, different spheres were created – economic, social, cultural, political, and 
religious – and were compartmentalized.  Religion was relegated to a private sphere and was not 
to mix with the others.  To understand what a modern believer’s new relationship to this 
compartmentalized world might look like, we might imagine a conversation between the two.  
The pious modern believer might say to an anthropomorphized modern state, “Secularization has 
not done away with religion!  I still feel it in my heart!”  And the secularized state might feign 
conceding but say under his breath, “That’s exactly where I want it.”  Bruno Latour (1993) has 
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explained this transcendental, ideal god as one of the guarantees of the modern constitution.  He 
holds that “No one is truly modern who does not agree to keep God from interfering with Natural 
Law as well as with the laws of the Republic.  God becomes the crossed-out God of 
metaphysics…” and that “His transcendence distanced Him infinitely, so that He disturbed 
neither the free play of nature nor that of society…” (Modern 33).  This triumph of humanism 
seemingly ushers in a new age of freedom but it also can trap man in an “iron cage,” as Weber 
has put it, and isolate his being.3 
 The steady elimination of religion from the mundane world and the rationalization of 
everyday life progressively allowed for a vision of the world as spiritless and made accessing 
these spirits difficult and seem like any desire to do so was backwards, primitive, and 
nonmodern. This disenchantment had its consequences for man’s relation to nature and to his 
own immortality.  Jane Bennett summarizes that “[a]s the disenchantment of nature progresses, 
as more and more habitats and gardens and landscapes and bodies are rendered devoid of spirit, 
there are fewer and fewer places where one might find comforting hints of the possibility of 
everlasting life” (78).  Additionally, this new modern and disenchanted world with 
compartmentalized social spheres and privatized religion seemed to alienate man from fellow 
man.  J. Hillis Miller’s (1963) treatment of Victorian writers points to this: “One great theme of 
modern literature is the sense of isolation, of alienation, brought about by man’s new situation.  
We are alienated from God; we have alienated ourselves from nature; we are alienated from our 
fellow men…” (8). 
                                                           
3Styers explores this “trade” in modern man “freeing” himself from magic: “… while ‘freedom’ from magic is 
certainly invoked as a constitutive element of modern modes of subjectivity, this freedom is purchased only at the 




 The story of experience in Unamuno’s works that I explore in this chapter responds to 
this alienation and offers a counter narrative in which experience creates opportunities for human 
beings to connect with each other and engage in ethical action.  In this story, counterintuitive 
experiences and the animating of inanimates break down dichotomies by bringing near what was 
thought distant.  They enchant the world by making immanent the transcendent.  As I have 
written in the introduction to this dissertation, Jane Bennett  defines being enchanted as being 
“struck and shaken by the extraordinary that lives amid the familiar and the everyday” and that 
“it is also a comportment that can be fostered through deliberate strategies” (4).  I draw on 
Bennett’s definition in my exploration of the possibility of enchantment and add to it that 
enchantments can unite man to fellow man and connect him to the world around him.    
Experiences that Unamuno or his characters deem “holy,” “divine,” or “religious” do not simply 
entail accessing a transcendent realm or a life beyond this one.  They involve the actions and 
intentions of a superhuman agent in everyday life and provide man with an explanation of final 
causes, especially an answer to the what for of life, death, and life beyond death.  According to 
this teleological story of enchantment, a superhuman agent does not just dwell in a transcendent 
realm where, if we are lucky or “good” we will be too in the hereafter, but also in our immanent, 
everyday realm. Thomas Tweed explains how religions can function in bringing the distant near: 
“Religions move what is imagined as the most distant horizon and what is imagined as the most 
intimate domain.  To use traditional Christian language, they travel vertically back and forth 
between transcendence and immanence” (158).4  By establishing his two types of knowledge, 
one from the self-preservation instinct and the other from the instinct to perpetuate and setting up 
                                                           
4Tweed draws upon theorist Bruno Latour’s exploration of religious speech-acts in bringing the distant near: “…if, 
when hearing about religion, you direct your attention to the far away, the above, the supernatural, the infinite, the 
distant, the transcendent, the mysterious, the misty, the sublime, the eternal, chances are that you have not even 
begun to be sensitive to what religious talk tries to involve you in” (“Freeze-Frame” 32).   
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experiences deemed religious in the violations that the latter has on the former, Unamuno’s 
notion of what is religious makes the other-worldly this-worldly.  The consequent positing of 
agents and animating inanimates create a realm permeated with the spirit that was thought to 
only reside in transcendence.  The lines are blurred between the two realms and the realms 
themselves as two worlds existing apart from each other fall into one another. 
By locating religious experience and the positing of superhuman agents in the interplay 
of two human instincts, these experiences and the gods they create simply become part of nature.  
The mind, and the way it limits and acquires beliefs, shapes the natural world, and through 
counterintuitive experiences and language has the ability to give spirit and attribute mentality to 
anything, whether it be a star or a rock as in DST or a tree as in Niebla.  What was thought of as 
residing above or beyond nature simply becomes “natural” through the process of cognition.  
Relatedly, what was once thought to be lifeless matter, can be imbued with spirit.  A distinction 
between a material world of spiritless things and a spiritual world of gods, souls, and other 
agents collapses in Unamuno’s works.  All gods, spirits, and souls have material bodies, and 
cannot be conceived of as otherwise, and all matter has the potential to possess spirit.   
This story of experience brings a sense of the divine back to the world but it still 
maintains its relation to a transcendent realm making this sense of enchantment both here and 
there.  In DST, experience is a vaivén (“a coming and going”) between two domains: “…el Dios 
sentimental o volitivo, es la proyección al infinito de dentro del hombre por vida, del hombre 
concreto, de carne y hueso” (“…the God of feeling and volition, is the projection to the infinite 
of the inwardness of the man of life, of concrete man, of flesh and bone”; my trans.; 24).  Later 
in the essay, this outwardly projection returns from the intimate realm from which it emanated: 
“…Dios mismo, no ya la idea de Dios, puede llegar a ser una realidad inmediatamente sentida… 
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tenemos a las veces el sentimiento directo de Dios…” (“…God Himself, not the idea of God, 
may become a reality that is immediately felt… we have at times the direct feeling of God…”; 
182; 139).  The power of this “Dios cordial” lies in its ability to move man in the world whereas 
the mere idea of god remains impotent in its transcendence. 
Now and Then 
Contained in the collapse of this dichotomy of immanence and transcendence is the 
continuation of a supposed enchanted, primitive past in a supposed disenchanted, modern 
present.  If the world is not just made up of calculable, predictable, and spiritless matter but 
instead is a domain saturated with spirits and agency, does this mean that the worlds Unamuno 
creates are not modern?  They are neither modern nor antimodern because the story of 
experience in which they are created does not seek to reenchant the world as if nature, human 
nature included, had changed from a seamless, homogenized past to an erratic, heterogeneous 
present.5  While he acknowledges that something has happened that has changed the background 
of belief, Unamuno draws no hard line between a “primitive” past and a “modern” present.  
Unamuno conceptualizes “primitive” man as the following: 
El hombre primitivo, viviendo en sociedad, se siente depender de misteriosas potencias 
que invisiblemente le rodean; se siente en comunión social, no sólo con sus semejantes, 
los demás hombres, sino con la Naturaleza toda animada e inanimada, lo que no quiere 
decir otra cosa sino que lo personaliza todo.  No sólo tiene él conciencia del mundo, sino 
que se imagina que el mundo tiene también conciencia como él.  Lo mismo que un niño 
habla a su perro o a su muñeco, cual si le entendiesen, cree el salvaje que le oye su 
fetiche o que la nube tormentosa se acuerda de él y le persigue.  Y es que el espíritu del 
hombre natural, primitivo, no se ha desplacentado todavía de la naturaleza, ni ha marcado 
el lindero entre el sueño y la vigilia, entre la realidad y la imaginación. (DST 172) 
Primitive man, living in society, feels himself to be dependent upon the mysterious forces 
invisibly environing him; he feels himself to be in social communion, not only with 
                                                           
5Latour characterizes “the modern” as one whose “fabric is no longer seamless” (Modern 7) and defines 
antimoderns as those who “want to defend localities, or spirit, or rationality, or the past, or universality, or liberty, or 
society, or God, as if these entities really existed and actually had the form that the official part of the modern 
Constitution granted them” (Modern 47).  Although Unamuno makes a case for god, it is not the god of the modern 
constitution that Latour outlines. 
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beings like himself, his fellow-men, but with the whole of Nature, animate and inanimate, 
which simply means, in other words, that he personalizes everything.  Not only does he 
possess a consciousness of the world, but he imagines that the world, like himself, 
possesses consciousness also.  Just as a child talks to his doll or his dog as if it 
understood what he was saying, so the savage believes that his fetich hears him when he 
speaks to it, and that the angry storm-cloud is aware of him and deliberately pursues him.  
For the newly born mind of the primitive natural man has not yet wholly severed itself 
from the cords which still bind it to the womb of Nature, neither has it clearly marked out 
the boundary that separates dreaming from waking, imagination from reality. (131-32) 
 
Society and nature for “primitive” man, through animation and anthropomorphization, are not 
two distinct spheres of existence.  Furthermore, “primitive” man, according to Unamuno, does 
not demarcate a separate realm for the transcendent or bracket off and cross out god, gods, or 
fetishes.   
Modern man in Unamuno’s works is not all that removed from his early ancestors’ 
mindset.  In a sense, man in Unamuno’s narratives has never been modern, to borrow a phrase 
from Latour (1991).  In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour questions the distinctions made 
between society and nature by “modern” man and advocates for a re-thinking of the two as 
separate categories.  As the title suggests, Latour claims that western, “modern” man has never 
been modern but has set up a “constitution” in which he purifies one domain from another by 
avoiding, and thereby ironically proliferating, “hybrids” and the overlaps of the domains.  Before 
giving his account of “primitive” man, Unamuno provides a summary of his formulation of the 
instincts of self-preservation and perpetuation and, in doing so, provides a parallel among the 
atemporal every man of “carne y hueso,” “primitive” man, and himself: 
Y recordando lo que en otra parte de esta obra dijimos, podemos decir que las cosas 
materiales, en cuanto conocidas, brotan al conocimiento desde el hambre, y del hambre 
brota el universo sensible y material en que las conglobamos, y las cosas ideales brotan 
del amor y del amor brota Dios, en quien esas cosas ideales conglobamos, como en 
Conciencia del Universo.  Es la conciencia social, hija del amor, del instinto de 
perpetuación, la que nos lleva a socializarlo todo, a ver en todo sociedad, y nos muestra, 
por último, cuán de veras es una sociedad infinita la Naturaleza toda.  Y por lo que a mí 
hace, he sentido que la Naturaleza es sociedad, cientos de veces al pasearme en un 
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bosque y tener el sentimiento de solidaridad con las encinas, que de alguna oscura 
manera se daban sentido de mi presencia. (DST 165-66)6  
And recalling what has been said in another part of this work, we may say that material 
things, in so far as they are known to us, issue into knowledge through the agency of 
hunger, and out of hunger issues the sensible or material universe in which we 
conglomerate these things; and that ideal things issue out of love, and out of love issues 
God, in whom we conglomerate these ideal things as in the Consciousness of the 
Universe.  It is social consciousness, the child of love, of the instinct of perpetuation, that 
leads us to socialize everything, to see society in everything, and that shows us at last that 
all Nature is really an infinite Society.  For my part, the feeling that Nature is a society 
has taken hold of me hundreds of times in walking through the woods possessed with a 
sense of solidarity with the oaks, a sense of their dim awareness of my presence. (127) 
 
Unamuno’s conceptualizations of “primitive” and “modern” make no distinction between nature 
and society and men from both times live in a world animated by spirit.7  There are no hybrids 
                                                           
6Nature as an animated society permeated with a sense of the divine is also evident in some of Unamuno’s shorter 
essays.  In “El individualismo español” (“Spanish Individualism”) he writes, “En este respecto [that one thinks he 
was especially chosen by God for a certain purpose] propendemos los españoles a creernos genios, o tenemos más 
bien un concepto robustísimo de la Divinidad, no creyéndole a Dios como el Dios frío y encumbrado del deísmo 
francés del siglo XVIII, el Dios bonachón y haragán de las buenas gentes que nos pinta Beránger, sino más bien 
como un Dios cuya atención y cuidado se extiende de la última hormiga, tomada individualmente, al más grande y 
espléndido de los soles” (“In this respect we Spaniards tend to believe that we are geniuses, or rather, we have a very 
robust concept of Divinity, not believing in the cold and exalted God of 18th-century French deism, the good-natured 
and lazy God of the people that Beránger painted, but rather we believe in a God whose attention and care extends 
from the last ant, taken individually, to the greatest and most splendid suns”; O.C. 3: 624);  This is echoed in 
“Intelectualidad y espiritualidad” (“Intelectuality and Spirituality”): “Una vez, al oír un canto popular entonado por 
un zagal, y que le llegaba cernido en el perenne follaje de las pardas encinas, estremecióse y sintió como si oyera 
voces de otro mundo, no de otro mundo que se tienda allende el nuestro, sino de otro mundo que dentro del nuestro 
palpita; era como que brotaran de las entrañas mismas de las cosas, como canto del alma de las encinas, de las 
nubes, de los guijarros, de la tierra o del cielo” (“Once, upon hearing a folk song sung by a shepherd boy, he sank 
into the perennial foliage of the brown oak trees, he shuddered and felt as if he heard voices from another world, not 
another world beyond ours, but rather another world that beats within ours; it was as if they sprang from the inner 
depths of things, like the song of the soul of the oaks, the clouds, the pebbles, the Earth, or the sky”; O.C. 3: 706-
07).  Some critics such as Armand Baker (1991) have interpreted this animation of nature as pantheism, something 
Unamuno rejects.  In DST, he writes, “Y si la ciencia en la inmortalidad del alma no ha podido hallar comprobación 
empírica racional, tampoco le satisface el panteísmo....  el panteísmo no es sino un ateísmo disfrazado” (“And if 
science in the immortality of the soul has not been able to find empirical, rational verification, neither has 
pantheism….  pantheism is nothing but a disguised atheism”; my trans; 105-06).  As I hope to demonstrate in the 
body in this chapter, a sense of the divine is not everywhere at all times but rather rests in the irregular apprehension 
of it.  As Mark C. Taylor succinctly puts it, “…when religion is everywhere, it is nowhere” (7). 
 
7This aspect of Unamuno’s thought has gone unexamined perhaps because of the tendency to view his work in terms 
of binaries, especially that of reason and religion.  Wyers (1976) is one such critic: “Nature and man remained 
separated in most of his writings; he exiled landscape from his fictions and then made it the exclusive subjects of 
poems, essays, and travel books.  Unamuno’s thought plays itself out in antithetical pairs – heart/head, 
substance/form, reality/appearance, inner/outer, masculine consciousness/feminine unconsciousness – that are 
rarely, if ever, experienced as the opposing poles of a single continuum.  The one is always the negation of the other.  
Nature and history are mutually exclusive terms” (ix-x).  The citations from DST about nature and society in this 
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because there are no distinct realms from which to fuse autonomous characteristics.  Modern 
man’s world, in this sense, is not as fragmented as he may have thought.  Gods and spirits, trees 
and rocks, and man do not exist in independent realms.  Not only are the lines of nature and 
society blurred by man’s ability to animate anything in Unamuno’s works, but the belief in and 
the apprehension of superhuman agents has not changed throughout time.8  Man’s cognitive 
makeup remains the same and “[e]sa animación, esa personificación va entrañada en nuestro 
mismo conocer” (“[t]his animation, this personification, interpenetrates our very knowledge”; 
DST 160; 124).  Religion, in this story of enchantment, is transhistorical because both 
“primitive” and “modern” man are born with the same two instincts and both think in language 
that they only come to form when joining with others.   
Here and There 
 The way Unamuno presents experiences that he or his characters deem religious in itself 
questions the models of compartmentalization and privatization of the secular script.  They are 
not wholly private nor entirely collective – collapsing another dichotomy, that of self and other.  
Religion can be located in the individual’s experience of it and reflection upon it: “Y es Dios en 
                                                           
chapter and about substance and form from the previous one clearly indicate that they are not “mutually exclusive” 
but rather mutually dependent. 
 
8In addition to making parallels between “modern” and “primitive” thought and questioning Vico’s distinction, cited 
in chapter one, Unamuno rejects the breaking down of history into ages: “En vano Comte declaró que el 
pensamiento humano salió ya de la edad teológica y está saliendo de la metafísica para entrar en la positiva; las tres 
edades coexisten y se apoyan, aun oponiéndose, unas en otras.  El flamante positivismo no es sino metafísica cuando 
deja de negar para afirmar algo, cuando se hace realmente positivo, y la metafísica es siempre, en su fondo, teología, 
y la teología nace de la fantasía puesta al servicio de la vida, que se quiere inmortal” (“It was in vain that Comte 
declared that human thought had already emerged from the age of theology and was now emerging from the age of 
metaphysics into the age of positivism; the three ages coexist, and although antagonistic they lend one another 
mutual support.  High-sounding positivism, whenever it ceases to deny and begins to affirm something, whenever it 
becomes really positive, is nothing but metaphysics; and metaphysics, in its essence, is always theology, and 
theology is born of imagination yoked to the service of life, of life with its craving for immortality”; DST 158-59; 
122).  Unamuno expresses this exact sentiment and again references Comte in “Sobre la enseñanza laica” (“On 




cada uno según cada uno lo siente y según le ama” (“And God is in each one of us in the 
measure in which each one feels Him and loves Him”; DST 191; 145) and “[c]ada cual define la 
religión según la sienta en sí más aún que según en los demás la observe, ni cabe definirla sin de 
un modo o de otro sentirla” (“[e]very man’s definition of religion is based upon his own inward 
experience of it rather than upon his observation of it in others, nor indeed is it possible to define 
it without in some way or another experiencing it”; DST 226; 171).  However, as Unamuno 
frequently reminds, “[l]o singular no es particular, es universal” (“[t]he singular is not particular, 
it is universal”; DST 31; 32)9 and the experiences themselves and the language that results from 
them by way of the instinct to perpetuate always necessitate another person.  Experiences 
deemed religious are always intercorporeal before they are intracorporeal.  Despite some 
instances where Unamuno seems to claim that religion is an individual phenomenon, the 
violations of the body and the mind as physical, solid objects happen in relation to other beings.  
Though God and religion may be interpreted individually, the initial feeling is always from a 
joint venture.  Additionally, the act of metarepresenting other’s thoughts requires collaborative 
experiences.  In DST, man metarepresents suffering in others by recognizing his own suffering 
and feels him or her in his embodied mind.   
The way that Unamuno sets up his two natural instincts and man’s ability to place 
himself in another’s mind involve some sort of social participation.  Experiences deemed 
                                                           
9Unamuno repeats this in works from DST to essays published two years before his death.  In AC, he writes, “Siendo 
un problema estrictamente individual, y por ello universal…” (“This being a strictly individual problema and, 
therefore, a universal one…”; 13) and “Como la individualidad es lo más universal…” (“As individuality is that 
which is most universal…”; 87).  A year after the Spanish translation of AC, he wrote an essay titled, “Nación, 
Estado, Iglesia, Religión” (“Nation, State, Church, Religion”) (1931) in which he maintains the same sentiment and 
reinforces his etymological understanding of “religion” as a “bond:” “Porque eso de que la religión es asunto 
puramente individual o privado, resulta, históricamente, un error.  La religión, sea lo que fuere, es un lazo entre 
individuos, un lazo que religa” (“Because that which says religion is a purely individual or private affair, is, 
historically, an error.  Religion, whatever it might be, is a bond between individuals, a bond that binds”; 92).  In one 
short essay, “Sobre la catolicidad” (“On Catholicity”) (1934), he writes, “…y nada hay más católico, más universal, 
que la individualidad” (“…and there is nothing more catholic, nothing more universal, than individuality”; 296). 
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religious and attributed to a superhuman agent in Unamuno’s fiction point to this sort of 
participation: Avito Carrascal’s experience happens in relation to suffering with his wife; 
Apolodoro’s happens upon getting a glimpse of Clara; Augusto Pérez’ experiences occur when 
falling in love with Eugenia and possibly Rosario and; in Valverde de Lucerna, the 
townspeople’s experience happens in relation to each other. 
Given the ability to have these types of experiences whenever and wherever, it might 
seem that Unamuno’s man of “carne y hueso” could be a constantly love-struck and melancholic 
being going through life positing agents everywhere.  This sort of spiritual world, however, is 
just as impossible as a material world without spirit.  Unamuno points to the mutual dependence 
of the two ideas: “…lo mismo da decir que todo es materia, como que todo es idea, o todo 
fuerza, o lo que se quiera” (“…it is the same to say that everything is matter as to say that 
everything is idea, or that everything is energy, or whatever you please”; DST 97; 80).  The 
interdependence of the material and the spiritual lies in the intermittent accessing and positing of 
the divine through experience.  The cultivation of these experiences depends on another 
cognitive faculty, that of memory, through which man can access the past and project into the 
future. 
 Experiences that Unamuno and his characters deem religious only become salient and set 
apart in opposition to the material world.  Because they are out of the ordinary in this way, they 
are more memorable.  They resemble more of what Harvey Whitehouse (2004) has termed an 
“imagistic” mode of religiosity as opposed to what he calls a “doctrinal” mode.  According to 
Whitehouse, in a doctrinal mode of religiosity, “ritual action tends to be highly routinized, 
facilitating the storage of elaborate and conceptually complex religious teachings in semantic 
memory, but also activating implicit memory in the performance of most ritual procedures” (65-
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66).10  Practices in an imagistic mode of religiosity, on the other hand, involve “infrequent 
repetition and high arousal activate episodic memory” (70).11  Unamuno’s criticism of Catholic 
and Protestant doctrine in DST and Lázaro’s advice of “poca teología” to Don Manuel’s 
replacement strongly suggest a rejection of a doctrinal mode of religiosity.  Experiences deemed 
religious in Unamuno’s works, conversely, because they are highly arousing, suggest more of an 
imagistic mode and, therefore, that they are more memorable. 
 The power of these experiences depends on the sporadic sense of them and can 
continually draw man’s attention to transcendence while simultaneously bringing the special 
character of the feeling to his everyday life.  It seems that his apprehension of the divine must be 
regularly, but not too regularly, made anew through experience.  The memory and constant 
renewal of it play this special role in the back and forth between the this- and other-worldy 
realms in DST.  Here, Unamuno addresses those who believe that accessing the divine simply 
entails being absorbed by it in a “morada de eterno aburrimiento” (“dwelling of eternal 
boredom”; 238).  He writes: 
Claro está que sienten así los que no aciertan a darse cuenta de que el supremo placer del 
hombre es adquirir y acrecentar conciencia.  No precisamente el de conocer, sino el de 
aprender.  En conociendo una cosa, se tiende a olvidarla, a hacer su conocimiento 
inconciente, si cabe decir así….  Y acaso el goce de la visión beatífica sea, no 
precisamente el de la contemplación de la Verdad suma, entera y toda, que a esto no 
resistiría el alma, sino el de un continuo descubrimiento de ella, el de un incesante 
aprender mediante un esfuerzo que mantenga siempre el sentimiento de la propia 
conciencia activa. (DST 238)12 
                                                           
10For example, many Catholics bless themselves by making the sign of the cross upon entering a church but, because 
this act has been highly routinized and therefore has become part of their implicit memory, they do not necessarily 
reflect upon the meaning of the act. 
 
11Whitehouse further distinguishes psychological and sociopolitical features of the two modes.  Some of the more 
salient differences as they might relate to a story of experience in Unamuno’s works are that in the doctrinal mode 
level of arousal is low whereas in the imagistic mode it is high.  Additionally, ritual meaning in a doctrinal mode is 
learned or acquired whereas in the imagistic mode it is internally generated (74). 
 
12Part of what I have omitted in this citation is a confusing reference to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) that 
Unamuno says is “ya citado” (“already cited”) without ever having mentioned him previously in the essays.  It is 
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It is clear that those who feel thus have failed to take note of the fact that man’s highest 
pleasure consists in acquiring and intensifying consciousness.  Not the pleasure of 
knowing, exactly, but rather that of learning.  In knowing a thing we tend to forget it, to 
convert it, if the expression may be allowed, into unconscious knowledge….  And 
perhaps the joy of the beatific vision may be not exactly that of the contemplation of the 
supreme Truth, whole and entire (for this the soul could not endure), but rather that of a 
continual discovery of the Truth, of a ceaseless act of learning involving an effort which 
keeps the sense of personal consciousness continually active. (179-80) 
 
The irregularity of experience impedes its routinization and always keeps it new.  If one were to 
live constantly in a sacred world, she would forget that it is sacred.  Likewise, the inhabitants of 
a profane world would not even recognize that their world is profane without the periodic 
experience of the sacred.   
 The intervallic taking hold of the divine is a two-way street and, again, joins together 
immanence and transcendence.  The counterintuitive experience of being absorbed by the divine 
transports it back to the mundane world.  After Unamuno writes about this “continuo 
descubrimiento” he asks, “¿Qué diferencia va de ser absorbido por Dios a absorberle uno en sí?  
¿Es el arroyico el que se pierde en el mar, o el mar en el arroyico?  Lo mismo da” (“What 
difference is there between being absorbed by God and absorbing Him in ourselves?  Is it the 
stream that is lost in the sea or the sea that is lost in the stream?  It is all the same”; DST 239; 
180).  His metaphor here, like “two-way street,” illustrates the flow going back and forth 
connecting two worlds and washing away any frontier that was said to exist between them.  
Tweed, who studies religions in part as confluences and flows, writes that “…religions, 
analogized as rivers and waterfalls, generate and sustain a ‘cascade’ of mediators that transform 
                                                           
important here because the reference underscores the pursuit of truth rather than the possession of it which is present 
throughout Unamuno’s works.  In an English version of DST, translator Anthony Kerrigan (1972) finds the 
reference in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) and gives the original German.  The English 
translation reads, “If God held the truth enclosed in his right hand, and in his left hand the one and only ever-striving 
drive for truth, even with the corollary of erring for ever and ever, and if he were to say to me: Choose! – I would 
humbly fall down to him at his left hand and say: Father, give! Pure truth is indeed only for you alone” (Hannay 




persons as they bring close what was imagined distant” (158).13  Religion imagined as a stream 
and sea in DST is not fixed and static but rather fluid and shifting which make its location 
variable. 
The interplay of the two instincts that Unamuno posits brings the story of experience into 
the “here” and makes religion an immanent phenomenon but, as Taves reminds, recognizing 
what these experiences look or feel like “people can search for them [and] cultivate them…” 
(Experience 40), which has the potential to locate religion elsewhere.  As I have noted above, 
experiences that Unamuno and his characters deem religious are set apart because they violate 
intuitions but they also provide the experimenter with a sense of awe and fullness not found in 
their everyday lives.  For example, the narrator in AP recounts the following after Apolodoro 
meets Clarita: “Y Apolodoro siente de noche, en la cama, como si se le hinchase el cuerpo todo y 
fuera creciendo y ensanchándose y llenándolo todo, y, a la vez, que se le alejan los horizontes del 
alma y le hinche un ambiente infinito” (“And at night in his bed, Apolodoro feels as if his whole 
body were swelling and growing and filling out and filling everything up, and at the same time, 
it’s as if his soul’s horizons were receding from him, as if he were being filled by an infinite 
expanse”; 124; 99).  The narrator of Niebla similarly points to a sense of fullness in Augusto 
after his first meeting with Eugenia: “El mundo le parecía más grande, el aire más puro, y más 
azul el cielo.  Era como si respirase por vez primera….  Empezaba a conocer el mundo” (“The 
world seemed to him bigger, the air purer, the sky bluer.  It was as if he were for the first time 
really breathing….  He was beginning to know the world”; 148; 84).  As we have seen in DST 
the story of experience continues then from these affective episodes to the animating of 
                                                           
13The other metaphors Tweed uses are “dwelling” and “crossing.”  He writes, “…orienting metaphors are most 
useful for analyzing what religion is and what it does: spatial metaphors (dwelling and crossing) signal that religion 
is about finding a place and moving across space, and aquatic metaphors (confluences and flows) signal that 
religions are not reified substances but complex processes” (59). 
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inanimates and the eventual positing of god.  The “here” of religion quickly becomes a way of 
accessing the “there” of religion by turning the individual’s gaze from himself to the world 
around him and beyond. 
The experiences that produce these effects of awe and fullness can be cultivated and can 
lead to the positing of their existence in a transcendent realm.  Charles Taylor (2007) writes that: 
Somewhere, in some activity, or condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that is, in that place 
(activity or condition), life is fuller, richer, deeper, more worth while, more admirable, 
more what it should be. This is perhaps a place of power: we often experience this as 
deeply moving, as inspiring. Perhaps this sense of fullness is something we just catch 
glimpses of from afar off; we have the powerful intuition of what fullness would be, were 
we to be in that condition, e.g., of peace or wholeness…. (5)   
 
This “condition,” as Taylor puts it, can serve in imagining a world beyond the one in which these 
experiences only happen momentarily.  In DST locating this condition in transcendence has a 
very real effect in immanence.  Positing or intuiting such a place can transform the here and now 
by imagining a there and then and envisioning the world other than it is.  Experience and the 
memory of it allow man to travel between two worlds and work towards the sense of fullness 
posited in the transcendent realm in the immanent one. 
If, as I tried to show in chapter one and in this chapter, rationalization and divinized 
science and politics were becoming the new social order for Unamuno, experiences deemed 
religious could serve as a subversion to this order by locating the truth of these experiences 
outside the rational control of science, the state, or the markets.  These kinds of experiences 
could provide a new mode of social relation opposed to the mechanization and 
compartmentalization effects of the secularizing world.14  Experience could bond humans to one 
                                                           
14Styers has explored the relationship of theories of magic as a “critique of modernity” (Magic 169) and how magic 
could serve to foster new modes for social relations.  “Enchantment” and “magic,” of course, are not unrelated 
terms.  Although I maintain that the story of experience that Unamuno tells is related to a Christian god, this story 
relates to how Styers examines theories that have placed magic as a foil to transcendent, other-worldly religion.  
Styers writes, “One of the central distinctions drawn between religion and magic in the scholarly literature involves 
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another in feeling in one possible etymological sense of the word.  Understanding leig to be the 
root of religare, to mean “to tie” or “to bind,” these experiences could function as a means for 
men and women to connect to one another.  Unamuno, the professor of Greek and Latin and who 
had an affinity for etymology, was no stranger to this possible origin of the word “religion.”  In 
AC, he alludes to it when exploring those who posited their own individual ends of the world and 
formed individual religions.  He writes, “una religio quae non religat, una paradoja” (“a religio 
quae non religat, a paradox”; 33).15  The story of experience problematizes the secularized 
notion of a purely private religion by dissolving boundaries between self and other in addition to 
opening up paths through which man can travel between immanence and transcendence. 
The back and forth, or the vaivén, of religion, however, still remains impotent located 
solely in experience.  Whether located in private apprehension or in violations of intuition with 
others, it still remains a spiritual something or nothing if not put into practice.  Latour reminds 
that “[a] purely spiritual religion would rid us of the religious” (qtd. in Styers Magic 104).  In 
Unamuno’s prose, a sacralized ethic of work functions as a way to act out experience and also 
serves as a way to recreate these experiences.  In DST, Unamuno writes:  
De primera intención protesto contra el inquisidor, y a él prefiero el comerciante que 
viene a colocarme sus mercancías; pero si recojido en mí mismo lo pienso mejor, veré 
que aquél, el inquisidor, cuando es de buena intención, me trata como a un hombre, como 
a un fin en sí, pues si me molesta es por el caritativo deseo de salvar  mi alma, mientras 
que el otro no me considera sino como a un cliente, como a un medio, y su indulgencia y 
tolerancia no es, en el fondo, sino la más absoluta indiferencia respecto a mi destino.  
Hay mucha más humanidad en el inquisidor. (DST 284) 
                                                           
their respective objects.  Religion is configured as involving matters that are, in one or another sense, ‘ultimate,’ 
‘transcendent,’ or ‘nonempirical.’  In contrast, magic is directed toward lesser, more immediate goals” (Magic 98).  
Both the enchantment that I see in Unamuno’s works and the magic that Styers studies are located in the here and 
now. 
 
15J.Z. Smith writes that this is one possible origin of “religion” but notes that, “Its etymology is uncertain, although 
one of the three current possibilities, that it stems from the root *leig meaning ‘to bind’ rather than from roots 
meaning ‘to reread’ or ‘to be careful,’ has been the subject of considerable Christian homiletic expansion from 
Lactantius’s Divine Institutes (early fourth century) and Augustine’s On True Religion (early fifth century) to 
William Camden’s Britannia (1586)” (269). 
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My immediate first impulse is to protest against the inquisitor and to prefer the merchant 
who comes to offer me his wares.  But when my impressions are clarified by reflection, I 
begin to see that the inquisitor, when he acts from a right motive, treats me as a man, as 
an end in myself, and if he molests me it is from a charitable wish to save my soul; while 
the merchant, on the other hand, regards me merely as a customer, as a means to an end, 
and his indulgence and tolerance is at bottom nothing but a supreme indifference to my 
destiny.  There is much more humanity in the inquisitor. (214) 
 
Although his use of an inquisitor seems problematic and he does not elaborate on what he means 
by “de buena intención” (“with good intentions”), this example illustrates a problem Unamuno 
perceives in the social order and provides insight as to how a businessman or any worker should 
conduct himself with others.  First, the businessman conducts his affairs in a compartmentalized 
sphere divorced from any religious concern and alienates himself from fellow man by treating 
him as a means to make money rather than an end in himself.  Second, the inquisitor is much 
more human because he has a genuine concern for the soul of the man he questions. 
 Work, compartmentalized in its own social sphere, loses the ability to serve as a medium 
between people connecting them to one another.  Unamuno criticizes the “going through the 
motions” and the treating of others as mere means in this social order: “…y los más, la inmensa 
mayoría, no cumplen con su oficio sino para eso que se llama vulgarmente cumplir – para 
cumplir, frase terriblemente inmoral-, para salir del paso, para hacer que se hace, para dar 
pretexto y no justicia al emolumento, sea de dinero o de otra cosa” (“…and the rest, the immense 
majority, perform their task perfunctorily, merely for the sake of nominally complying with their 
duty – para cumplir, a terribly inmoral phrase – in order to get themselves out of difficulty, to get 
the job done, to qualify for their wages without earning them, whether these wages be pecuniary 
or otherwise”; DST 278-79; 210).16  He then gives the example of the shoemaker who stands in 
contrast to the businessman and those who just simply “cumple con su oficio:”  
                                                           




…y piensen ellos, sus parroquianos, que no debía haberse muerto, y esto así porque les 
hizo calzado pensando en ahorrarles toda molestia y que no fuese el cuidado de los pies 
lo que les impidiera vagar a la contemplación de las más altas verdades; les hizo el 
calzado por amor a ellos y por amor a Dios en ellos, se lo hizo por religiosidad. (DST 
279) 
…and they will feel that he ought not to have died.  And this will result from the fact that 
in working for them he was anxious to spare them any discomfort and to make sure that it 
should not be any preoccupation with their feet that should prevent them from being at 
leisure to contemplate the higher truths; he shod them for the love of them and for the 
love of God in them – he shod them religiously. (210) 
 
The shoemaker provides an example of a subversion of the emerging or already in place social 
order in that he does not work in two different social spheres.  Furthermore, work for him 
becomes a religious rite in itself.17  In one sense, he cultivates experience and brings religion into 
the here and now through his work and, in another, the work itself, done religiously, places him 
into divine contact with others facilitating the possibilities of other enchanting experiences.  His 
work as a religious rite is generative.  The shoemaker’s labor connects him to others and prompts 
him to give of himself on their behalf. 
Alienation and Alternatives 
 Several characters in Unamuno’s fiction serve to highlight the alienating effects of the 
purely spiritual, immaterial god-idea of the secular script.  The transcendent, bracketed-off god 
in his novels creates a disorienting space in which man is alienated from fellow man and in 
which nature, void of spirit, can be observed and manipulated through rationalization.  
Unamuno’s fiction also gives us clear picture of how experience can be transformative in 
creating new relationships by juxtaposing characters who have such experiences with those who 
                                                           
17It should be noted that “working religiously” in economic or civil spheres does not mean a collapse of church and 
state.  While Unamuno bemoaned work divorced from religious purposes, he did advocate for a separation between 
church and state.  In 1906, he wrote, “In substance the two civil wars [Carlist wars of the 19th century] that bloodied 
our land in the last century were fought over freedom of religious conscience in Spain. ... I hope we will arrive at the 
separation of Church and State. And all of this will be but the prologue of an awakening of the Spanish religious 
conscience, in a stupor induced by the Canticles of the Roman Church” (qtd. in Valdés 17).  In the examples cited in 
the body of this text, a church or any of its representatives as mediators between people are markedly absent. 
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operate mechanically in their compartmentalized and rationalized worlds.  Again, the context 
provided by narrators and characterization aid in understanding how the characters have become 
who they are, if they have transformative experiences, and whether their actions are described 
positively or negatively. 
The contrast between Avito Carrascal’s relationships to others throughout most of the 
novel and those at the end and later when he reappears in Niebla reveals an alienation of a man 
living in a world in which nature is spiritless and therefore manipulable and sentiment is 
untestable and therefore irrational.18  Despite Avito’s initial experience upon meeting Marina, he 
continues to think rationally and eventually alienates himself from his wife.  From the very start 
he categorizes Marina and all women as “la naturaleza, el instinto, la inconciencia, la materia” 
(“nature, instinct, the unconscious, raw material”) and himself and all men as “el arte, la 
reflexión, la conciencia, la forma” (“art, reflection, consciousness, form”; AP 49; 28).  After this, 
he continues ruminating nervously about choosing Marina to be the mother of his future genius 
and briefly considers trying to change her but immediately dismisses the idea: “¿Educarla?  
¡Imposible!  Toda mujer es ineducable; la propia más que la ajena” (“Train her?  Impossible!  
All women are untrainable; your own more so than somebody else’s”; AP 55; 33).  Of course, 
Avito’s “scientific” classification of women has detrimental effects on his marriage and his 
wife’s relationship to her son to the point where he reproaches her for kissing her child.   
By equating women with nature and contrasting himself as a man with them, Avito 
places himself beyond nature.  In doing so he isolates himself from his natural surroundings and, 
                                                           
18In addition to Styers, cited above, Talal Asad (2003) maintains that relegating the Christian God to a supernatural 
realm had an effect on the natural one: “For the representation of the Christian God as being sited quite apart in ‘the 
supernatural’ world signals the construction of a secular space that begins to emerge in early modernity.  Such a 
space permits ‘nature’ to be reconceived as manipulatable material, determinate, homogeneous, and subject to 
mechanical laws.  Anything beyond that space is therefore ‘supernatural’ – a place that, for many, was a fanciful 
extension of the real world, peopled by irrational events and imagined beings” (27-28). 
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from this distance, cannot conceive of any spirit in them.  Nature then is simply predictable 
matter that he can study and control.  His constant attempts to manipulate Marina, the gestation 
period, and her relationship to Apolodoro exemplify this.  Another striking example is when he 
takes his son to Doctor Herrero’s hospital to witness a guinea pig undergoing an experiment.  At 
first the child is excited at how cute the animal is and reads its trembling as its being cold.  
However, Avito informs him, “No, pequeño, no tiene frío, es que se va a morir pronto….  Mira, 
hijo mío, este señor le ha metido esa enfermedad al conejo para estudiarla” (“No, my little man, 
he’s not cold, he’s like that because he’s going to die son….  Look, my boy, this man has put a 
disease inside the guinea pig in order to study its effects…”; AP 97; 75).  As I have shown in 
chapter two, Avito equates human development with human evolution thinking that he might 
allow his son to first write using hieroglyphics rather than Spanish.  The narrator makes Avito’s 
comparison explicit: “Carrascal vigila la evolución del pequeño salvaje, meditando en el 
paralelismo entre la evolución del individuo y la de su especie….  ‘Su madre le hará fetichista – 
se dice -.  ¡No importa!  Como la especie, tiene el individuo que pasar por el fetichismo; yo me 
encargaré de él’” (“Carrascal keeps a close watch on the evolution of the little savage, pondering 
the parallelism between the evolution of the individual and that of the species….  ‘His mother’s 
going to make him a fetishist,’ he says to himself; ‘What does it matter!  As with the species, the 
individual has to pass through fetishism; I’ll look after him”; AP 69; 46).  Marina, nature 
incarnate and, therefore, more primitive according to Avito’s logic, may have the detrimental 
effect of retarding the learning process in Apolodoro’s development.  In the hospital we see 
Avito’s attempt move his son out of a “primitive” stage by severing a sentimental connection 
with nature.  This experience, however, traumatizes Apolodoro, who can never forget it.  When 
he is older Avito finally takes him to Don Fulgencio to leave him under his tutelage.  As Don 
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Fulgencio examines him, the narrator remarks, “El mozo se sofoca y el sofoco le trae el recuerdo 
del pobre conejillo de antaño…” (“The boy is suffocating, and his suffocation brings to his mind 
the long-ago memory of the poor guinea pig…”; AP 106; 84).  The parallel between animal and 
child and the foreshadowing of Apolodoro’s death is rather evident.  “Science,” in the end, kills 
them both. 
Avito’s supposedly rational view of gender also alienates him from his daughter.  
Because he believes that “[e]l fin de la mujer es parir hombres” (“the end of woman is to beget 
men”; AP 100; 78), the only education he is willing to let her have is a physical one to prepare 
her for this.  Also, although he agonizes over a name for his son, he is indifferent about the name 
of his daughter because “¿qué importa cómo se llame una mujer?” (“what does it matter what a 
woman is named?”; AP 100; 78).  As Rosa grows up next to her brother and in the care of 
Marina, Avito notes that she seems to be more intelligent than Apolodoro.  Preoccupied by the 
matter Avito consults Don Fulgencio who rationalizes that “[c]uanto más inferior es la 
especie…antes llega a madurez; según se asciende en la escala zoólogica, es más lento el 
desarrollo de la cría…” (“[t]he more inferior the species…the sooner it arrives at maturity; the 
higher one ascends along the zoological scale, the slower is the development of the offspring…”; 
AP 100; 78).  Finally, the most salient example of the consequences of living under a social order 
where reason and science supposedly reveal the facticity of nature is Avito’s reaction and distant, 
cold study of Rosa’s death.  While parodic in nature, Avito’s treatment of Rosa’s death 
highlights the alienating effect of his secular, scientific world.19   
                                                           
19As a parody Avito Carrascal seems more caricature than character and his project to educate his son only in the 
ways of science appears exaggerated.  However, Avito and his project would have been the logical conclusion of 
many of the theories on men, women, children, and “primitives” coming out of the 19th century and the beginning of 
the 20th.  Charles Darwin (1809-1882), for example, wrote, “…with woman the powers of intuition, or rapid 
perception and perhaps of imitation, are more strongly marked than man; but some, at least, of these faculties are 
characteristic of the lower races, and therefore of a past and lower state of civilization” (858).  Judith Worell (2001) 
summarizes evolutionary theories of the 19th century: “Because of innate biological factors the human female’s 
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The juxtaposition of Carrascal’s reaction to his daughter’s death with that of his son’s 
hints at the transformative power of experience. Marina and Avito’s union in suffering at the 
death of Apolodoro reunites husband with the woman with whom he first fell in love.  AP ends 
with Avito wanting to continue the “pedagogy” that led to his son’s death with his grandson 
suggesting that his experience was fleeting but his reappearance in Niebla exemplifies the 
transformative power of that experience in his relationship to others.  Perhaps unexpectedly, 
Avito reemerges in Niebla in a church and relates the story of Apolodoro’s death to Augusto.  He 
has now abandoned his scientific theories and tells Augusto, “…no hay ciencia ni realidad que 
valgan para mí…” (“…there is neither science nor reality that means anything”; Niebla 173; 
123).  His letting go of rational, scientific thought has a profound effect on his connection to 
others.  When Augusto expresses his surprise at finding Avito in church, the latter explains, 
“Somos unos cuantos que al anochecer nos reunimos ahí a rezar el rosario.  No sé quiénes son, ni 
ellos me conocen, pero nos sentimos solidarios, en íntima comunión unos con otros” (“There are 
a certain number of us who meet here at nightfall to tell the rosary.  I don’t know who they are, 
and they don’t know me, but we feel that we are one and in intimate communion with one 
                                                           
nervous system was limited (or prevented from its full development) either by the simple fact of being female or 
because of the biological demands of development and maturation of the female reproductive system.  The end 
result was a nervous system that was less capable of sophisticated higher mental processes (creative thought, rational 
insight) and which comparatively accentuated development of the lower mental processes (emotion and certain 
aspects of perception)” (595).  Equating child development with that of humans, Freud wrote, “We know that a 
human child cannot successfully complete its development to the civilized stage without passing through a phase of 
neurosis sometimes of greater and sometimes of less distinctness….  In just the same way, one might assume, 
humanity as a whole, in its development through the ages, fell into states analogous to the neuroses….  Religion 
would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out 
of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father” (712-13).  Styers has shown that many theorists of religion 
during this time period tried to show that women and children, among other “deviants,” were prone to magical 
thinking, as opposed to the rational thinking that distanced superhuman agents (Magic 16, 36, 118, 207, 223).  To 
summarize, the kind of thinking parodied in AP is that men, with their ability to think rationally and logically, can 
place the irrational outside the world and practice science.  Women and children, who are prone to more 
superstitious thinking and sentimentality like “primitives,” are incapable of the kind of abstract thinking exercised 
by men and practice religion.  That Carrascal and his endeavor seem ridiculous and only possible in fiction make 
Unamuno’s critique of these theories that much more critical. 
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another”; Niebla 174; 123).  Additionally, his relationship with Marina has transformed.  When 
Augusto asks about his wife, he exclaims, “¡Ah, mi mujer!  ¡Mi mujer!  ¡La he desubierto!  
Hasta mi tremenda desgracia no he sabido lo que tenía en ella” (“My wife!  I have discovered 
her!  Up to the time of my tremendous misfortune I did not know what I had in her”; Niebla 174; 
123).  The transformative power of his experience is clear.  Avito shifts from treating his wife as 
a manipulable element of nature whose sole duty it was to have children to uniting with her in an 
experience that makes what was purely symbolic, religion, an everyday reality.  Experience in 
his immanent realm functions to bind him to his wife and fellow man. 
 Experience has a similar effect in Niebla in that it brings the other-worldly to an 
immanent domain and serves to bind Augusto to the rest of humanity and nature.  Our first 
description of the protagonist reveals the alienating and disorienting effect of the rationalization 
of god.  At the beginning, god, for Augusto, is a purely transcendent idea of a superhuman agent.  
When Augusto first leaves his house, he checks to see if he will need his umbrella and, in his 
stream of consciousness, uses the umbrella as a metaphor for God: “Aquí, en esta pobre vida, no 
nos cuidamos sino de servirnos de Dios; pretendemos abrirlo, como a un paraguas, para que nos 
proteja de toda suerte de males” (“Here, in this wretched life, we think only of putting God to 
use; we try to open him as we do an umbrella, in order that he may protect us from all sorts of 
evils”; Niebla 109; 21-22).  God in this initial passage is a distant being that can be called upon 
by the individual but that has no real effect in Augusto’s life.  Immediately after this brief 
rumination about a transcendent god, Augusto asks himself, “Y ahora, ¿hacia dónde voy?, ¿tiro a 
la derecho o a la izquierda?” (“And now in which direction shall I go?”; 109; 21-22) and the 
narrator remarks, “Porque Augusto no era un caminante, sino un paseante de la vida” (“Because 
Augusto was less of a walker through life than a wanderer”; my trans.; Niebla 109-110).  This 
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preliminary description reveals the confused existence of a modern man who has bracketed-of 
god. It also gives us the state of Augusto’s life not only in that moment but during the years since 
his mother died and sets the stage for a different kind of social relation upon glimpsing Eugenia. 
 Before Eugenia opens Augusto’s eyes to life and makes him more of a “caminante” 
(“walker”) as opposed to a “paseante” (“wanderer”) in life, Augusto had alienated himself from 
others after the death of his mother.  We see this as he enters into a conversation with Rosario in 
which he barely lets her speak: “Bueno, cállate, basta – y cerraba él los ojos -; no digas nada, 
déjame hablar solo, conmigo mismo.  Así he vivido desde que murió mi madre, conmigo mismo, 
nada más que conmigo, es decir, dormido” (“‘Very well, that will do.  Now keep quiet.’ – and he 
closed his eyes.  ‘Don’t say a word; let me talk alone, to myself.  It is the way I have lived since 
my mother died, by myself, always by myself; that is to say, always asleep.’”; Niebla 167; 114) 
This passage points to important aspects of Augusto’s characterization: without someone to love 
or someone to love him, he has been living his life in isolation and therefore has been incapable 
of having a transformative experience that enchants his mundane life.  However, the memory of 
what life was like with his mother suggests that Augusto can recognize what such an experience 
might feel like and therefore can cultivate it.   
 Augusto’s relationship with his mother serves as an initial counterintuitive experience 
that he continually tries to recreate and develop throughout the novel.  When he tries to make 
sense of his relationship or lack thereof with Eugenia he enters a church “[y] repasó su vida toda 
de hijo, cuando formaba parte de su madre y vivía de su amparo…” (“[a]nd he relived again all 
of his life as a son, when he formed a part of his mother and dwelt under her protection…”; 
Niebla 172; 121).  This description of his mother underscores the confusing of the physical 
boundaries of their bodies and are therefore set apart as memorable.  Moreover, these memories 
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always place Augusto in intimate connection with nature suggesting that these experiences gave 
him the ability to perceive spirit in non-human realms.  After he delivers a letter to Magarita he 
walks down Alameda Avenue “a refrescar sus emociones en la visión de verdura, a oír cantar a 
los pájaros sus amores.  Su corazón verdecía, y dentro de él cantábanle también como ruiseñores 
recuerdos alados de la infancia” (“to quiet his emotions in the greeness of the shrubbery and in 
hearing the birds sing their loves.  His heart was young and fresh, and within him were singing 
too, like the nightingales, the winged memories of his infancy.”; Niebla 130; 54).  Shortly after, 
while still thinking of his mother, he finds the poor little puppy that he will name Orfeo with 
whom he empathizes contemplating the dog’s loneliness at having been left for dead.   
 Augusto’s mother foresees his son’s loneliness and alienation after her death and 
encourages him to seek out the intimate connection they have had and to nurture it.  She says,  
Así que yo me vaya de este mundo y te quedes solo en él tú, cásate, cásate cuanto antes.  
Trae a esta casa dueña y señora….Pero trae ama a la casa.  Y que sea ama de casa, hijo 
mío, que sea ama.  Hazla dueña de tu corazón, de tu bolsa, de tu despensa, de tu cocina y 
de tus resoluciones.  Busca una mujer de gobierno, que sepa querer… y gobernarte. 
(Niebla 125)  
So when I leave this world and you remain alone in it, get married, get married as soon as 
possible.  Bring a keeper of and lady to this house….  But bring a keeper of the house.  
And she must be a keeper of the house, my son, she must be a keeper.  Make her keeper 
of your heart, of your money, of your pantry, of your kitchen, of your resolutions.  Look 
for a woman who rules, who knows how to love…and manage you. (my trans.)   
 
The experience that his mother urges him to recreate with his wife reiterates the forceful 
possession of knowing an other in domination that Unamuno describes in DST.  Effectively, the 
search to recreate the love that Augusto experienced with his mother has the transformative 
power of taking him out of himself and making him feel as if he again concretely exists in the 
world.  He expresses this to Orfeo: 
Y ahora me brillan en el cielo de mi soledad los dos ojos de Eugenia.  Me brillan con el 
resplandor de las lágrimas de mi madre.  Y me hacen creer que existo, ¡dulce ilusión!  
Amo, ergo sum!  Este amor, Orfeo, es como lluvia bienhechora en que se deshace y 
146 
 
concreta la niebla de la existencia.  Gracias al amor siento al alma de bulto, la toco.  
Empieza a dolerme en su cogollo mismo el alma, gracias al amor, Orfeo.  Y el alma 
misma, ¿qué es sino amor, sino dolor encarnado? (Niebla 141) 
Shining now in the heaven of my solitude are the two eyes of Eugenia.  They shine with 
the glitter of my mother’s tears.  And they make me believe that I exist – sweet illusion!  
Amo, ergo sum.  This love, Orfeo, is like a beneficent rain that dissipates and at the same 
time condenses the mist of existence.  Thanks to love, I feel my soul taking solid form, I 
touch it.  Thanks to love, Orfeo, my soul is beginning to pain me in its very marrow.  And 
the soul itself, what is it but love?  What but incarnate pain? (73-74) 
 
The love that Augusto believes he has found again connects his earthly existence to 
transcendence.  The language that he uses suggests a back and forth between two realms and 
connects the past to the present.  Eugenia’s eyes are simultaneously in the heaven of his 
loneliness and in the here of his life.  The connection between her eyes and his mother’s tears 
alludes to the loving experience he desperately seeks to recover and connects the past to the 
present.  The simile that love is like rain echoes the flow of the “arroyico” (“little stream”) in 
DST; its falling from the heavens to earth connects the two realms and the division between the 
two is lost in a mist.  Finally, love materializes spirit and he is transformed.  His soul is no longer 
an airy nothing but rather a concrete something that he can touch and feel.   
Augusto’s cultivation of experience continues enchanting his life and the transformation 
of self transforms his relationship to the world around him.  After speaking to Eugenia for the 
first time, he again recalls his mother and, upon leaving her house, passes into a world different 
from the one when he entered:  
En lo más íntimo de sus oídos cantaba aquella palabra de su madre: ¡cásate! Casi todas 
las mujeres con que cruzaba por la calle parecíanle guapas, muchas hermosísimas y 
ninguna fea. Diríase que para él empezaba a estar el mundo iluminado por una nueva luz 
misteriosa desde dos grandes estrellas invisibles que refulgían más allá del azul del cielo, 
detrás de su aparente bóveda. Empezaba a conocer el mundo. (Niebla 148) 
In his innermost ear that word of his mother’s was singing, Marry!  Nearly all the women 
that he passed on the street seemed pretty, many of them beautiful, and not one of them 
ugly.  To him it seemed that the world was beginning to be illuminated by a new and 
mysterious light, proceeding from two great invisible stars shining beyond the blue of the 




Light has the same effect as rain in that it joins heaven and earth.  It emanates from there but 
produces an effect here – Augusto begins to see his immanent realm more clearly with the light 
of the transcendent. 
 Like thoughts of his mother, reflecting upon his experience of love with Eugenia brings 
him into contact with a nature imbued with spirit.  Although Eugenia rejects him, the experience 
that he has had still produces a great effect.  After a conversation with Doña Emerlinda, 
Eugenia’s aunt, Augusto again finds himself in “un baño en naturaleza abierta a cielo abierto, y a 
la rosa de los vientos” (“a bath out in the open country, under the open sky with the breezes 
blowing about him”; Niebla 211; 184).  Now that he feels his “alma de bulto” he can feel pain 
and suffering like the “hombre de carne y hueso” of DST and, as in the essay, this suffering 
causes him to intuit the spirit of things around him and join them in communal suffering.  As he 
sits on a bench in a plaza he contemplates the effect of artificial light on the trees around him and 
exclaims, ¡Pobres árboles que no pueden gozar de una de esas negras noches del campo, de esas 
noches sin luna, con su manto de estrellas palpitantes!...  ¡Pobres árboles trasnochadores!” 
(“Poor trees, that may not enjoy one of those black nights in the country, one of those nights 
without a moon, under a mantle of palpitating stars!...  Poor sleepless trees!”; Niebla 213; 187).   
 Lastly, experience has transformative power in the form of generosity in Augusto.  
Again, as Bennett contends, enchantments can make us aware of the gifts that culture and nature 
offer us and we can in the same spirit give of ourselves.  In Augusto’s act of generosity toward 
Eugenia, he quite literally gives her a gift; he frees her from the mortgage her father burdened 
her with.  Although with this gift he seems to be trying to win her over, as Eugenia 
understandably assumes, his motives are altruistic and predicated on the feeling she has stirred in 
him.  He tells her aunt and uncle, “Eugenia, señores, me ha despertado a la vida, a la verdadera 
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vida, y, sea ella de quien fuere, yo le debo gratitud eternal” (“Eugenia, señores, has awakened me 
to life, and no matter whose she may be, I owe her an eternal debt of gratitude”; Niebla 164; 
109).  It is not that he believes this will tip the scales in his favor in his struggle against Mauricio 
to win her heart but rather that the gift she unwittingly gave him prompted generosity in his 
spirit. 
It is unsurprising that Eugenia would consider Augusto’s gift as some sort of extortion.  
Despite being the woman that he loves, Eugenia serves as a foil to Augusto.  Beginning with 
their childhoods, the two are contrasted.  Augusto had a loving relationship with his mother and 
Eugenia was orphaned.  The memory of the loving relationship that Augusto had with his mother 
allows him to search for and try to recreate a loving relationship as an adult.  Eugenia’s lack of 
any loving relationship as a child gives her nothing to try to cultivate later in life.  Augusto’s 
relationships are characterized by deep experience.  Eugenia’s relationship with Mauricio centers 
on work and money.  Augusto’s experience with his mother and subsequent attempts to develop 
this experience places him in intimate connection with nature.  Eugenia is decidedly outside of 
nature.  
Eugenia’s world has been thoroughly compartmentalized and she cannot conceive of a 
gift inspired by anything other than some kind of trade.  In contrast to Augusto, the narrator does 
not give us much of Eugenia’s childhood other than that she was orphaned by a father who 
committed suicide after a failed stock market operation.  However, this small detail already 
begins to set up Eugenia as a foil to Augusto.  From her childhood, her life is consumed by a 
debt that she plans to pay off by giving piano lessons and is marked by the this-worldly concern 
of making money. 
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 Eugenia’s focus on “ganándose una vida” (“making a living”) and her preoccupation with 
money and work alienate her from others.  Augusto is enthralled to learn that she is a pianist.  
The thought of her playing music already inspires him as he writes her a letter in which he 
includes two original verses.  He later declares, “…la expresión sensible del amor es la música” 
(“…the sensuous expression of love is music”; Niebla 129; 51).  However, when he first meets 
her, he quickly finds out that his idea of music is quite different from hers: 
 Conozco, señorita, su gran amor al arte… 
      ¿Al arte?  ¿A cuál, al de la música? 
      ¡Claro está! 
      ¡Pues le han engañado a usted, don Augusto! [...] 
      ¿Es que no le gusta la música? 
      Ni pizca, se lo aseguro.  […] 
      Como es voz pública que es usted una excelente profesora… 
      Procuro cumplir lo mejor posible con mi deber profesional, y ya que tengo que 
ganarme la vida…. (Niebla 145) 
Señorita, I know your great love of art –  
     Art?  What art – the art of music? 
     Of course! 
     Then they have misinformed you, Don Augusto. […] 
     Are you not fond of music? 
     Not a bit, I assue you. […] 
     Since you are known to be such an excellent teacher –  
     I try to fulfil my professional duties as well as I can; and now that I have to  
earn my own living…. (78-79) 
 
Eugenia compartmentalizes art and conceives of it as a separate sphere from that of religion.  For 
her it is a this-worldly phenomenon and not a “revelación de lo eterno, de lo divino de las cosas” 
(“the revelation of the eternal, of the divine in things”) as Unamuno puts it in DST.  Furthermore, 
she alienates herself from others by commodifying music.  Rather than teaching it as way to 
penetrate others and relieve communal suffering she merely “cumple con su oficio” (“fulfills her 
professional duties”) just to make a living.  Like the businessman in DST, she treats others as a 
means and not ends in themselves. 
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 Additionally, Eugenia commodifies her relationships.  Her connections with Mauricio, 
Augusto, and even Orfeo are mediated by money.  Her constant refrain to Mauricio of “tienes 
que buscar trabajo” (“you have to find a job”) and his constant reply of “buscaré trabajo, lo 
buscaré” (“I’ll find a job, I’ll find one”) so that one day they can get married suggest that their 
union depends on a commercial trade; in exchange for finding a job, Eugenia will marry him.  
The commodification of their relationship extends even further and eventually entangles Augusto 
in their “business deal.”  Once Augusto pays off the mortgage that Eugenia’s father left her, she 
can abandon giving piano lessons to pay it down and she and Mauricio are free to run off 
together.  Before the two flee and while Eugenia is pretending she is going to marry Augusto, 
she makes it clear that, when the two get married, Augusto will have to get rid of Orfeo (which, 
because she knows that she is never going to marry him anyway, seems especially and 
unnecessarily cruel).  Her treatment of Orfeo reflects her treatment of Augusto and confirms her 
as his foil.  When Augusto tries to make the case for keeping the dog, he asks, “…¿por qué no el 
perro, del que se ha dicho con tanta justicia que sería el mejor amigo del hombre si tuviese 
dinero…?” (“[w]hy not the dog – of whom it has been so justly said that he would be man’s 
greatest friend if he had money – ?”; Niebla 259; 262).  She responds, “No, si tuviese dinero el 
perro no sería amigo del hombre, estoy segura de ello.  Porque no lo tiene es su amigo” (“No, if 
he had money he wouldn’t be man’s friend, I am certain of that.  He’s man’s friend because he 
hasn’t money”; Niebla 259; 261).  Her cold, economic view of Orfeo differs greatly from that of 
Augusto who shows himself as being able to have compassion and suffer with both humans and 
non-humans alike.  Lastly, the business-like relationship between Eugenia and Mauricio and 
their involving Augusto has its final consequence.  Being treated like a commodity that they used 
and threw away, Augusto resolves to kill himself. 
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 The tale of the disenchantment of the world has tragic consequences for the characters in 
AP and Niebla.  They reveal the effects of a purely transcendent, ethereal idea of god and the 
related consequences of a rationalized and compartmentalized social order.  But the story of 
experience provides a hopeful counter tale.  This story twists a Christian narrative by bringing a 
rationalized, transcendent god back into the mundane affairs of “el hombre de carne y hueso” 
and some of the characters in Unamuno’s fiction.  The story of experience offers possibilities of 
enchantment by weaving together past and present, the natural world and the cultural, and, 
finally, the religious and the secular.  Counterintuitive experiences of love, suffering, and 
compassion deemed religious do indeed set them apart from other experiences but not so far 
apart that they are inaccessible or require special permission, space, or time.  Furthermore, 
although they are set apart, they are not protected by taboos.  Loving another and suffering with 
and for him or her are not everyday experiences but they are not so uncommon that they cannot 
be accessed regularly. Nor do they necessitate special instructions or appointed mediators to 
facilitate this experience.  One could be on a bench in a plaza contemplating the sleeplessness of 







CHAPTER 4: RELATING RELIGION: READING RELIGION 
In the previous chapter, I explored the story of experience as a possibility of enchantment 
that connects immanence and transcendence and which subverts the privatization and 
compartmentalization of the secular script.  I wrote that experience must be continually made 
anew so that it does not simply become something habitual and part of unreflective knowledge, 
something hardened into the kind of dogmatic thinking that, as I have explained in chapter one, 
Unamuno so often denounced.  In this chapter, I argue that Unamuno relates a story of 
uncertainty that places the superhuman agent posited through learning and experience in doubt.1  
This does not mean, however, that Unamuno finally rejects the possibility of a Christian god and 
a world inhabited by spirits in favor of the disenchantment of the secular script.  The story of 
uncertainty, by incorporating both religious and secular narratives in its relation, reveals the 
literary quality and malleability of both and destabilizes any fixed meaning attributed to them.  I 
use “relate” in this chapter in two senses: 1.) to tell a story and 2.) to connect.  In the first sense, 
Unamuno’s works tell a story of Christianity and secularization that undergoes twists and 
distortions but, through the reader’s participation, never disappears.  In the second, the story of 
uncertainty connects religious myths to secular narratives by weaving the two together.  Finally, 
in a combination of the two, reading Unamuno’s stories entails both telling stories and 
                                                           
1Armand F. Baker studies the uncertainty of the historic man, Unamuno, in “Unamuno and the Religion of 
Uncertainty” (1990).  He begins with an overview of critics who have held that Unamuno was and was not a 
believer in God and seeks “to reconcile these conflicting views” in his article.  In his treatment of Unamuno’s 
uncertainty, Baker touches on several aspects that I treat in this chapter – love and compassion and belief through 
action.  However, our analyses differ significantly in that Baker attempts to elucidate a sort of belief system of the 
historic Unamuno and my chapter focuses on Unamuno’s use of literary tropes and techniques that undermine stable 
interpretations of his works and then, through the metafictional mode, weaken strong claims to truth about the world 
external to the texts. 
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connecting them to other stories which undermines the stability of their meaning.  Through an 
exploration of paradox, metafiction, intertextuality, and gaps in narration and dialogue, I will 
ultimately contend that Unamuno’s stories create ontological and epistemological uncertainty 
about existence, weaken both religious and secular claims to truth, and then employ this 
uncertainty and weakness to offer a possibility of enchantment.   
Paradox and Stories about Stories 
 The story of uncertainty begins with a paradox that connects religious and secular 
accounts of the existence of both god and man.  In DST, Unamuno relates the Christian idea of a 
creator god with the secular account that society has created god.  Early on in his essay he writes, 
“Y hemos de ver que es esa facultad íntima social, la imaginación que lo personaliza todo, la 
que, puesta al servicio del instinto de perpetuación, nos revela la inmortalidad del alma y a Dios, 
siendo así Dios un producto social” (“We shall have to enquire what is this inner social faculty, 
the imagination which personalizes everything, and which, employed in the service of the 
instinct of perpetuation, reveals to us God and the immortality of the soul – God being thus a 
social product”; 47; 43).  However, in the chapter titled “De Dios a Dios,” he both contradicts 
and reaffirms this position:  
Dios y el hombre se hacen mutuamente, en efecto; Dios se hace o se revela en el hombre, 
y el hombre se hace en Dios, Dios se hizo a sí mismo… y podemos decir que se está 
haciendo, y en el hombre y por el hombre.  Y si cada cual de nosotros, en el empuje de su 
amor, en su hambre de divinidad, se imagina a Dios a su medida, y a su medida se hace 
Dios para él, hay un Dios colectivo, social, humano resultante de las imaginaciones todas 
humanas que le imaginan.  Porque Dios es y se revela en la colectividad. (183) 
God and man, if effect, mutually create one another; God creates or reveals Himself in 
man and man creates himself in God.  God is His own maker…and we may say that He is 
making Himself continually both in man and by man.  And if each of us, impelled by his 
love, by his hunger for divinity, creates for himself an image of God according to his own 
desire, and if according to His desire God creates Himself for each of us, then there is a 
collective, social, human God, the resultant of all the human imaginations that imagine 




God, then, is both someone that creates man and is created by man.  This is not to say that god is 
human nature objectified and projected outwardly in a Feuerbachian sense and, now that we 
recognize this, we can do away with god.  On the contrary, the mutual creation of man and god is 
not only real but “realmente real” (“really real”), as Unamuno puts it.  But we can already 
anticipate here how this paradox problematizes ontological questions of the nature of existence.  
If we collectively imagine god, does it truly exist?  Relatedly, if we make ourselves in a god we 
have imagined, do we truly exist?  This paradox, however, never fully develops in the essay.  
The novel, on the other hand, with its characters and author and space for dialogue, sometimes 
between the two, allows this paradox to fully manifest itself.   
The primary example of the mutual construction of character and author, creation and 
creator is Niebla.  The tendency of the scholarship on Niebla to focus on the meeting between 
Augusto and Unamuno at the end of the novel has left the systematic references to story-telling 
throughout the novel largely unexamined and, therefore, has overlooked stories, products of the 
imagination, as tools that weaken belief and problematize questions of creation and creator.  In 
Niebla, these stories serve as relations that progressively weaken Augusto’s certainty in a 
creator-god and structure the novel up to the point where Augusto and Unamuno meet.  The 
initial description of Augusto as a “paseante” in life and his thoughts on god that I mention in 
chapter three bear repeating here.  Upon leaving his house, he says, “Esto cambiará en el cielo 
cuando todo nuestro oficio se reduzca, o más bien se ensanche, a contemplar a Dios y todas las 
cosas en Él.  Aquí, en esta pobre vida, no nos cuidamos sino de servirnos de Dios; pretendemos 
abrirlo, como a un paraguas, para que nos proteja de toda suerte de males” (“In heaven all this 
will be changed.  There our function will be reduced, rather it will be broadened into that of 
contemplating God and all things in him.  Here, in this wretched life, we think only of putting 
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God to use; we try to open him as we do an umbrella, in order that he may protect us from all 
sorts of evils”; Niebla 109; 21-22).  Although a transcendent and “bracketed-off” god, August is 
certain of its existence.  As the novel continues, however, his conception of god changes 
drastically from a god of certainty to one that perturbs and instills doubt and whose very being he 
questions.  Stories and the words with which they are related are largely responsible for this 
change in belief. 
 Augusto’s meeting Eugenia, as I have explained in chapter three, triggers memories of 
his mother which, in turn, elicit memories of his childhood.  One of the first descriptions the 
narrator gives of Doña Soledad and Augusto as a child is that “[p]or las noches le leía…algo, 
unas veces la vida del Santo, otras una novela de Julio Verne o algún cuento candoroso y 
sencillo” (“[i]n the evening his mother used to read to him, sometimes the life of a saint, at other 
times a novel of Jules Verne, or some tale simple and sincere”; Niebla 132; 56).  Soon after we 
get this description, when talking to Orfeo, Augusto asks, “¿No es acaso todo creación de cada 
cosa y cada cosa creación de todo?  Y ¿qué es creación?, ¿qué eres tú, Orfeo?, ¿qué soy yo?” 
(“Can’t you say, perhaps, that the whole world is the creation of each thing and each thing the 
creation of the world?  And what is creation?  What are you, Orfeo?  And what am I?”; Niebla 
140; 72).  The seeds of uncertainty have already been planted by bedtime stories and brought 
again to the surface through Augusto falling in love with Eugenia.   
 Love stories and story-telling throughout the novel continually destabilize Augusto’s 
certainty leaving him with doubts about his own existence.  Avito Carrascal’s appearance in 
Niebla and his relation of how he has “rediscovered” his wife and Víctor’s story of his marriage 
make Augusto not only a character in the novel but also narratee who receives these love stories 
at the same time his is being written.  Not surprisingly perhaps, after hearing these stories, 
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Augusto questions the existence of his soul.  Chapters seventeen, Eloíno Rodríguez de 
Alburquerque y Álvarez de Castro’s love story, and twenty-one, Don Antonio’s, also cast 
Augusto in the role of narratee.2  The confusion for Augusto between fiction and reality are 
explicit.  During Víctor’s account of Don Eloíno Augusto interjects, “Pues todo eso, Víctor, 
parece inventado” (“I believe that you are inventing all this, Victor”) to which Víctor responds, 
“Pues no lo es.  Hay cosas que no se inventan” (“Well, I’m not.  There are some things that can’t 
be invented”; Niebla 197; 159).  Later, Augusto exclaims, “¡Todo esto es fantástico!” (“This is 
utterly fantastic!”) and Víctor responds, “No, es histórico” (“No, it is historic”; Niebla 197; 160).  
And the effects of the story are immediate.  The more Augusto reflects on the stories he hears the 
further away he gets from the passive recipient of god-as-a-protector-from-evil idea he has at the 
start of the novel.  Building on his reflections on god and creation, he questions the role Víctor 
plays in writing his own novel:  
 Aunque, por supuesto, todo lo que digan mis personajes lo digo yo… 
     Sí, que empezarás creyendo que los llevas tú, de tu mano, y es fácil que acabes  
convenciéndote de que son ellos los que te llevan.  Es muy frecuente que un autor acabe 
por ser juguete de sus ficciones…. (Niebla 200) 
And yet of course all that my characters say, I am saying… 
     Yes, you may begin by thinking that you are guiding them, with your own hand, but 
you may easily end in the conviction that it is they who are guiding you.  If often happens 
that an author ends by being the plaything of his own inventions…. (161) 
 
Víctor’s nivola resembles Augusto’s life to the point where he invents a dog that his character 
can talk to when there is no other present.  This similarity to fiction causes even further 
reflection: “Todo esto que me pasa y que les pasa a los que me rodean, ¿es realidad o es ficción?  
¿No es acaso todo esto un sueño de Dios…?” (“All of this that is happening to me, and 
happening to the others about me, is it reality or is it fiction?  May not all of it perhaps be a 
                                                           
2Gayana Jurkevich explores Augusto’s role as narratee in Niebla (“Digressions”). 
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dream of God…?”; Niebla 201; 166).  Of course, then, Augusto returns home and resumes his 
monodialogues with Orfeo. 
 Questions of creator and creation come to a climax when Augusto, wanting to commit 
suicide, travels to Salamanca to pay Unamuno a visit.  Augusto bases his argument for his 
existence on the fact that Unamuno entertains a conversation with his fictional character in the 
novel.  He further argues his existence referencing Unamuno’s previous works: “… ¿no ha sido 
usted el que no una, sino varias veces, ha dicho que Don Quijote y Sancho son no ya tan reales, 
sino más reales que Cervantes?” (“Are you not the person who has said, not once but several 
times, that Don Quixote and Sancho are not only real persons but more real that Cervantes 
himself?”’ Niebla 279; 295).3  Augusto, by reading Unamuno’s earlier works, continues to 
construct beliefs upon the shaky scaffolding that his previous reflection has afforded him and his 
views on god and life have changed.  In one final remark to Unamuno he blurs the lines between 
who is playing which role: “Y yo vuelvo a insinuarle a usted la idea de que es usted el que no 
existe fuera de mí y de los demás personajes a quienes usted cree haber inventado.  Seguro estoy 
de que serían de mi opinión don Avito Carrascal y el gran don Fulgencio…” (“And I will again 
suggest this to you, namely, that you do not exist outside of me and of the other characters that 
you think you have invented.  I am certain that Don Avito Carrascal would be of my opinion and 
the great Don Fulgencio – ”; Niebla 280; 296-97).4  It may seem that god has devolved from a 
                                                           
3This sentiment remains constant throughout Unamuno’s works.  In his article, “Pirandello y yo” (“Pirandello and 
I”) (1923) on Luigi Pirandello’s (1867-1936) Sei personaggi in cerca d’autore (1921) and his own Niebla, he writes, 
“… don Quijote y Sancho tienen más realidad histórica que Cervantes, y que no es Shakespeare el que creó a 
Macbeth y Hamlet y el rey Lear y Falstaf y Otelo…, sino éstos a él…” (“…Don Quixote and Sancho have more 
historic reality that Cervantes, and it isn’t that Shakespeare created Macbeth, Hamlet, King Lear, Falstaf, and 
Othello…, but rather that they created him…”; 83). Again in Cómo se hace una novela (1927) this idea appears: 
“Todo ser de ficción, todo personaje poético que crea un autor hace parte del autor mismo” (“Every fictional being, 
every poetic character that creates an author forms part of the author himself”; 136). 
 
4De Toro sees Augusto’s remarks as one of three ways with which characters establish their autonomy : “…la 
primera, quizás la más conocida de todas, es la concepción unamuniana de que el ente de ficción se impone al autor, 
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guarantor of heaven to a possible being of Augusto’s own creation.  However, this possible being 
that only offers uncertainty gives a vital force to Augusto’s life as opposed to the god of 
guarantee that allowed him to be a resigned meanderer with no struggle for life. 
These relations within relations and relations about relating in Niebla not only undermine 
the certainty of Augusto’s beliefs.  They also, through the metafictional mode, draw the reader 
into the story by not-so-subtly reminding him that he, like Augusto, is a narratee reading a story 
and by confronting him with the stability of his own beliefs.  Patricia Waugh (1984) provides a 
definition of “metafiction” and, within it, underscores how this kind of writing creates 
uncertainty about an objective reality:  
Metafiction is a term given to fictional writing which self-consciously and systematically 
draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose questions about the relationship 
between fiction and reality.  In providing a critique of their own methods of construction, 
such writings not only examine the fundamental structures of narrative fiction, they also 
explore the possible fictionality of the world outside the literary fictional text. (2) 5 
 
By constantly revealing themselves as stories, directly addressing the reader, and incorporating 
the fictive author within them, Unamuno’s narratives, as metafiction, blur the lines between their 
                                                           
siendo éste un mero instrumento del personaje al servicio del cual se pone para narrar lo que le vaya dictando ... el 
creador concibe el personaje e inmediatamente éste se le va imponiendo al autor por las características inherentes a 
su naturaleza, es decir, lo que Unamuno ha llamado ‘lógica interna’del personaje de ficción” (“the first, maybe the 
most well-known of all, is the Unamunian concept that the fictional entity imposes itself on the author, with the 
author being a mere instrument who narrates what the character dictates to him…the creator conceives of the 
character and immediately the character imposes himself upon the author with the inherent characteristics of its 
nature, that is to say, what Unamuno has called the ‘internal logic’ of the fictional character”; 360). 
5 Waugh holds that “[m]etafiction is a mode of writing within a broader cultural movement often referred to as post-
modernism” (21) and references Brian McHale who maintains that the contradictions in postmodernist works are 
ontological and “sees as modernist those epistemological contradictions which question how we can know a reality 
whose existence is finally not in doubt” (15).  Despite Unamuno’s falling outside of literary postmodernism, the 
criteria that Waugh lays out for a work to be considered metafiction (20-21) certainly would include the narratives 
that I treat here, especially Niebla. Furthermore, in what I hope will be obvious in the body of this chapter, 
Unamuno’s narratives do indeed place the existence of reality in doubt in order to problematize both religious and 




supposedly fictional reality and that external to it.6  They put the reader face to face with his 
stories and make him reflect upon the language and cognitive constructions with which he crafts 
his own narratives, religious myths and secular stories alike.  Thus, Unamuno’s relations compel 
the reader to ask himself epistemological questions about how he creates truth. 
Metafiction in Unamuno’s works has been treated thoroughly by Robert Alter (1975), 
Fernando de Toro (1981), Robert Spires (1984), Ana María Dotras (1994), and Marsha S. Collins 
(2002), among others.7  In this chapter I intend to add to the work done by these scholars by 
exploring how metafiction functions to undermine religious and secular claims to truth and how 
it exposes the cognitive mechanisms at work in relating and reading stories. 
Although much work has been written about the metafictional aspect of Unamuno’s 
narrative, there is still much to be said.  Spires writes that “[f]or many, the process of destroying 
fiction’s conventions and illusions is centered on, if not limited to, the final three chapters of 
Niebla” (43).  He examines Niebla’s prologue and post-prologue in relation to the rest of the 
                                                           
6Much has been written about Unamuno as fictive author of characters of his texts.  Critics such as J.A.G Ardila 
(2010), Peggy Watson (2004), Carlos Blanco Aguinaga (1967), Victor Ouimette (1974), and Frances W. Weber 
(1973) maintain that it is Unamuno’s attempt to retain authorial control of his characters.  Others such as Frances 
Wyers (1990) write that Unamuno endeavors to achieve immortality through his fictionalization: “…Unamuno 
enters the novelist’s world of Mist and joins his character Augusto Pérez – and all others – beyond death in the 
concrete world of fiction.  Both character and author perpetuate themselves in ‘the soul of [their] people and the soul 
of all humanity,’…” (344). 
 
7Alter writes, “The characters [of Niebla], who delude themselves into imagining they possess free will, are merely a 
dream of the author, who in turn, with his own illusions of autonomous existence, is merely a dream of God” (155) 
and “The casting of doubt on the reality of existence, fictional and nonfictional alike, leads Unamuno to raise certain 
radical questions about how fiction should be written…” (156). 
Spires provides a much more in-depth analysis of metafiction in Niebla.  In his introduction he puts forth a 
definition of the “metafictional mode:” “If we accept the fictional mode as a triad consisting of the world of the 
fictive author, the world of the story, and the world of the text-act reader – subject of course to interior duplication 
by means of embedded stories – a metafictional mode results when the member of one world violates the world of 
another” (15).  He goes on to explore in his chapter on Niebla the multiple violations that this work presents. 
Dotras, whose analysis follows closely that of Spires, highlights several of the same transgressions: 
Unamuno paradoxically inserting himself into the text and thereby undermining his authority as author yet becoming 
more “real” as a fictional character of his own creation and that of the reader; the references to the writing process in 
Víctor’s nivola; and addressing the reader directly. 




novel in addition to these last three chapters.  Alter, de Toro, Dotras, and Collins however, 
mainly focus on the end of the novel.  Although all four critics question the authority of 
Unamuno, his characters, and the reader in the creation of the text and their own realities, they 
ironically place authority in Orfeo’s concluding remarks.8  They point to where Orfeo 
contemplates man’s use of language in his “epilogue:” “Pero [el hombre] ladra a su manera, 
habla, y eso le ha servido para inventar lo que no hay y no fijarse en lo que hay.  En cuanto le ha 
puesto un nombre a algo, ya no ve este algo, no hace sino oír el nombre que le puso, o verle 
escrito.  La lengua sirve para mentir, inventar lo que no hay y confundirse” (“But he barks in a 
way all his own – he speaks.  And this has enabled him to invent what does not exist and to 
overlook what exists.  As soon as he gives a thing a name he ceases to see the thing itself; he 
only hears the name that he gave it or sees it written.  His language enables him to falsify, to 
invent what does not exist, and to confuse himself”; Niebla 297; 326).  Collins, for example, in 
maintaining that Orfeo’s relation to Augusto is one of the “analogous pairings of creator with 
created” (286) writes, “…Parker rightly notes that Orfeo’s oration functions as an epilogue 
completing the frame for the central narrative set up by the two prologues” (302).  First, I 
imagine Unamuno laughing at us in participating in the easy attribution of mentality to 
Augusto’s dog just like a child or “primitive” man in DST I discuss in chapter two.  Second, the 
four critics interestingly do not mention the almost identical sentiments that Augusto expresses 
about language and, in overlooking the instability that Augusto expresses about words, place too 
neat an ending to Niebla.  After attempting to kiss Rosario Augusto ruminates: 
                                                           
8They are not alone in giving Orfeo the final word. For example, Ciriaco Morón Arroyo, in “Niebla en la evolución 
temática de Unamuno” (“Mist in the Thematic Evolution of Unamuno”) (1966), writes, “el monólogo de Orfeo es la 
recapitulación, que da unidad a la obra de tan complicada y desordenada estructura” (“Orfeo’s monologue is the 




La he estado mintiendo y he estado mintiéndome.  ¡Siempre es así!  Todo es fantasía y no 
hay más que fantasía.  El hombre en cuanto habla miente, y en cuanto se hable a sí 
mismo, es decir, en cuanto piensa sabiendo que piensa, se miente.  No hay más verdad 
que la vida fisiológica.  La palabra, este producto social, se ha hecho para mentir.  Le he 
oído a nuestro filósofo que la verdad es, como la palabra, un producto social, lo que creen 
todos, y creyéndolo se entienden.  Lo que es producto social es la mentira. (Niebla 204-
05)9 
I have been lying to her, and I have been lying to myself as well.  It’s always that way.  
Everything I say is make-believe, and there is nothing that is not make-believe.  
Whenever a man talks he lies, and so far as he talks to himself – that is to say, so far as he 
thinks, knowing that he thinks – he lies to himself.  The only truth in human life is that 
which is physiological.  Speech – this thing that they call a social product – was made for 
lying.  I have heard one of our philosophers say that truth is also a social product, like 
speech; truth is what all persons believe, and, by all believing the same thing, they 
understand one another.  A social product?  That which is a social product is never truth, 
but lie –. (172-73) 
 
Orfeo is present for this monodialogue and then Augusto directly addresses him: “¡Ah!, ¿ya estás 
aquí, Orfeo?  Tú, como no hablas, no mientes, y hasta creo que no te equivocas, que no te 
mientes” (“Ah, you here, Orfeo?  Well, you don’t lie because you don’t talk.  And I almost 
believe that you never go wrong – you don’t lie to yourself”; Niebla 205; 173).  Augusto’s 
similar thoughts on language and direct address of his dog cast a level of uncertainty on the 
novel.  Orfeo, in his contemplation of man’s use of language admits that language “hasta nos ha 
contagiado a los perros” (“he has even infected us dogs”; Niebla 297; 327) and, then, remarks, 
“¿Qué será ahora de él?  ¿Dónde estará aquello que en él hablaba y soñaba?  Tal vez allá arriba, 
en el mundo puro, en la alta meseta de la tierra, en la tierra pura toda ella de colores puros, como 
                                                           
9While it is not exactly clear who “nuestro filósofo” (“our philosopher”) is, given Unamuno’s propensity to refer to 
his other works in his essays and novels, which I will discuss later on in this chapter, it seems that he may be 
referring to his own view of language in DST: “La razón…es un producto social.  Debe su origen acaso al lenguaje.  
Pensamos articulada, o, sea reflexivamente, gracias al lenguaje articulado, y este lenguaje brotó de la necesidad de 
trasmitir nuestro pensamiento a nuestros prójimos” (“Reason…is a social product.  It owes its origin, perhaps, to 
language.  We think articulately – i.e. reflectively – thanks to articulate language, and this langauge arose out of the 
need of communicating our thought to our neighbours”; 45; 41) and “Y es que ese sentido social, hijo del amor, 
padre del lenguaje y de la razón y del mundo ideal que de él surge, no es en el fondo otra cosa que lo que llamamos 
fantasía o imaginación” (“And it is true that this social sense, the creature of love, the creator of language, of reason, 




la vio Platón, al que los hombres llaman divino….” (“What can have become of him?  Where 
can that part of him be which spoke and dreamed in him?  Perhaps there above, in the pure 
world, on the high plateau of the earth, in that fine region of the earth, all of it in fine colours as 
Plato saw it, which men call divine…”; Niebla 299; 330-31).  Orfeo, through language, directs 
his attention away from this world and creates an ideal world to cope with the ambiguity of 
death.  Upon verbalizing his thoughts or even having thoughts in the eulogy, he creates an 
imagined world with words that critics have left unexamined.  Furthermore, if Orfeo and 
Augusto are an analogous pairing to that of Augusto and Unamuno and Unamuno and god, the 
question of immortality and creator and creation becomes too unproblematic by giving authority 
to Orfeo’s final remarks; upon death they are all reunited with their creator.  The ending of 
Niebla appears more open than Alter’s, Dotras’, de Toro’s, and Collins’ analyses suggest.  If 
language is just falsification, then Orfeo cannot be trusted either.  His reflection on language in 
articulated form is the equivalent of a professed liar telling us he is lying.  Additionally, what 
Unamuno writes about language in DST and what his characters say about it in Niebla only serve 
to perpetuate the paradox.  On the one hand, language creates reality as in DST, and then, on the 
other, through his use of metafiction in his novels, Unamuno leaves his readers questioning 
whether or not there might exist a “real” world beyond language.  Samuel Amago (2006), in his 
study of metafiction in contemporary Spanish novels, points to this conundrum of language in 
creating reality:  
Language, after all, is the house we live in, and it is the novel’s self-conscious 
acknowledgement of the constructedness of language that makes this so clear; it is 
through language that we are able to put order to our universe.  If our conceptions of 
reality are largely subjective…then our methods of representing that reality must 
necessarily be characterized by the same subjectivity.  Language, which structuralists 
exposed as a subjective system of arbitrarily assigned signifiers, necessarily reflects the 




Metafiction in Unamuno’s works, by drawing the reader’s attention to language as the subjective 
building-blocks with which they are constructed and highlighting the illusory nature of language, 
leaves her doubting the reality of the fictional story she has just read and, as Waugh puts it, 
“drawing on the traditional metaphor of the world as book” (3) creates an uncertainty of the 
reality external to the text, another world of words. 
Name Games 
 Although my conclusion differs from that of Collins with regard to the ending of Niebla 
and, thus, questions of creator and creation in the novel, I agree with her that “…discussion of 
the symbolic nature of such names [like ‘Orfeo’] in Niebla has become commonplace in 
Unamuno criticism, but the relationship between this feature of the text and the novel’s 
engagement with language remains largely unexplored” (291).  However, we differ again in our 
interpretations of “Orfeo” and the assertion that names have a “symbolic nature” in all of 
Unamuno’s works.  While Collins maintains that Unamuno’s use of “Orfeo” recalls the Greek 
myth of the prophetic poet Orpheus, his remark that “Orfeo, en efecto, encontróse huérfano” 
(“Orfeo, indeed, found himself an orphan”; my trans.; Niebla 296), after the death of Augusto, 
suggests that Unamuno is playing with a similar etymological root for “orphan” and “Orpheus” 
and merely pointing out that the poor pooch has been twice abandoned.  Both Collins and I seem 
to be baited into a language game that Unamuno has created for us.  In addition to metafiction as 
a means to call into question the stability of language, Unamuno’s story of uncertainty plays with 
intertextuality as a means to undermine the meaning of the words we use in creating and 
interpreting worlds.  Julia Kristeva (1966) has theorized that “…any text is constructed as a 
mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another.  The notion of 
intertextuality replaces that of intersubjectivity, and poetic language is read as at least double” 
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(37).10  Unamuno’s use of onomastics plays with intertextuality and brings to light the “at least 
double” meaning of words in reference to other texts.  In AP, Avito self-consciously explores the 
meaning of names.  In thinking about what to name his future son, he plays with names trying to 
be very careful to avoid the cultural heritage of Christianity in this naming.  He finally settles on 
“Apolodoro” because, although it references the Greek god Apollo and therefore “una forma de 
superstición” (“a form of superstition”; AP 64; 42), “tiene que ser griego, por ser la lengua griega 
la de la ciencia” (“[it] must be Greek of course, that being the language of science”; AP 63; 41).  
Through Avito’s ruminations about what to name his son, Unamuno plays with the history of 
religion and calls into question how much, if at all, Christianity has changed from classical 
Greek mythology in an intertextual backtracking through religious history.  Likewise in SMBM, 
he refers to the historical and religious meaning of names: “Y ahora, antes de cerrar este epílogo, 
quiero recordarte, lector paciente, el versillo noveno de la Epístola del olvidado apóstol San 
Judas, - ¡lo que hace un nombre! –, donde se nos dice como mi celestial patrono, San Miguel 
Arcángel – Miguel quiere decir ‘¿Quién como Dios?’, y arcángel, archimensajero…” (And now, 
before I bring this epilogue to a close, I wish to recall to your mind, patient reader, the ninth 
verse of the Epistle of the forgotten Apostle, Sain Judas – what power in a name! – where we are 
told how my heavenly patron, St. Michael Archangel (Michael means ‘Who such as God?’ and 
archangel means arch-messenger)…”; 122; 66-67).  However, the instability of the meaning of 
names becomes apparent through characterization.  As I have mentioned, Ángela, because of her 
hazy memory and mixing feelings into her confession, is more interpreter than messenger.  
Similarly, Miguel de Unamuno, with his “sin más que corregir pocas, muy pocas particularidades 
                                                           
10The italics are in the original. 
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de redacción” (“only a few, a very few editorial emendations”; SMBM 121; 66) of Ángela’s 
narration, does not simply relay a message either, as his name might imply. 
The problem of understanding names and the interpretation of worlds in Unamuno’s 
work underscores the arbitrariness of language and destabilizes interpretation through the 
intertextuality of his texts with others and redende Namen and ironic names.11  If, for example, 
we are to understand AP’s Marina as being an archetypal mother and Don Fulgencio 
Entrambosmares as existing between the “seas” of science and religion, then their names 
correspond fittingly to their characterization.  The characterization of Marina accords well with 
her name whether it is taken as “mar materna,” as in Jurkevich’s interpretation or as a diminutive 
form of María, the archetypal mother.  Marina is not only Apolodoro’s mother but also serves as 
a maternal figure for her husband.  As the two embrace in misery at the death of their son, she 
calls out “¡Hijo mío!” (“My son!”) to which Avito responds “¡Madre!” (“Mother!”; AP 163; 
137).  Don Fulgencio Entrambosmares’ name might also be “a name that speaks.”  He seems to 
be between the two “seas” of religion and science mixing them in his “Tratado de cocotología” 
(“Treatise on Cocotology”) giving a scientific description of paper birds while also 
contemplating their archetypal and divine existence.   
Names in Niebla are ones that speak both symbolically and ironically.  If we are to 
understand Augusto as being anything but “august” because of his existential anxieties and the 
orphan Eugenia as “well-born,” their names take on an ironic twist.  In another ironic 
                                                           
11Redende Namen, as Paul R. Olson points out in his The Great Chiasmus: Word and Flesh in the Novels of 
Unamuno (2003), is German for “names that speak” (52).  Through an understanding of redende Namen and with 
reference to Geoffrey Ribbans (1989), Olson explores the contrary nature of first and surname of Augusto Pérez. In 
addition to Olson and Ribbans, many other scholars have posited meanings of names in Unamuno’s narratives: 
Isabel Paraíso in Las voces de psique: estudios de teoría y crítica literaria (The Voices of the Psyche: Studies in 
Literary Theory and Criticism) (2001) (45-46); Gayana Juerkevich’s “The Sun-Hero Revisited : Inverted Archtypes 




interpretation of Augusto, critics find incongruence between the passive, non-assertive Augusto 
and the great emperor for which it has been said he was named.  Collins treats Augusto’s 
surname, Pérez, symbolically pointing out that the common Spanish family name makes the 
protagonist one among many and, thus, representing an “Everyman.”  The literary context of 
Niebla seems to lend credence to this interpretation.  The nivola lacks any concrete reference to 
where Augusto lives and, therefore, could be anywhere.12  Unamuno does, however, give us a 
sense of when the story takes place but only in some faint clues.  Augusto’s wondering about the 
automobile and what purpose it serves to get anywhere faster gives us a modern context as does 
the appearance of Avito Carrascal.  Augusto, therefore, might be considered not an “everyman” 
but a “modern everyman” complete with his existential crisis at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Names in SMBM come to a confusing climax by taking on a multitude of interpretations 
that destabilizes any interpretation of the novel.  Is Ángela a faithful messenger of Don Manuel’s 
story or is her name ironic in that her account is unreliable?  Is Lázaro really a figure raised from 
the dead as his biblical name implies or is it ironic in that he maintains his “ideas progresistas” 
and continues to not believe in the “superstition” that is religion?  Is Don Manuel really “with 
god” as his name suggests or, because he cannot bring himself to say “creo en la resurrección de 
la carne y la vida perdurable” (“I believe in the resurrection of the flesh and life everlasting”) and 
feels abandoned by god, just another ironic name?  While characterization and context might 
help us better understand the redende Namen of characters in AP and either the ironic or 
symbolic names in Niebla, they offer no such certainty in SMBM.  Ángela, messenger of god, 
does not and cannot faithfully deliver the story of Don Manuel because she does not remember if 
everything happened the way she related it and mixes her own feelings into the narrative, which 
                                                           
12We do know that Augusto travels to Salamanca to meet with Unamuno (Niebla 286) but we do not know from 
where he leaves. 
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would make her name ironic.  However, if we take into account that Unamuno ends the story 
saying that “…la novela es la más íntima historia, la más verdadera…” (“…the novel is after all 
the most intimate, the truest history…”; SMBM 123; 68), Ángela’s name accords well with her 
characterization and, what appeared to make her name ironic actually makes it symbolic.   
The characterization of Lázaro confuses the reader’s understanding of his name too.  
Before he enters the story, the narrator first describes him as opposed to sending his sister to a 
religious school and criticizing the small town as “medieval.”  After his stay in the new world he 
returns to Spain and “empezó a borbotar sin descanso todos los viejos lugares comunes 
anticlericales y hasta antireligiosos y progresistas que había traído renovados del Nuevo Mundo” 
(“he began to spout the old anti-clerical commonplaces, to which he added anti-religious and 
‘progressive’ propaganda brought back from the New World”; SMBM 87-88; 27).  The town 
expects something of a showdown between him and Don Manuel but rather quickly Don Manuel 
appears to win him over eventually getting him to promise to pray for his mother and even 
participate in the sacrament of Communion.  It appears that Lázaro does indeed rise from the 
dead renouncing his “progressive” ways and embracing religion, in which case his name is 
symbolic.  Upon Don Manuel’s death Lázaro remarks to Ángela,  
Él me curó de mi progresismo.  Porque hay, Ángela, dos clases de hombres peligros y 
nocivos: los que convencidos de la vida de ultratumba, de la resurrección de la carne, 
atormentan, como inquisidores que son, a los demás para que, despreciando esta vida 
como transitoria, se ganen la otra, y los que no creyendo más que en este…. (SMBM 114) 
It was he who cured me of my delusion of ‘progress,’ of my belief in its political 
implication.  For there are, Angela, two types of dangerous and harmful men: those who, 
convinced of life beyond the grave, of the resurrection of the flesh, torment other people 
– like the inquisitors they are – so that they will despise this life as a transitory thing and 
work for the other life; and then, there are those who, believing only in this life…. (57-
58) 
 
Yet, even after all this and taking over for Don Manuel as the shepherd of the town, we never 
know what Lázaro believes. 
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Don Manuel presents a similar uncertainty.  Although his name means “god is with us,” 
he appears to have no faith that he will be “with god” in a life after death which would make his 
name ironic.  But an intertextual reading of SMBM and DST suggests that his name might be 
symbolic.  Don Manuel and, later, Lázaro, dedicate their lives to Valverde de Lucerna and act as 
if there were a god and life after death.  At the end of “De Dios a Dios” (“From God to God”) in 
DST, Unamuno writes, “Creer en Dios es anhelar que le haya y es, además, conducirse como si 
le hubiera; es vivir de ese anhelo y hacer de él nuestro íntimo resorte de acción” (“To believe in 
God is to long for His existence and, further, it is to act as if He existed; it is to live by this 
longing and to make it the inner spring of our action”; 197-98; 150).  If we read SMBM in 
relation to DST, “Manuel” recaptures its symbolic meaning and the good martyr is again with 
god.  Unamuno’s use of names both symbolically and ironically make any interpretation of his 
characters’ beliefs uncertain at best.  The self-conscious play with the indeterminacy of words 
through names in Unamuno’s works destabilizes their structure and undermines any claim to an 
objective interpretation of the stories and, by postulating “the possible fictionality of the world 
outside the literary fictional text” through the metafictional mode, likewise critique objective 
interpretations of reality. 
 At the level of words, intertextuality exposes the “at least double” meaning of names.  
But, at the level of entire texts, the instability of the meaning of words is exacerbated and words 
and whole stories take on multiple significances.  As in Niebla, stories in SMBM serve to weaken 
belief.  This novel seemingly relates the story of a Catholic priest who does not believe in life 
after death.  However, an intertextual reading of the short novel with DST adds a layer of 
uncertainty on top of an already ambiguous text and changes the protagonist of the story.  If we 
take into account that, for Unamuno, the true crisis of secularization consists not of the 
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disappearance of religion but, instead, of unreflective belief in anything, as I explain in chapter 
one, SMBM becomes the story of Ángela achieving agonic doubt.  She tells a story “a modo de 
confesión” (“by way of confession”; 65; 1) that relates her moving from an unquestioning faith 
to not knowing what she believes.  She goes from a “Sí creo” (“I believe”; 98; 39) to a “¿Y yo, 
creo?” (“And I, do I believe?”; 120; 64).  The indeterminacy of Lázaro’s and Don Manuel’s 
beliefs and their actions, in an intertextual reading, become just a ruse to force Ángela to 
question her simple “fe de carbonera.”  Her metarepresentation of their thoughts cause her to 
doubt.  As she reflects upon why Don Manuel would intimate his doubts to her, she asks, “¿Por 
qué no me engañó?” (“Why didn’t he deceive me?”; SMBM 99; 40) and ends her relation still 
trying to make sense of what they believed: “Y ahora, al escribir esta memoria, esta confesión 
íntima de mi experiencia de la santidad ajena, creo que Don Manuel Bueno, que mi San Manuel 
y que mi hermano Lázaro se murieron creyendo no creer lo que más nos interesa, pero sin creer 
creerlo, creyéndolo en una desolación activa y resignada” (“Now, as I write this memoir, this 
confession of my experience with saintliness, with a saint, I am of the opinión that Don Manuel 
Bueno, my Don Manuel, and my brother, too, died believing they did not believe, but that, 
without believing in their belief, they actually believed, with resignation and in desolation”; 
SMBM 119; 63).  In the end, Ángela takes up the work of Lázaro and Don Manuel and lives for 
her town tormented by the same doubt as her brother and spiritual father.  This, however, begs 
the question, if Don Manuel and Lázaro are so concerned with instilling doubt, why not create an 
even more “tragicomic” spectacle for the entire town?  Ángela asks herself: “¿Por qué no me 
engañó entonces como engañaba los demás?” (“Why did he not deceive me as he deceived the 
others?”; SMBM 99; 40) and offers a possible answer.  When her brother tells her to make sure 
that the townspeople do not find out about Don Manuel’s secret, she responds, “Si intentase, por 
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locura, explicárselo, no lo entenderían.  El pueblo no entiende de palabras; el pueblo no ha 
entendido más que vuestras obras.  Querer exponerles eso sería como leer a unos niños de ocho 
años unas páginas de Santo Tomás de Aquino… en latín” (“Why even if I were to try, in a fit of 
madness, to explain it to them, they wouldn’t understand it.  The people do not understand your 
words, they understand your actions much better.  To try and explain all this to them would be 
like reading some pages from Saint Thomas Aquinas to eight-year-old children, in Latin”; 
SMBM 117; 60).  However, Ángela’s answer still begets another question: why were Don 
Manuel’s and Lázaro’s works not sufficient for her?  The characterization of Ángela from the 
very beginning gives us a hint as to why she was set apart as the lost sheep from the flock of 
Valverde de Lucerna.  We do not know much about Ángela as a child other than she “devoured” 
the books that her father brought from outside the town: “Trajo consigo unos cuantos libros, el 
Quijote, obras de teatro clásico, algunas novelas, historias, el Bertoldo todo revuelto, y de esos 
libros, los únicos casi que había en toda la aldea, devoré yo ensueños siendo niña” (“He had 
brought a number of books with him: Don Quixote, some plays from the classic theatre, some 
novels, a few histories, the Bertoldo, everything mixed together.  From these books (practically 
the only books in the whole village), I nurtured my young girl dreams…”; SMBM 66; 1-2).  As 
with Augusto and his bedtime stories, the seeds of doubt, through fiction, whose internal reality 
mirrors and therefore questions external reality, have already been sown in Ángela’s mind and, 
because she had in her possession the only books in town, her condition of belief is different than 
that of the town.  Don Manuel’s mission then becomes the nourishing of this seed.  When Ángela 
comes to the priest to confess her doubts, he does not preach Catholic theology but rather 
counsels her to read “el Bertoldo, que leía tu padre” (“read the Bertoldo, as your father before 
you did”; SMBM 83; 21).  Her brother too insists that she “leyese de libros que él trajo y de otros 
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que [le] incitaba a comprar” (“read the books that he brought [her], and others which he urged 
[her] to buy,” which Don Manuel fully supports: “Pues lee, hija mía, lee y dale así gusto.  Sé que 
no has de leer sino cosa buena; lee aunque sea novelas.  No son mejores las historias que llaman 
verdaderas” (“Well, read, my daughter, read and make him happy by doing so.  I know you will 
read only worthy books.  Read even if only novels; they are as good as the books which deal 
with so-called ‘reality’”; 89; 29).  Ángela’s doubts grow and Don Manuel further procures to 
nurture them.  In one of her final discussions with Don Manuel she asks, “¿Cuál es nuestro 
pecado, padre?” (“What is our sin, Father?”), but, instead of referring to Genesis, he turns to one 
of the “obras de teatro clásico” (“works of classical theater”) that surely formed part of Ángela’s 
father’s collection, Calderón de la Barca’s metatheatrical play, La vida es sueño (Life is a 
Dream): “Ya lo dijo un gran doctor de la Iglesia Católica Apostólica Española, ya lo dijo el gran 
doctor de La vida es sueño, ya dijo que ‘el delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido.’  Ése es, 
hija, nuestro pecado: el de haber nacido” (“A great doctor of the Spanish Catholic Apostolic 
Church has already explained it; the great doctor of Life is a Dream has written ‘The greatest sin 
of man is to have been born.’  That, my child, is our sin; to have been born”; SMBM 108-09; 
51).13  Ángela’s reading of fictional works, at the behest of Don Manuel, instills uncertainty and 
she cannot confirm nor deny the beliefs of her brother, Don Manuel, or her own.  By this 
account, “Ángela” is not a faithful messenger relating a story but rather its protagonist and, in 
another language game, could have been better named “Lázaro” as she is raised from the 
                                                           
13Don Manuel is referring to the décima in which Segismundo finds himself chained up: “¡Ay, mísero de mí!  ¡Y ay, 
infelice! / Apurar, cielos, pretendo, / ya que me tratáis así, / qué delito cometí / contra vosotros naciendo; / aunque si 
nací, ya entiendo / qué delito he cometido. / Bastante causa ha tenido / vuestra justicia y rigor; / pues el delito mayor 
/ del hombre es haber nacido” (Calderón 37) (“Ah, woe is me!  Ah, how wretched I am! / Heavens, I seek to inquire 
- / since you treat me this way - / what crime I committed / against you when I was born; / though, seeing that I was 
born, I already realize / what crime I have committed: / there was sufficient reason for / your justice and severity, / 




deadness of unquestioning faith.  Of course, the certainty of this interpretation is undermined by 
Ángela’s cloudy memory and the “few changes” that Unamuno made to the original confession. 
Abasement of the Author 
Some critics have read Unamuno’s writing himself into his fiction as a desperate attempt 
to maintain a god-like control over his characters and works and have interpreted them as 
extensions of the author.  Thomas Franz (1980), one such critic, reads Unamuno’s characters as 
fictional progeny signaling the author’s frequent use of “hijos espirituales” (“spiritual children”) 
to describe not only his characters but entire works of fiction.  Using this as his point of 
departure, Franz goes on to posit that Unamuno endeavors to work out his own “multiple 
personality” through these fictional children.14  While critics like Franz and Ouimette rightly 
point to the creator-like relationship Unamuno has with his works and characters, Unamuno’s 
                                                           
14Franz writes, “Throughout his lifetime Unamuno consistently refers to his novels and characters as his ‘hijos 
espirituales,’ while discussing the art of novelizing in terms of human parturition…” (Franz 647).  There are several 
instances throughout Unamuno’s writings where he uses this expression.  In “Qué libro mío prefiero” (“What Book 
of Mine I Prefer”) he writes, “Aunque tuviera preferencia por alguno de mis hijos espirituales, por algunos de mis 
libros no la declararía” (“Even if I had a preference for one of my spiritual children, for one of my books, I would 
not say it”; O.C. 10: 295).  “Los hijos espirituales” (“Spiritual Children”), a short story about a husband and wife, 
Federico and Eulalia, Federico refers to his writings as his “hijos espirituales” (O.C. 9: 254-60).  Another critic, 
Birute Ciplijauskaite (1961), also alludes to this expression in Unamuno’s works in “El amor y el hogar: Dos fuentes 
de Fortaleza en Unamuno” (“Love and Home, Two Sources of Strength in Unamuno”) (88).  Finally, Don Fulgencio 
Entrambosmares expresses this sentiment to Apolodoro in AP: “Los que no tenemos hijos nos reproducimos en 
nuestras obras, que son nuestros hijos; en cada una de ellas va nuestro espíritu todo, y el que la recibe nos recibe por 
entero” (“Those of us who don’t have children reproduce ourselves in our works, which are our children; in each of 
them is contained our entire spirit and he who receives it receives the whole of us”; 147; 122). 
 Franz, following Victor Ouimette (1974), approaches Unamuno’s works biographically and judges the 
author rather harshly: “The frenzied, maniacally-driven ‘agonists’ of Unamuno’s narratives, far from impregnating 
each reader with the struggles of Unamuno’s own multiple personality, actually threatened to obscure the 
importance of his continually underlined authorial presence.  Victor Ouimette recently has shown how Unamuno 
insists on the greatest of vertical distances between himself and his characters in order to point up his god-like 
domination of their stage” (648); “Ouimette has provided solid textual evidence to show that Unamuno needs all 
these characters ‘to protect himself while testing the ground before he takes a stand on an issue’; that is, he uses his 
characters’ mouthings as ‘trial ballons’ for his own subsequent philosophical pronouncements (p. 132)” (651); “In a 
similar fashion, it would appear that Unamuno’s novelistic family, his ‘hijos espirituales,’ are also relied upon to 
accompany and comfort the author and author-character.  Embodying differing facets of the writer’s personality, 
they lend him the solace and illusion of being among those who understand his own predicaments.  Moreover, since 
they reflect the quirks and manias of their own author, they stand in a position to convince him that his own 




own theory of interpretation that I outline in chapter one suggests that the reader might assume 
more control over the meaning of a work and its characters than does the author.15  Furthermore, 
the language that he uses suggests a kenotic flow from author-creator-father to work/character-
creation-child.  Manuel García Blanco (1952) highlights Unamuno’s use of this kind of language 
to talk about his writing: “No se olvide que Unamuno solía verter el alma – la expresión es suya 
– en sus cartas” (5) (“Do not forget that Unamuno used to pour his soul – the expression is his – 
into his letters”).16  In one of Unamuno’s more well-known works, Cómo se hace una novela, he 
again uses language that conveys a flow to talk about the writing process: “Héteme aquí ante 
estas páginas blancas, mi porvenir, tratando de derramar mi vida a fin de continuar viviendo, de 
darme la vida, de arrancarme a la muerte de cada instante” (131)  (“Behold me here, before these 
white pages, my future, trying to pour out my life in order to continue living, to give myself life, 
to pull myself back from the death of each instant”).  Unamuno’s “pouring” himself into his texts 
and characters indicate a kenotic relationship, an abasement of the divine authority of the author, 
with his “hijos espirituales.”  While in Christian theology the kenosis has been generally 
understood as the partial emptying of divine attributes in the incarnation, Luca D’Isanto 
underscores the kenosis of the divine in the act of creation:17 
Millbank has recently shown that the doctrine of kenosis was consistently developed by 
Hamann as an incarnation of God into language.  Thus the emphasis of the self-
                                                           
15Unamuno’s theory of interpretation bears repeating here.  He writes in “Intelectualidad y espiritualidad,” “Porque 
hubo tiempo en que se aficionó a la exégesis.  No a una exégesis científica; no a escudriñar y rebuscar lo que 
hubieran querido decir los que escribieron los libros sagrados; no a concordarlos lógicamente ni a inquirir, por las 
ideas y sentimientos de la época y el país en que vivieron, cuál fuese su sentir y su pensar; sino a tomar pie de 
aquellos textos, consagrados por los siglos, y en los que ha cuajado tan grande copia de tradición, y lanzarse desde 
ellos a especulaciones libres” (O.C. 3: 709).  In, “Sobre la lectura e interpretación del ‘Quijote,’” he repeats this 
theory: “Si la Biblia tiene un valor inapreciable, es por lo que en ella han puesto generaciones de hombres que con 
su lectura han apacentado sus espíritus; y sabido es que apenas hay en ella pasaje que haya sido interpretado de 








exhaustion of God into the entire text of nature, the writing of creation.  “By his kenotic 
act of writing, [God] creates the world and human history as a present sign whose 
concealment-revealment of the absent God is the possibility of man’s free creative 
response which unravels gradually through time.”  The point is that the text of creation, 
as well as that of the Scriptures, opens the way to an unlimited semiosis.  In Vattimo’s 
language, the text is open to the infinitely repeatable movement of interpretation. (11-
12)18 
 
Unamuno’s texts mirror the kenosis in that, in his “pouring” himself into them, he partially 
relinquishes his authority over their meaning and opens them up to a myriad of interpretations.  
Furthermore, by writing himself into the texts, Unamuno reveals himself as a sign, a sort of flesh 
made word, to be created and re-created through interpretation and, thus, perpetuates the paradox 
of who is creating whom.19  Finally, through the metafictional mode, the metaphor “book as 
world” inverts commutatively to “world as book” which reveals that the world too is open to 
multiple interpretations. 
The kenotic abasement of Unamuno in his texts assigns a role to the reader, that of 
creative interpreter.  In Niebla, although Augusto addresses the reader directly for the first time 
in his desperate case for existence, this role is assigned from the beginning when Unamuno pours 
himself into the post-prologue, which, instead of introducing the work, forms part of it.  In 
Víctor’s prologue, he assures the reader that Augusto took his own life.  Then, Unamuno 
immediately follows promising the reader that it was he who killed Augusto.  From the 
beginning it is made clear that Augusto’s death will be at the interpretation of the reader.  Spires 
succinctly summarizes our role in relation to the paradoxical relationship between authors and 
characters: “Authors and characters, since they are merely sign systems, alternately create and 
                                                           
18D’Isanto is referring to John Millbank’s (1997) “The Linguistic Turn as a Theological Turn” in The Word Made 
Strange.  Vattimo echoes this thought: “The stories and myths of the Bible have this same sense of incarnation, and, 
before that, of creation, at least when viewed from the perspective of the Christian faith” (Belief 79). 
 




are created by one another.  And, of course, this creative process is all for the benefit of the text-
act reader, the third creator/creation paradox constituting the fictional mode” (41).  Unamuno 
ends the Prologue-Epilogue to AP’s second edition calling attention to the reader’s function as 
interpreter in the co-creation of the story: “Parémonos.  Me has venido, lector, acompañando en 
este mutuo monodiálogo; me lo has estado inspirando, soplando sin tú saberlo me has estado 
haciendo mientras yo lo estaba haciendo y te estaba haciendo a ti como lector.  Gracias, pues, 
gracias de corazón, por ello.  Y como es tu obra, se te ofrece tuya…” (“Let’s stop.  Reader, 
you’ve come with me, accompanying me in this mutual monodialogue; you’ve been inspiring, 
prompting me, without your knowing it; you’ve been creating me while I was creating it and 
creating you as reader of it.  My thanks, then, my heartfelt thanks.  And, this being your work, 
it’s offered to you…”; 38; 17).  A character forcing its author to lose control of a story by 
obligating him to follow its own internal logic, as Augusto remarks to Víctor and with which he 
later reproaches Unamuno, and an author trying to maintain control of his character and story 
underscores the mutual construction of both creator and creation yet the point where one begins 
and the other ends is left to the interpretive reader as in the death of Augusto.  The reader is 
forced to question just how much the author has “poured” into his creation. 
The internal logic of the character and the interpretive role of the reader cast a veil of 
uncertainty on the author as creator of meaning and, through metafiction’s mirroring of the world 
external to the text, weakens the certainty of the existence of a creator-god.  The reader’s role, 
because it can produce a multitude of interpretations, further undermines any reference to 
authorial control.  Wyers (1990), in his study of authorship in Unamuno’s works, refers to 
Roland Barthes’ (1915-1980) “death of the Author” illustrating how the reader’s interpretation 
destabilizes ultimate meanings: 
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To give a text an Author is to impose a limit and to postulate a meaning, a “final 
signified.” But in writing there is no ultimate fixed meaning in the text precisely because 
it is made up of multiple meanings. Even that multiplicity constantly undermines itself. 
“Writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it” (Barthes 147). This 
refusal of a fixed meaning is also, Barthes goes on to say, a refusal of God and his 
hypostases, “reason, science, law” (147). (329) 
 
Drawing the reader into the text casts him into the role of active participant rather than passive 
recipient and, through his interpretive abilities, weakens the certainty of a creator-god just as it 
does other claims to truth.  The reader’s interpretation ultimately becomes the narrative itself 
and, as mere words, the meaning of the narrative becomes unstable and infinitely variable.  In 
short, the reader becomes the story teller and only one among many. 
DST and Niebla provide accounts that further relate secular and religious stories that not 
only foreground the story teller’s ability to twist and distort stories through interpretation but that 
also emphasize the narrative quality of both kinds of narratives.  In chapter two of DST, 
Unamuno briefly recounts the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and then 
immediately asks his readers, “¿Queréis otra version de nuestro origen?  Sea” (“Do you want 
another version of our origin?  Very well then”; 40; 37).  He then goes on to relate the story of 
man’s evolution from lesser primates to a bipedal being and all that this evolution meant: freeing 
up the hands, opposable thumbs, and the ability to carry the weight of a heavier head.  But then, 
he seamlessly weaves together this secular account with religious narrative:  
Y esa posición también, haciendo que la cabeza pese verticalmente sobre el tronco, 
permitió un mayor peso y desarrollo de aquélla, en que el pensamiento se asienta.  Pero 
necesitando para esto unos huesos de la pelvis más resistentes y recios que en las especies 
cuyo tronco y cabeza descansan sobre las cuatro extremidades, la mujer, la autora de la 
caída, según el Génesis, tuvo que dar salida en el parto a una cría de mayor cabeza por 
entre unos huesos más duros.  Y Jahvé la condenó, por haber pecado, a parir con dolor 
sus hijos. (DST 40)  
Moreover, this position, causing the head to weigh vertically upon the trunk, facilitated 
its development and increase of weight, and the head is the seat of the mind.  But as this 
necessitated greater strength and resistance in the bones of the pelvis than in those of 
species whose head and trunk rest upon all four extremeties, the burden fell upon woman, 
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the author of the Fall according to Genesis, of bringing forth larger-headed offspring 
through a harder framework of bone.  And Jahwé condemned her, for having sinned, to 
bring forth her children in sorrow. (37-38) 
 
At the end of Niebla, we again see a relating of secular story and Christian narrative and how 
Orfeo makes cohere even contradictory stories: 
¡Y es claro, el perro que se pone en dos pies va enseñando impúdica, cínicamente, sus 
vergüenzas, de cara!  Así hizo el hombre al ponerse en pie, al convertirse en mamífero 
vertical, sintió al punto vergüenza y la necesidad moral de taparse las vergüenzas que 
enseñaba.  Y por eso dice su Biblia, según les he oído, que el primer hombre, es decir, el 
primero de ellos que se puso a andar en dos pies, sintió vergüenza de presentarse desnudo 
ante su Dios.  Y para eso inventaron el vestido, para cubrirse el sexo. (298) 
Of course a dog that walks upon his hind legs exhibits the private parts of his body 
shamelessly and self-consciously.  This is what happened to man when he rose upon his 
feet and turned himself into an upright mammal.  At once he had a feeling of shame and 
felt it necessary to cover the parts that he was showing.  And for this reason his Bible 
says, as I have heard from men, that the first man – that is to say, the first who undertook 
to walk upon his hind legs – was ashamed to present himself naked before his God.  And 
for this reason they invented clothes, to cover up their sex. (328) 
 
The combining and confusing of stories of origin underscores how scientific discourse and 
biblical myth employ similar modes of thinking that are essentially narrative.  They both tell 
stories. 
 The inclusion of these distortions within metafictional texts again questions the 
distinction between fiction and reality and, to refer back to Waugh, because metafictional works 
“provid[e] a critique of their own methods of construction,” they therefore place the construction 
of the stories within them under scrutiny.  Additionally, they force the secular critic, like the 
believing reader, to consider her participation in constructing her ultimate truth, thus bringing the 
human being and her interpretive ability into the story.  In light of Latour’s theory, discussed in 
chapter three, that a modern constitution exists and that this constitution guarantees the 
autonomy of society and nature, we can see how Unamuno’s narratives might be an example of 
hybrids proliferating while the modern tries to avoid them.  These stories cast doubt on the 
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autonomy of the anthropologists’ and archaeologists’ studies by bringing the anthropologists and 
archaeologists back into the story and do not allow for conceiving of their work as divorced from 
their interpretive minds.  Just as stories about gods and religion do not produce themselves 
“religiously,” Latour reminds that “[s]cience does not produce itself scientifically any more than 
technology produces itself technologically or economy economically” (Modern 116).  Unamuno 
similarly summarizes that observation must pass through human minds to arrive at interpretation:  
Esa ya clásica supuesta prueba redúcese, en el fondo, a hipostatizar o sustantivar la 
explicación o razón de un fenómeno, a decir que la Mecánica hace el movimiento; la 
Biología, la vida; la Filología, el lenguaje; la Química, los cuerpos, sin más que 
mayusculizar la ciencia y convertirla en una potencia distinta de los fenómenos de que la 
extraemos y distinta de nuestra mente que la extrae. (DST 177) 
In effect, this traditional supposed proof of God’s existence resovles itself fundamentally 
into hypostatizing or substantivating the explanation or reason of a phenomenon; it 
amounts to saying that Mechanics is the cause of movement, Biology of life, Philology of 
language, Chemistry of bodies, simply by adding the capital letter to the science and 
converting it into a force distinct from the phenomena from which we derive it and 
distinct from our mind which effects the derivation. (135) 
 
The practice cannot be divorced from the practitioner. The believing reader and the secular critic 
are both confronted with their role as interpreter and co-creators of their truths. 
 Unamuno’s characterization of his own essays not as scientific discourse devoid of 
allegory and metaphor but rather as stories more closely aligned with fiction blurs the lines 
between genres and calls into question the properties that have been attributed to both.20  His 
combining and confusing creation myth with more scientific theories of origin and evolution and 
including them within works that he recognizes as stories cast doubt on these theories.  This also 
calls into question the veracity of these theories and, by combining them rather than opposing 
                                                           
20Donald L. Shaw concisely states, “There is indeed no firm frontier between Unamuno’s broadly philosophical 
books and his creative writings.  He himself asserted in the prólogo-epílogo to his second novel, Amor y pedagogía 
(1902): ‘el sentimiento, no la concepción racional del Universo y del la vida, se refleja, mejor que en un Sistema 
filosófico, en un poema en prosa o verso, en una novela…ante todo y sobre todo la filosofía es, en rigor, novela o 




them, shows how malleable they are as stories.  With slight changes to both religious myth and 
scientific story, the distinction between genres and modes of thought are distorted. 
 Collapsing genres confuses the poetic, fictional, and imaginative as the proper domain of 
the “irrational” with the prosaic, real, and concrete as the proper domain of the “rational.”21 The 
playfulness and imaginativeness of novels, poems, and theater intermingles with the “serious 
business” of the essay.  The confusion again falls to the reader and the language he uses to 
interpret these works.  In Unamuno’s stories about gods, sleepless trees, and talking dogs, the 
literary terms like “personification” and “pathetic fallacy” might be substituted for 
anthropological ones like “anthropomorphism” and “animism.”   
Unamuno’s novels and essays not only constantly remind us that they are stories but also 
make us aware of the tools, like language, with which these stories are constructed and 
interpreted.  Reason, that supposed scrutineer of falsity and liberator from superstition and 
irrational thinking, is another such tool.  In DST, Unamuno writes, “Hegel hizo célebre su 
aforismo de que todo lo racional es real y todo lo real racional; pero somos muchos los que, no 
convencidos por Hegel, seguimos creyendo que lo real, lo realmente real, es irracional; que la 
razón costruye sobre irracionalidades” (“Hegel made famous his aphorism that all the rational is 
real and all the real rational; but there are many of us who, unconvinced by Hegel, continue to 
believe that the real, the really real, is irrational, that reason builds upon irrationalities”; 25; 27) 
                                                           
21Richard King (1999) explores this western, modern distinction: “From the seventeenth century onwards we see the 
gradual secularization of ‘the mystical’.  The category now becomes closely associated with the metaphors and 
mysteries of poetry and ‘literature’ – cultural forms that became defined during this period in strict opposition to the 
alleged transparency of meaning to be found in prose and scientific writing. Thus, in the seventeenth century, so 
Certeau argues, Western science established its own distinctiveness – its cultural and political identity, through the 
exclusion of more expressive modes of thought and the construction of a category known as ‘literature’. In this way, 
oppositions were set up between the opacity of rhetoric and allegory and the plain transparency of prose. Fiction 
becomes opposed to factual writing, subjectivity to objectivity, the metaphorical (allegorical) is contrasted with the 
literal, and the multivocality of ‘literature’ was seen as distinguishing it from the univocality of science” (16). 
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and later underscores how reason simply serves as a means of connecting the irrational dots: “Lo 
racional, en efecto, no es sino lo relacional; la razón se limita a relacionar elementos 
irracionales” (“The rational, in effect, is simply relational; reason is limited to relating irrational 
elements”; 107; 86).  Both Christian and secular readers of Unamuno’s narratives, by relating 
fictional elements within the texts, are again made aware of their participation through 
interpretation. 
 As co-creators of the texts, products of the imagination, we are baited into Unamuno’s 
game by constructing rational arguments based on fantasy and the irrational.  For example, one 
of my interpretations of Lázaro is that he was a non-believer affected by his stay in America and 
that Don Manuel, as a Catholic priest that has assured the belief of his “flock” in Valverde de 
Lucerna, sets out to save Lázaro.  Having learned the parable of the lost sheep in grammar school 
and having read other works by Unamuno give me a specific, albeit not unique, context in 
reading SMBM.22  My context frames my interpretation and I participate in the creation of these 
two characters giving them new life.  Given the many biblical references in SMBM and how man 
can posit a superhuman agent through experience in DST, this interpretation seems “reasonable.”  
Avito Carrascal’s appearance in Niebla serves as another example of co-creating characters.  At 
the end of AP, it seems that the good positivist will at least concede some territory to religious 
belief after his mutual suffering with Marina and the subsequent involving a superhuman agent.  
This, however, is not the case as Carrascal will attempt to implement the same “pedagogy” that 
he used with Apolodoro in the raising of his grandson.  One of my interpretations to explain 
Carrascal’s sudden appearance in a church in Niebla is that his experiment to educate a genius in 
                                                           
22Gorka Bilbao Terreros (2012) briefly points to this interpretation of Lázaro (253). Catherine Ann Hollingsworth 




the ways of science failed again.  Given his experience when Apolodoro dies, my interpretation 
seems, again, “reasonable.”  In both interpretations I use my background knowledge and reason 
to connect events and fill in gaps in an attempt to make the stories and my own interpretations 
cohere.23  Through the use of reason I participate in the construction of imaginative stories and in 
the creation of the characters themselves.  The base of my stories is a fictional story, a narration, 
a myth and, as such, malleable, fluid, non-dogmatic, and anything but certain.  Just as Unamuno 
calls attention to the interpretive work of the mind of the mechanic, biologist, philologist, and 
chemist in their fields, he subtly reveals the interpretive work of the literary critic, who, as he 
relates elements of the story enters into it and participates in its construction.  Unamuno’s fiction 
reveals that giving meaning to a text can only be done and understood in relation to other stories.  
Furthermore, this relation is culturally and historically constrained by the texts, contexts, and 
intertexts of the interpreter.  Through metafiction’s “pull” of the reader and its outward 
projection and the kenotic abasement of the divine, the interpreter is reminded that the text of 
creation is likewise culturally and historically interpreted. 
A Partial Kenosis 
 As my comments above about Unamuno “baiting” his reader and the partial 
relinquishing of divine attributes of the kenotic event have already intimated, the reader and her 
                                                           
23C.A. Longhurst (2008) examines the gaps that Unamuno, as author, creates for his readers in an attempt to control 
them since he cannot maintain it in the text: “Unamuno was both an interpreter of texts and a creator of them. From  
passing interpretations of classical literature (he was after all Professor of Greek) and the Spanish classics (notably 
Don Quixote), he went on to construct his own literary texts, which owe not a little to his penchant for 
reinterpretation, in itself unsurprising but which in his case tends markedly towards the heterodox and aberrant. 
What is clear is that interpretation and creation were close fellow travelers for Unamuno. It was as an interpreter of 
texts (not least of course the Bible, which after all is the fount of hermeneutics) that he approached his own. And as 
an interpreter of texts he was well aware that virtually any form of linguistic utterance has gaps that can, and often 
do, make meaning unstable. This is especially true of narrative, for the sustained sequence that conforms it can never 
be temporally or spatially complete. Well before Wolfgang Iser and other reader-response theorists reached the same 
conclusion, Unamuno knew full well that reading is a gap-filling exercise” (“Reader” 471).  While I agree with 
Longhurst that the gaps Unamuno creates constrain the interpretation of the reader, this chapter differs significantly 
from his article in that I explore the use of reason, cognitive mechanisms, and ellipses in the creating and opening up 
of these gaps while he studies questions posed to the reader.   
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interpretive capacity has not decisively won the battle over control of the text.  It is one thing to 
claim that experiences deemed religious in DST are set apart as counterintuitive to our cognition 
and an entirely different one to claim that Niebla is a metaphor for how to make pancakes.  
Unamuno, the text, and the characters permit some interpretations and not others. The author and 
the internal logic of the characters shape the interpretation of the reader illustrating the paradox 
of mutual creation.  Hutcheon (1980) writes of the reader’s role in interpreting metafiction that 
“he is left to make his own meaning, to fill the void, to activate the work…. The author seems to 
want to change the nature of literature by altering the nature of the reader’s participation in it" 
(150).  Using reason to relate stories, the reader does indeed play a creative role in the text but he 
must also ask what elements he is relating.  
 As readers, external to the fictional worlds of Unamuno’s characters, we may think we 
are privy to the full realization of the work through narration, dialogues, monologues, and 
monodialogues but we are never given the whole story.  As readers we fill in the gaps and, in 
doing so, participate in creating the characters we read about.  It is up to us to bridge gaps in the 
narrations.  We are asked to answer thematic questions: How did Augusto Pérez die?  What does 
Don Manuel believe?  What happened to Avito Carrascal between the time he endeavors again to 
create a genius in Apolodoro’s son and when he reappears in a church in Niebla?  But, 
Unamuno’s message of “Y como es tu obra, se te ofrece tuya…” (“And, this being your work, 
it’s offered to you…”; AP 38; 17) reminds us that, although we are active in the creation of the 
story, the work is offered to us. 
Ellipses in Unamuno’s texts elucidate the relationship between the interpretive work of 
the reader and the manipulation of the author.  They open up gaps in the narration that invite the 
reader in while also placing constraints on the interpretation.  In the climactic scene of Niebla, as 
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Augusto blurs the lines between creator and created and who is playing which role, the 
protagonist and Unamuno continually interrupt each other in a dialogue of half-formed 
declarations and protestations punctuated by ellipses which create gaps and fragment thoughts at 
crucial moments that could provide an answer as to Augusto’s existence.  The following is 
characteristic of their dialogue: 
 “Usted ha manifestado dudas sobre mi existencia…” 
      “Dudas, no.” – le interrumpí –….  
      “¿no ha sido usted el que no una, sino varias veces, ha dicho que Don Quijote y 
Sancho son no ya tan reales, sino más reales que Cervantes?”   
      “No puedo negarlo, pero mi sentido al decir eso era…” 
      “Bueno, dejémonos de esos sentires y vamos a otra cosa.” (279-80) 
 “You have expressed doubts about my existence –” 
      “Doubts?  No!” I interrupted. 
      “Aren’t you the person who has said, not once but several times, that Don Quixote and 
Sancho are not only real persons but more real than Cervantes himself?” 
      “I can’t deny it, but the sense in which I said it was…” 
       “Very well, never mind in what sense.” (295-96) 
 
Similarly, SMBM is full of fragmented dialogue opening up gaps at crucial moments.  Don 
Manuel never gives a straightforward answer to Ángela’s direct questions about heaven, hell, 
and sin.  And, then in a conversation with Lázaro, when it seems that he might finally verbalize 
his true beliefs about an afterlife, he cuts himself off: 
Nuestro reino, Lázaro, no es de este mundo…   
     ¿Y el otro?   
     El otro, Lázaro, está aquí también, porque hay dos reinos en este mundo.  O mejor, el 
otro mundo… vamos, que no sé lo que me digo. (104) 
Our kingdom, Lazarus, is not of this world… 
     And the other? 
     The other is here.  Two kingdoms exist in this world.  Or rather, the other world… Ah, 
I don’t really know what I’m saying. (46) 
 
Also like in Niebla, in SMBM the ellipses create a gap for the reader to fill and, in the preceding 
examples, to interpret the major themes of the novels – Augusto’s existence and Don Manuel’s 
beliefs.  And, as if the fragmented dialogues and gaps did not render an uncertain enough 
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reading, Ángela’s final reflections remind us that it is she who relates this dialogue, one for 
which she was not present, creating yet another gap. 
 Although the reader enters the text to relate one element to another, the silence and gaps 
produced by Unamuno form part of his manipulation.  Where the reader might see the freedom 
to interpret, the author may maintain control through the creation of these gaps.  Metafiction 
again functions to project the paradoxes internal to the text outwardly into the world of the reader 
and questions what gaps he might fill and in whose story.  Don Fulgencio Entrambosmares’ 
concept of la morcilla in AP exemplifies this sort of asserting one’s freedom in a story controlled 
by another’s narrative.  He explains this idea to Avito: 
Pues morcilla se llama, amigo Carrascal, a lo que meten los actores por su cuenta en sus 
recitados, a lo que añaden a la obra del autor dramático.  ¡La morcilla!  Hay que espiar su 
hora, prepararla, vigilarla, y cuando llega meterla, meter nuestra morcilla, más o menos 
larga, en el recitado, y siga luego la función.  Por esa morcilla sobreviviremos, morcilla, 
¡ay!, que también nos la sopla al oído el gran Apuntador. (AP 77-78) 
Well, the ad lib, Carrascal my friend, is what the actors insert into their lines on their 
own, the words they add to the author’s dramatic work.  The ad lib!  We have to watch 
for its coming, prepare for it, keep an eye out for it, and when it arrives, we need to 
introduce, insert, our ad lib, longer or shorter, into the line, and may the show then go on.  
By means of that ad lib we’ll survive – an ad lib which the great Prompter also whispers 
into our ear. (55) 
 
His theory of la morcilla exacerbates the paradox.  Supposedly there is only a momentary gap 
that opens up when the actor can truly act freely yet he must prepare for it which supposes a 
level of freedom in itself.  Furthermore, this act of true freedom is constrained by the whispers of 
the “gran Apuntador.”  La morcilla resembles the gap-filling of the reader in that it is constrained 
by someone or something else’s moment of silence and loss of control.  Yet, this someone or 
something is ever present, just “off-stage,” behind the text, or perhaps pushed into 
transcendence.  Likewise, the supposed silence with an occasional whisper of god in the modern 
age should not be confused with its absence.  This silence is powerful.  Just as the author in 
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narrative opens up space for creating, re-creating, and interpreting with what he does not write, a 
silent or silenced god might do the same.  The reader-creation may act as if she were truly free to 
make her own meaning without realizing that her own creations might be manipulated and 
informed by the context, or lack thereof, provided by the author-creator.  But there is no way to 
be certain where reader interpretation begins and where authorial control ends. 
 The context Unamuno gives his characters in their development helps frame their 
experiences but what he leaves out is crucial in inviting the reader into the text.  The reader is not 
given free-reign of interpretation but rather is constrained by the contexts and intercontexts that 
Unamuno provides.  In doing so, he seems to anticipate the cognitive mechanisms the reader 
employs in formulating an interpretation and underlines the use of these mechanisms in creating 
meaning inside and outside of the text.  Throughout his novels, Unamuno provides little to no 
physical description of his characters.  The most we get is of Don Manuel: “Era alto, delgado, 
erguido, llevaba la cabeza como nuestra Peña del Buitre lleva su cresta, y había en sus ojos toda 
la hondura azul de nuestro lago” (“He was tall, skinny, and erect; he would carry his head like 
our Buzzard Peak carries its summit and, in his eyes, there was all the blue depth of our lake”; 
my trans.; SMBM 67).  What he does often provide, as he does here with Don Manuel, are his 
characters’ eyes.  He leaves it up to the reader’s intuitive ontologies to fill in the rest.  Augusto’s 
creation of Eugenia parallels the reader’s creation of fictional characters in that they both assign 
their objects of creation to the category of “person” based on little information and faint clues.  
Just by catching a glimpse of Eugenia’s eyes, Augusto immediately conceives of a person and 
begins to fill in the details to the point that he imagines her “blancas manos” (“white hands”).  
His creation of Eugenia happens almost simultaneously as the reader’s creation of him.  The 
reader’s intuitive ontologies likewise assign Augusto to the category of “person” “al aparecer…a 
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la puerta” (“upon appearing at the door”; my trans.; Niebla 109) and, by assigning him to this 
category, the reader begins to fill in the details.  The parallel acts of creating cause the reader to 
reflect upon the easy attribution of traits to characters that are never seen.  If I, as an interpretive 
reader, ask how Augusto could possibly know what Eugenia’s hands look like when he had only 
seen her eyes, I must similarly ask myself why my Augusto is dressed in black.  The parallel 
becomes even more evident in that, just as Augusto calls her “mi Eugenia,” I have done the same 
with my Augusto in an attempt to claim ownership of the thing I have just created.24  Finally, 
another parallel exists through an intertextual reading of Niebla and DST.  As we have seen in 
chapter two, Unamuno’s hombre de carne y hueso (y seso) of DST exemplifies the immediate 
attribution of mentality and agency to things based on minimal information:  
Ahí está una masa informe; parece una especie de animal; no se le distinguen miembros; 
sólo veo dos ojos, y ojos que me miran con mirada humana, de semejante, mirada que me 
pide compasión, y oigo que respira.  Y concluyo que en aquella masa informe hay una 
conciencia Y así, y no de otro modo, mira al creyente el cielo estrellado, con mirada 
sobrehumana, divina, que le pide suprema compasión y amor supremo, y oye en la noche 
serena la respiración de Dios que le toca en el cogollo del corazón, y se revela a él.  Es el 
Universo que vive, sufre, ama y pide amor. (208)   
Here is a formless mass; it appears to be a kind of animal; it is impossible to distinguish 
its members; I only see two eyes, eyes which gaze at me with a human gaze, the gaze of a 
fellow-being, a gaze which asks for pity; and I hear it breathing.  I conclude that in this 
formless mass there is a consciousness.  In just such a way and none other, the starry-
eyed heavens gaze down upon the believer, with a superhuman, a divine, gaze, a gaze 
that asks for supreme pity and supreme love, and in the serenity of the night he hears the 
breathing of God, and God touches him in his heart of hearts and reveals Himself to him.  
It is the Universe, living, suffering, loving, and asking for love. (157) 
 
This intertextual reading makes more explicit what the metafictional mode has intimated; the 
same cognitive faculties used to create fictional characters are the same used in the creation of 
superhuman agents based on some very faint “clues.” 
                                                           
24Spires points out this relationship between creation and ownership (39). 
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The metafictional mode of the novel causes further reflection upon the creation of beings 
external to the text.  Hutcheon highlights this back and forth of the reader of metafiction:  
“…paradoxically the text also demands that [the reader] participate, that he engage himself 
intellectually, imaginatively, and affectively in its co-creation.  This two-way pull is the paradox 
of the reader.  The text’s own paradox is that it is both narcissistically self-reflexive and yet 
focused outward, oriented toward the reader” (7).  This vaivén between worlds creates a house of 
mirrors that destabilizes meaning inside and outside of the text. Within it, the reader is forced to 
acknowledge her contribution to the creation of characters through interpretation and intuitive 
ontologies, recognize that these characters were given to her by the author, and accept that the 
characters shape her interpretation.  External to the text, she must also question these various 
levels of creator and creation. 
Metarepresentation, the ability to have beliefs about beliefs and to have beliefs about 
beliefs about beliefs, is another cognitive capacity that plays a role in the creating and filling of 
gaps in Unamuno’s works and lies at the heart of metafiction itself.  My interpretations of Avito 
Carrascal’s appearance in Niebla and Lázaro as the proverbial lost sheep in SMBM characterize 
the filling in the gaps by the reader with beliefs about the characters’ beliefs.  To interpret Don 
Manuel’s actions and Avito’s going to church, I have to formulate a belief about the beliefs that 
inform this action.  However, the reader again is not free from the constraint of the author and 
characters.  They, too, metarepresent our beliefs and, in doing so, shape our reading.  Throughout 
DST, Unamuno anticipates the questions and thoughts of the reader as in the following examples: 
“No se me oculta tampoco que podrá decírseme que todo esto... son metáforas.  Así es, y no 
pretendo otra cosa sino discurrir por metáforas” (“I am well aware that it may be objected that all 
this talk…is merely metaphor.  So it is, and I do not claim to discuss otherwise than by 
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metaphor”; 47; 42); “‘¡Ensueños mitológicos!’, se dirá.  Ni como otra cosa los hemos 
presentado” (“Mythological dreams! it will be said.  And I have not pretended that they are 
anything else”; 263; 198).  Víctor too has formed a belief about the beliefs of readers.  As 
Augusto’s certainty in god and his existence progressively weakens, Víctor remarks to him, “[y] 
además, que si, como te decía, un nivolista oculto que nos esté oyendo toma nota de nuestras 
palabras para reproducirlas un día, el lector de la nivola llegue a dudar, siquiera fuese un fugitivo 
momento, de su propia realidad de bulto y se crea a su vez no más que un personaje nivolesco, 
como nosotros” (“And besides, supposing that, as I suggested, there is a ‘nivolist’ here in hiding 
who is listening to us and taking down our words for the purpose of reproducing them – well, I 
want to make the reader of his nivola doubtful of his own solid reality, if only for a passing 
moment, and take his turn in believing that he is only a ‘nivolistic’ personaje like ourselves”; 
Niebla 275; 288).  His metarepresentation here of the reader’s doubt points to how the 
metafictional plays with the metarepresentational.  Hutcheon’s claim that the text “demands that 
he participate, that he engage himself intellectually, imaginatively, and affectively in its co-
creation” supposes not only that the reader, through his engagement and participation, formulate 
beliefs about the beliefs of the characters and authors but also, in the “two-way pull,” that he 
formulate beliefs about his own beliefs about fiction and reality, creator and creation.  
Metafiction is a mode that triggers thoughts about thoughts and this metarepresentation opens up 
a text to fill in gaps while simultaneously creating those gaps. 
The metafictional and intertextual nature of Unamuno’s works finally reveals one last 
cognitive function at work in the interpretation of stories, what Herrnstein Smith has termed 
“cognitive conservatism.” She writes that, despite this mechanism’s tendency to belief-
persistence, it is dynamic and paradoxically creative: “…the psychological mechanisms involved 
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here operate not simply or primarily by maintaining our established belief systems but also and 
perhaps more significantly by incorporating into them whatever comes along: novel ideas, 
anomalous observations, new practical techniques, and so forth” (16).  Unamuno similarly 
identifies the mind’s ability to accommodate new knowledge: “Se aprende algo, o para un fin 
práctico inmediato, o para completar nuestros demás conocimientos...” (“We learn something 
either for an immediate practical end, or in order to complete the rest of our knowledge…”; DST 
35; 34).25  The self-conscious references to other stories and the inclusion of stories within 
stories and making them cohere as Unamuno and Orfeo do in relating Christian and secular 
narratives of origin illustrate this kind of cognitive conservatism.  Separately the story of the 
Garden of Eden and theories of evolution relate different accounts of human nature but, because 
they are malleable and fluid, related to one another, they give a coherent narrative of why woman 
suffers during childbirth and why humans wear clothes.  Intertextuality and metafiction, 
reflecting the world of the reader, expose her cognitive conservatism and she must consider the 
stories with which she, through interpretation, relates another story.  The two, by uncovering the 
shaky foundation upon which stories are built, thus weaken the narratives of both religious 
interpreter and secular critic.    
My relating the gap-filling activity to la morcilla, as well as the interpretations above of 
SMBM and Niebla in relation to AP and DST indicate an intertextual reading that destabilizes 
meaning in the individual texts.  I have multiplied the meaning of one text by interpreting it in 
relation to another.  However, my intertextual interpretations, in addition to being constrained by 
                                                           
25This is expressed again in DST: “Llamamos verdadero a un concepto que concuerda con el sistema general de 
nuestros conceptos todos, verdadera a una percepción que no contradice al sistema de nuestras percepciones; verdad 
es coherencia” (“We call a concept true which agrees with the general system of all our concepts; and we call a 




my cultural and historical situatedness, are also constrained by Unamuno.  He constantly places 
his works in relation to each other: SMBM ends with a reference to Niebla; Niebla references 
DST, Víctor Goti refers to AP in his prologue and, as we have seen, Avito Carrascal makes an 
appearance in this novel; finally, DST refers back to AP.  This intertextuality, in addition to 
forcing the reader to bridge even larger gaps between stories and co-create characters, functions 
as a way of placing one work in dialogue with another.  The intertextuality of Unamuno’s works 
forces the reader to reflect on the tradition of the text in a Borgesian “La biblioteca de Babel” 
fashion: to understand book A, consult book B, to understand book B, consult book C, and so on.  
In this way Unamuno’s works reveal that texts form part of a tradition and are formed by it.  
Additionally, this intertextuality reflects the changes and distortions to stories through their 
interpretations and propagation.  Reading Unamuno’s fiction mirrors the twisting of narratives in 
that the text reflects the various received traditions from its multiple authors and in that the 
readers’ interpretations reflect the multiple construals of these traditions.  As in my example 
above of Lázaro as a lost sheep, not only do the many Biblical references in SMBM and my 
cognitive faculties inform my interpretation but also the texts of my own cultural background.  
Using reason, cognition, and my literary and cultural context to create an interpretation, I “mind” 
a hermeneutical gap.26  The metafictional nature of Unamuno’s novels, in their outward 
projection, make apparent this “minding” of gaps in the twisting and distorting of texts through 
interpretation and show that interpretation is contextually contingent. 
Slippery Symbols 
Symbols in SMBM highlight the contingent nature of interpretation by taking on 
different, and often contradictory, meanings through the contexts within which they are related.  
                                                           




The instability of the meaning of names and the elusiveness of any stable interpretation that it 
causes is compounded by the variability of meanings that natural symbols take on in this short 
novel.  The interpretation of symbols in SMBM, especially those of the lake and the mountain, is 
a well-trodden area of study.  While critics have come up with a myriad of understandings of the 
two natural features embracing Valverde de Lucerna, Howard Mancing (2006) has pointed out 
that critics tend to explore the lake as doubt and the mountain as faith (359n22).27  The various 
interpretations of these symbols in the criticism in itself illustrate their instability and the 
uncertainty of assigning them any fixed meaning.   
The first context that Ángela gives us of the mountain and the lake make an explicit 
connection to Don Manuel: “Era alto, delgado, erguido, llevaba la cabeza como nuestra Peña del 
Buitre lleva su cresta, y había en sus ojos toda la hondura azul de nuestro lago” (“He was tall, 
skinny, and erect; he would carry his head like our Buzzard Peak carries its summit and, in his 
eyes, there was all the blue depth of our lake”; my trans.; SMBM 66-67).  From the beginning the 
two natural elements create confusion.  On one hand, we have a firm, supposedly immovable 
element associated with the Catholic priest’s head and, on the other, a fluid, unstable element 
associated with his eyes.  An intertextual reading of SMBM and DST would reveal to us that the 
mountain symbolizes reason through its association with the head.  In the essay, Unamuno writes 
that reason alone annihilates belief in immortality and explicitly associates the head with reason: 
                                                           
27Pelayo H. Hernández (1963), for example, holds the mountains as a symbol of faith (253).  Eduardo Godoy 
Gallardo (2001) notes that most critics read the lake as symbolizing doubt and the mountain as faith but he interprets 
the two as symbols of the New and Old Testaments respectively (33).  M. Gordon (1986) maintains that the 
mountain “symbolises the life and faith of the living of Valverde de Lucerna” (157).  Marie J. Panico (1963) 
believes that the mountain represent Don Manuel’s “high ideals” and that the lake “mirrors death” (473).  Rosendo 
Díaz-Peterson (2013) writes that “[l]a montaña es signo de verticalidad, inmortalidad, del mismo don Manuel.  El 
lago, por su parte, simboliza lo horizontal, la tradición, la superstición, el pueblo” (“the mountain is a sign of 
verticality, immortality, of Don Manuel himself.  The lake, on the other hand, symbolizes horizontality, tradition, 




“La razón, la cabeza, nos dice: ‘¡Nada!’” (“Reason, the head, speaks to us the word Nothing!...”; 
192; 146).28  The comparison between the lake and his eyes, as windows into his soul, would 
reveal something deeper perhaps at odds with the reason at the surface of his head. 
Later contextual clues seem to corroborate the interpretation that the lake symbolizes 
something in conflict with reason, namely that of a profound faith.  On the Feast of St. John, Don 
Manuel uses the lake as a “piscina probática” (“Pool of Bethesda”) to cure the sick and possessed 
(SMBM 70-71).  Additionally, according to legend, there is a feudal, medieval village submerged 
in the lake suggesting that it is a place of unquestioning faith.  In a conversation between Lázaro 
and Ángela, the association of the lake with Don Manuel again points to the possibility that what 
is hidden beneath the appearance of Don Manuel is a profound faith:  
Ya sabes que dicen que en el fondo de este lago hay una villa sumergida y que en la  
noche de San Juan, a las doce, se oyen las campanadas de su iglesia.   
     Sí, una villa feudal y medieval…. 
     Y creo que en el fondo del alma de nuestro Don Manuel hay también sumergida,  
 ahogada, una villa y que alguna vez se oyen sus campanadas. (SMBM  91-92) 
You already know that they say that at the bottom of the lake there is a submerged village 
and that on the night of Saint John, at midnight, you can hear the bells of its church. 
     Yes, a feudal and medieval village… 
     I believe that in the bottom of Don Manuel’s soul there is also a submerged and 
drowned village and that sometimes you can hear its bells ringing. (my trans.) 
 
Finally, the biblical context, that of turning the water of the lake into wine, that Don Manuel 
provides would further lend support to the interpretation that the lake symbolizes deep faith.  
Ángela recalls Don Manuel saying, “¡Ay, si pudiese cambiar el agua toda de nuestro lago en 
vino, en un vinillo que por mucho que de él se bebiera alegrara siempre sin emborracharse 
                                                           
28Unamuno repeatedly associates the “head” with “reason throughout DST: “Hay en la filosofía de este hombre 
Kant, hombre de corazón y de cabeza,… el salto de la Crítica de la razón pura a la Crítica de la razón práctica.  
[…]  Kant reconstruyó con el corazón lo que con la cabeza había abatido” (“In the philosophy of this man Kant, a 
man of heart and head…there is a significant somersault…from the Critique of Pure Reason to the Critique of 
Practical Reason”; 23-24; 26);“El hombre razonable dice en su cabeza: ‘No hay otra vida después de ésta’…” (“The 
reasonable man says in his head, “There is no other life after this…”; 273; 206). 
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nunca… o por lo menos con una borrachera alegre!” (“Ah, if I could only change all the water in 
our lake into wine, into a dear little wine which, no matter how much of it one drank, would 
always make one joyful without intoxicating… or, if intoxicating, would make one joyfully 
drunk”; SMBM 79; 16-17).  This passage prefigures the remark that Don Manuel later says to 
Lázaro that the two need to continue working to give the town opium to keep them happy. 
While the above contexts seem to suggest that the lake symbolizes a profound faith that 
contents the people of Valverde de Lucerna and that Don Manuel harbors deep in his soul, other 
passages in the short story seem to indicate that it represents just the opposite, doubt.  Despite the 
unquestioning faith of the submerged medieval town and the magical powers of the lake to cure, 
its waters often perturb Don Manuel.  Ángela again makes this explicit through a comparison 
between the lake and Don Manuel’s eyes: “Leí no sé qué honda tristeza en sus ojos, azules como 
las aguas del lago” (“I thought I read a deep unknown sadness in his eyes, eyes which were as 
blue as the waters of the lake”; SMBM 86; 25).  The most poignant examples that connect the 
lake to doubt are the words that Don Manuel pronounces and the ones he cannot bring himself to 
recite.  Ángela makes a comparison between the effect of Don Manuel’s reenactment of Christ’s 
expression of doubt and the effect of a cold, north wind over the lake: “Y cuando en el sermón de 
Viernes Santo clamaba aquello de: ‘¡Dios mío, Dios mío!  ¿por qué me has abandonado?’, 
pasaba por el pueblo todo un temblor hondo como por sobre las aguas del lago en días de cierzo 
de hostigo” (“And when on Good Friday he intoned ‘My God, my God, my God, why hast Thou 
forsaken me?’ a profound shudder swept through the multitude, like the lash of a northeaster 
across the waters of the lake”; SMBM 72; 8-9).  Lastly, Ángela recounts Don Manuel’s powerful 
voice getting lost in a lake of doubt: “Y al llegar a lo de ‘creo en la resurrección de la carne y la 
vida perdurable’ la voz de Don Manuel se zambullía, como en un lago, en la del pueblo todo, y 
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era que él se callaba” (“As we reached the section ‘I believe in the resurrection of the flesh and 
life everlasting,’ the voice of Don Manuel was submerged, drowned in the voice of the populace 
as in a lake”; SMBM 74; 11). 
The mountain as a symbol is no less ambiguous.  In some contexts it seems to symbolize 
reason, as I mention above, and, in others, it represents faith and doubt.  As the townspeople 
recite the Credo they form “una voz simple y unida, fundidas todas en una y haciendo como una 
montaña” (“a simple and united voice, all voices merged together into one and making a sort of 
mountain”; my trans.; SMBM 74).  Their collective “I believe” seems to be as strong and 
unshakable as a mountain.  Furthermore, the addition of another natural element, snow, and 
understanding it to symbolize belief, seems to support the mountain as a symbol of faith.  The 
snow dissolves in the doubt of the lake but is sustained by the solid faith of the mountain.  
However, the introduction of yet another natural element, clouds, to the symbols seems to 
indicate that the top of the mountain, Don Manuel’s head, symbolizes doubt.  His beliefs are no 
longer supported by a firm and apparent structure but rather lost in a misty veil of clouds. 
Any meaning attributed to the lake and mountain becomes uncertain because, although 
the two are often opposed, they both symbolize faith and doubt in different contexts and are 
interdependent.  Ángela first describes Valverde de Lucerna as an “aldea perdida como un 
broche entre el lago y la montaña que se mira en él” (“remote village which lay like a brooch 
between the lake and the mountain reflected in it”; SMBM 69; 5) and, during the act of 
confession, Don Manuel counsels Ángela to believe calling her attention to the relation between 
the two elements: “Cree en el cielo, en el cielo que vemos.  Míralo – y me lo mostraba sobre la 
montaña y abajo, reflejado en el lago” (“‘Believe in Heaven, the Heaven we can see.  Look at it 
there’ – and he pointed to the heavens above the mountain, and then down into the lake, to the 
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reflection”; SMBM 85; 24).  The connection between the two brings the distant near and the 
transcendent down to earth, like in the story of experience, but, here, it is not a firm belief in a 
superhuman agent who guarantees life after death but rather a divine doubt that only offers the 
uncertainty of its existence.  The indeterminacy but interconnectedness of the two symbols 
continues throughout the story and, again, it is an aquatic metaphor that blurs lines between here 
and there and, in SMBM, faith and doubt.  Don Manuel explains to Lázaro, “Aquí se remansa el 
río en lago, para luego, bajando a la meseta, precipitarse en cascadas, saltos y torrenteras por las 
hoces y encañadas, junto a la ciudad, y así se remansa la vida aquí, en la aldea” (“Here the river 
eddies to form a lake, so that later, flowing down the plateau, it may form into cascades, 
waterfalls, and torrents, hurling itself through gorges and chasms.  So does life eddy in the 
village…”; SMBM 101; 42-43).  This line alludes to the same sentiment in DST when Unamuno 
anticipates and metarepresents the thoughts of his readers when he responds, “Pues eso, uno que 
afirma contrarios, un hombre de contradicción y de pelea, como de sí mismo decía Job: uno que 
dice una cosa con el corazón y la contraria con la cabeza, y que hace de esta lucha su vida.  Más 
claro, ni el agua que sale de la nieve de las cumbres”  (“Just this – one who afirms contraries, a 
man of contradiction and strife, as Jeremiah said of himself; one who says one thing with his 
heart and the contrary with his head, and for whom this conflict is the very stuff of life.  And that 
is as clear as the water that flows from the melted snow upon the mountain tops”; 266; 201).  
That is to say, not clear at all.  The constant evaporation and precipitation, rising from the lake 
and falling down the mountain, highlights the vaivén of both faith and doubt and that one always 
invades the other whether symbolized by the lake or the mountain.   
 A final interpretation that underscores the uncertainty in meaning of the lake and the 
mountain is that they are not symbols at all but rather animated beings that serve as means of 
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apprehending spirit.  This also requires an intertextual reading of SMBM and DST.  In the essay, 
as I have explained in chapter two, feeling one’s own suffering and counterintuitive experiences 
can cause him to animate inanimates.  The collective experiences of Ángela and the townspeople 
with Don Manuel and his penetrating voice and, for Ángela and Lázaro anyway, his suffering 
give life to the natural world around them.  In one instance of attributing animacy and even 
mentality, the lake prays a litany for the people of Valverde de Lucerna.  In another, during Don 
Manuel’s last mass, he asks Ángela to pray for Jesus Christ.  She immediately thinks, “Habré de 
rezar también por el lago y por la montaña” (“I should also pray for the lake and for the 
mountain”; my trans.; SMBM 107).  Finally, in reflecting upon the lessons she has learned from 
Don Manuel, she relates, “Y él me enseñó a vivir, él nos enseñó a vivir, a sentir la vida, a sentir 
el sentido de la vida, a sumergirnos en el alma de la montaña, en el alma del lago, en el alma del 
pueblo de la aldea…” (“And he taught me live, he taught us to live, to feel life, to feel the 
meaning of life, to merge with the sould of the mountain, with the soul of the lake, with the soul 
of the village…”; SMBM 118; 62).  In this context, both the lake and the mountain are the 
projected faith and doubt of Don Manuel and Ángela which is then projected back upon them.  
The natural elements, rather than symbols, become animate beings in a mutual creation with the 
people that live between them. 
In the end, the multiple meanings of the mountain and the lake affect any reading of the 
story and, because of this multiplicity, any interpretation of it becomes uncertain.  We cannot 
point to any one element with any conviction to establish what Don Manuel or Lázaro believed 
and we are just left with Ángela’s questions.  What makes her, and Unamuno for that matter, 
different from Don Manuel and Lázaro, if they really did do all they could to keep the 
townspeople believing and happy, is that she reveals her “secret” and Unamuno discloses it to us.  
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The reader is forced to ask the same questions as Ángela after her brother’s and spiritual father’s 
deaths, “Why didn’t she just deceive us?” and why does Unamuno not do the same?  The answer 
might literally be in our hands.  As readers of fiction, like Ángela and Augusto, the seeds of 
doubt have already been sown in our imagining other worlds, and Unamuno, like Don Manuel, 
seeks to nurture our uncertainty.  
Living Religion 
This ontological uncertainty about the nature of reality and the related epistemological 
uncertainty about claims to truth in Unamuno’s works, however, offer the possibility of a story 
of enchantment not only in the sense of Bennett’s “to be struck and shaken” but also as an 
incantation with words.  Styers has examined modern scholars’ rejection of the power of words 
on the basis that those who seek to coerce others and the material world through words do so 
under the “magical” misapprehension that signifier and signified are one in the same (Magic 
220-21).  We have seen in the preceding pages of this chapter through Unamuno’s play with 
names, symbols, and intertextuality that there exists no such misconception in his works as he 
constantly undermines the stability of the meaning of words and underscores their arbitrariness.  
Yet fiction, worlds of words, cast a potent incantation on Augusto, Ángela, and the reader in 
their imagining other worlds.  Unamuno, like the modern scholar of magic that Styers studies, 
“…have mocked the efficacy of ‘mere words,’ even as they have conjured powerful spells” 
(Styers Magic 24).  One major difference, however, between Unamuno and the scholars Styers 
examines is that Unamuno self-consciously discloses that he constructs stories with the very 
blocks he has shown to be unstable and inexact.  As he begins his story about man’s two natural 
instincts in DST, the foundation of what he and his characters deem religious, he enters into 
dialogue with his reader: “No se me oculta tampoco que podrá decírseme que todo esto... son 
198 
 
metáforas” (“I am well aware that it may be objected that all this talk…is merely metaphor”; 47; 
42).  In doing so, he does not pretend to demythologize existence and to show that, at last, “the 
real” exists beyond the concealing veil of words but rather that any attempt to demythologize is 
just another mystification constructed with the only tool available in relating stories.  
Furthermore, by self-consciously laying bare the language with which he relates the story of 
human existence, he reveals the exploratory and “weak” nature of this ontology.  Bennett 
remarks that “[w]hat distinguishes a weak ontologist from a traditional metaphysician is that the 
former emphasizes the necessarily speculative and contestable character of her onto-story and 
thus does not try to demonstrate its truth in any strong sense” (161).29  Unamuno does seem to be 
preaching an onto-story to his readers but the contestable nature of these relations, as well as the 
“two-way pull” of the reader in metafiction, draw the reader into dialogue with the author.  In 
this sense, Unamuno speaks to us “religiously.”  Latour writes,  
In religious talk, there is indeed a leap of faith, but this is not an acrobatic salto mortale in 
order to do even better than reference with more daring and risky means, it is a 
somersault yes, but one which aims at jumping, dancing toward the present and the close, 
to redirect attention away from indifference and habituation, to prepare oneself to be 
seized again by this presence that breaks the usual, habituated passage of time. (“Freeze-
Frame” 45)   
 
This is not to say that reading Unamuno’s works results in some sort of ecstasy where time 
stands still but rather that, in entering into dialogue with us, he calls both religious and secular 
                                                           
29As I have been using Vattimo’s thought as a way of exploring the weakening of narratives in Unamuno’s works 
through twists and distortions, it should be made clear here that Bennett’s use of “weak ontologist” refers not to 
Vattimo but to Stephen K. White (2000).  While there are some important differences between Vattimo’s pensiero 
debole and White’s weak ontology, both men’s thoughts underscore “the necessarily speculative and contestable 
character” of claims to truth.  Because of this and because Bennett stresses the narrative quality of these claims by 
using “onto-story,” I have opted to include this in my analysis in this chapter.  For similarities and distinctions 
between White and Vattimo see White’s Sustaining Affirmation (2000) (7n10), Ted H. Miller’s (2008), “The Two 
Deaths of Lady Macduff: Antimetaphysics, Violence, and William Davenant’s Restoration Revision of ‘Macbeth,’” 
White’s (2009) response to Miller, “Violence, Weak Ontology, and Late-Modernity,” and Miller’s (2009) rejoinder, 




readers’ attention to the certainty of their onto-stories and forces them to reflect upon how these 
stories inform their every-day lives.  It is an enchantment that “shakes” the reader amidst the 
ordinary passage of time and it is also a call to conversion, one that invites the reader to weaken 
her own claims to truth, whether that truth be that god is the creator of man or that man is the 
creator of god, and live with the uncertainty of her beliefs. 
 Unamuno participates in secularizing stories while also offering a very modern 
possibility of enchantment.  His rejection of the stability of language does not flat-out “refuse 
God and his hypostases – reason, science, law” (qtd. in Wyers 329), as Barthes puts it, but rather 
plays with the illusory nature of language and the uncertainty it produces.  His harnessing this 
uncertainty lays at the heart of his incantation.  This story of enchantment turns on its head the 
very thing that has been said to characterize the secular.  Talal Asad, for example, highlights 
uncertainty as that which epitomizes the secular: 
…this world is “secular” not because scientific knowledge has replaced religious 
belief…but because, on the contrary, it must be lived in uncertainty, without fixed 
mooring even for the believer, a world in which the real and the imaginary mirror each 
other.  In this world the politics of certainty is clearly impossible. (64-65) 
 
The metafictional mode of Unamuno’s works, “in which the real and the imaginary mirror each 
other,” serves to propagate the secular, yet the uncertainty that it creates supplies a space for 
creating stories that momentarily and weakly anchor belief, religious ones included. 
 Unamuno’s call to conversion in his religious speech act and dialogue with us deviates 
from traditional theories of religion in that it does not seem to console.30  The story of 
uncertainty as a possibility of enchantment in his works plays with the modern context in which 
                                                           
30For example, David Hume suggested that religion arises as a response to “incessant hopes and fears” and Sigmund 
Freud and Karl Marx famously compared religion to the consolatory effects of a narcotic.  Tweed offers a more 
contemporary example: “Religions are confluences of organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and confront 
suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes and cross boundaries” (54). 
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it is related and, thus, it comforts at the same time as it unsettles.  Saler underscores this duality 
of enchantments in the modern age: 
There are forms of enchantment compatible with, and even dependent upon, those tenets 
of modernity usually seen as disenchanting the world, such as rationality and self-
reflexivity.  Modern enchantment often depends upon its antinomial other, modern 
disenchantment, and a specifically modern enchantment might be defined as one that 
enchants and disenchants simultaneously. (702) 
 
Bennet also offers that “[e]nchantment does coexist with despair” and adds that “…these 
momentary experiences, as they accumulate, can have salutary effects on the background sense 
of being that informs daily life” (159).  The story of uncertainty in Unamuno’s works and the 
illusory nature of words with which it is constructed weaken the reader’s onto-story but does not 
foreclose the possibility that any meaning can be drawn from these stories.  The multiple 
meanings of words, as the elementary building-blocks of our stories, does not mean that there is 
no story possible to understand the world but rather that there are multiple stories through which 
we might understand our existence in it.  Unamuno’s works reveal what Nietzsche had theorized, 
that the world has become a fable, but one salutary effect of this fabulization are the conditional 
and temporary truths formulated through interpretation.  D’Isanto writes, 
Fabulization, understood as the weakening of the principle of reality, consists in the 
recognition that the world is increasingly identified with a proliferation of Weltbilder, of 
images of the world which give rise to conflict of interpretation. […] In other words, 
hermeneutics may be truthful precisely because it is aware of being merely a provisional 
– therefore never definitive, never ultimate – interpretation of the announcement that 
comes from the transmission of messages. (2) 
 
The enchantment of this uncertainty offers hope and consolation in that we might create and then 
grasp a guiding principle but it also unsettles us in that this principle is one among many and 
culturally and historically contextualized. 
 Another salutary effect that the story of uncertainty may have is the flexibility of the 
weak ontologist.  Toward the end of DST, Unamuno writes, 
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El que basa o cree basar su conducta – interna o externa, de sentimiento o de acción – en 
dogma o principio teórico que estima incontrovertible, corre riesgo de hacerse un 
fanático, y, además, el día en que se la quebrante o afloje ese dogma, su moral se relaja.  
Si la tierra que cree firme vacila, él, ante el terremoto, tiemble…. [….] 
     Pero al que cree que navega, tal vez sin rumbo, en balsa movible y anegable, no ha de 
inmutarle el que la balsa se le mueva bajo los pies y amenace hundirse. (267-68) 
He who bases or thinks that he bases his conduct – his inward or his outward conduct, his 
feeling or his action – upon a dogma or theoretical principle which he deems 
incontrovertible, runs the risk of becoming a fanatic, and moreover, the moment that his 
dogma is weakened or shattered, the morality based upon it gives way.  If, the earth that 
he thought firm begins to rock, he himself trembles at the earthquake….  [….]   
     But he who believes that he is sailing, perhaps without a set course, on an unstable and 
sinkable raft, must not be dismayed if the raft gives way beneath his feet and threatens to 
sink. (202) 
 
The aquatic metaphor here, like in the story of experience, highlights the dynamic, as opposed to 
static, nature of belief.  Unamuno’s use of a raft in this example serves an illuminating a 
metaphor for a weak ontology.  It is a feeble structure as opposed to something stronger and 
more solid but can nonetheless accommodate the successive waves and flows of belief and 
doubt. 
 The raft metaphor, like the symbols in SMBM, echo the “coming and going,” or the 
vaivén, that connects transcendence and immanence in the story of experience.  Likewise, the 
“book as world” metaphor, indispensable to metafiction, serves as a way to connect different 
plains of existence.  Tweed writes that metaphor “directs language users’ attention to this and not 
that, and it transports them from one domain of language, experience, and practice to another” 
(46).  Unamuno’s metafictional works, by drawing on the text-as-creation metaphor, transport 
the reader from the mundane world to the fictional by forcing him to participate in the creation of 
the story and then, through his role as creator, project him into transcendence.  Conversely, 
metafiction moves the reader from the mundane world to the fictional in that, by his very 
participation through minding gaps, he, like the characters he reads about, becomes a play thing 
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for the author.  He then redirects his gaze toward transcendence but, this time, as creation rather 
than creator. 
This uncertainty of who is creating whom and the words that create this ambiguity offer 
yet another salutary effect of this story of enchantment.  Tweed further observes that metaphor 
“prompts a linguistic crossing that can create association, stir affect, and prompt action” (47).  
Through action this enchantment “can be fostered through deliberate strategies” (Bennett 4) and 
cultivated through attachments to it.  Actions can, in turn, substantiate the story.  The “something 
out there,” whether a creative agent or a created one, becomes more real as man acts according to 
its possible existence and, even though it is hypothetically postulated, its being becomes less so 
the more man acts in harmony with its reality.  Unamuno’s use of hypothetical as if statements in 
constructing a way of living in uncertainty performs one final flip of the secular script that does 
two things: it offers a weak metaphysical referent and exposes the incantory nature of the tale of 
disenchantment by revealing the similar way that action makes uncertainty more certain in a 
supposedly disenchanted world.31 
A narrative of disenchantment depends as much on hypothetically posited as if statements 
and the acting as if these statements were true as the enchantment of uncertainty.  In his “Science 
as Vocation,” Max Weber famously declares that the world has become disenchanted not 
because everything has been counted up and calculated through intellectualization and 
rationalization but because modern man can live as if he could comprehend his world through 
these processes:  
[Increasing intellectualization and rationalization] means that principally there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, 
master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no 
longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the 
                                                           




savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations 
perform the service. (Essays 139)32 
 
The world is only disenchanted theoretically and only becomes so actually through modern 
man’s acting as if the possible were a reality.  For example, a modern literary critic may know 
little about a thunder storm but, instead of attributing these mysterious noises to the bowling of 
angels, she may be wholly unimpressed by the storm believing that, if she had to, she could in 
principle explain the event perhaps by recourse to atmospheric science.  In short, the literary 
critic acts as if natural phenomena could be explained intellectually and rationally.  This as if 
way of living requires that modern man live in the hypothetical although he makes it more real 
through his action.  The story of disenchantment, as “mere words,” has exercised a powerful 
spell and coerced action in the modern world.  This disenchanted way of living, however, is not 
very different from the enchanted one that Unamuno relates; both rely on living in the 
hypothetical and uncertain.   
 Unamuno takes this secular way of thinking and offers a counter spell.  He asks if we 
could not live and act as if there were a superhuman agent that guarantees immortality.  The 
agent’s objective existence would only become real as man acts on his desire that there be a god 
and living this hypothetical existence.  Unamuno famously declares that believing is wanting to 
believe: “...creer es querer creer, y creer en Dios ante todo y sobre todo es querer que le haya” 
(“…to believe is to wish to believe, and to believe in God is, before all and above all, to wish 
that there may be a God”; DST 131; 102).  He continues that not only does the desire that god 
exist create it but also the acting according to this weak tenet.  This sentiment, which I mention 
above, bears repeating here: “Creer en Dios es anhelar que le haya y es, además, conducirse 
como si le hubiera; es vivir de ese anhelo y hacer de él nuestro resorte de acción (“To believe in 
                                                           
32My emphasis.   
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God is to long for His existence and, further, it is to act as if He existed; it is to live by this 
longing and to make it the inner most spring of our action”; 197-98; 150) and  later, “Querer que 
exista Dios, y conducirse y sentir como si existiera.  Y por este camino de querer su existencia, y 
obrar conforme a tal deseo, es como creamos a Dios…” (“Wishing that God may exist, and 
acting and feeling as if He did exist.  And desiring God’s existence and acting conformably with 
this desire, is the means whereby we create God…”; 206; 156). God’s creation depends on belief 
and the affirmation of belief through action just as modern man’s belief that there is no god and 
the action that corroborates its inexistence.  In both ways of thinking beliefs are only as true as 
the action they incite.  Pragmatically, action makes the belief true in both the tale of 
disenchantment and Unamuno’s story of uncertainty.  One major difference, however, between 
the affirmation and reaffirmation of belief in action of the secular script and Unamuno’s 
formulation of acting as if there were a god is that, in Unamuno’s conception, action always 
depends upon a principle of uncertainty and the recognition of one’s own interpretation as 
provisional whereas the secular view of a disenchanted world makes a strong claim to truth.  
Another important difference is that, in Unamuno’s counter enchantment, a hypothetically-
posited spiritual realm offers a way of imagining the world other than it is and the action 
performed to make this realm true draws man toward a place of fullness as posited in the story of 
experience.   
The spiritual realm has a real effect in mundane existence.  Unamuno writes in DST, “Y 
el alma, mi alma al menos, anhela otra cosa; no absorción, no quietud, no paz, no apagamiento, 
sino eterno acercarse sin llegar nunca, inacabable anhelo, eterna esperanza que eternamente se 
renueva sin acabarse del todo nunca.  Y con ello un eterno carecer de algo y un dolor eterno” 
(“And the soul, my soul at least, longs for something else, not absorption, not quietude, not 
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peace, not appeasement, it longs ever to approach and never to arrive, it longs for a never-ending 
longing, for an eternal hope which is eternally renewed but never wholly fulfilled.  And together 
with all this, it longs for an eternal lack of something and an eternal suffering”; 262-63; 197).  
This sentiment echoes what he writes in his essay “Mi religión” in which he attempts to respond 
to those who, like so many critics, try to locate his thoughts in one kind of system of belief or 
another: “mi religión es buscar la verdad en la vida y la vida en la verdad, aun a sabiendas de que 
no he de encontrarla mientras viva; mi religión es luchar incesante e incansablemente con el 
misterio” (118) (“my religión is to search for truth in life and life in truth, knowing full well that 
I shall never find them while I am alive; my religion is to struggle incessantly and tirelessly with 
mystery”).  The enchantment of uncertainty, like the enchantment of experience, is both here and 
there in the constant cognitive process of continual learning without ever arriving at an absolute 
truth.   
Truth, as something continually made rather than something that exists statically and 
objectively, can serve as a pull or a “drawing near” but, in its production, is also a call to action.  
Charity, in Unamuno’s works, performs this action in creating truths and in weakening them.  In 
DST, he writes, 
… la caridad verdadera es invasora, y consiste en meter mi espíritu en los demás 
espíritus, en darles mi dolor como pábulo y consuelo a sus dolores, en despertar con mi 
inquietud sus inquietudes, en aguzar su hambre de Dios con mi hambre de Él. La caridad 
no es brezar y adormecer a nuestros hermanos en la inercia y modorra de la materia, sino 
despertarles en la zozobra y el tormento del espíritu. (286-87) 
…true charity is a kind of invasion – it consists in putting my spirit into other spirits, in 
giving them my suffering as the food and consolation for their sufferings, in awakening 
their unrest with my unrest, in sharpening their hunger for God with my hunger for God.  
It is not charity to rock and lull our brothers to sleep in the inertia and drowsiness of 
matter, but rather to awaken them to the uneasiness and torment of spirit. (216) 
 
Charity serves several functions in the enchantment of uncertainty.  First, it works as way of 
connecting man to fellow man; it is not simply an almsgiving to the pordioseros of the world but 
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rather a giving of oneself and a receiving of others.  Second, it implies a discursive, dialogical 
process; it is not simply a “there, there” or an “I feel your pain” but rather a back-and-forth, 
invasive “feel my pain too.”  It “strikes” at and “shakes” the interlocutors’ certainty with the 
doubts and uncertainty of the other.  In doing so, the interlocutors imitate creators in a kenotic 
emptying of themselves.  D’Isanto holds that  
…if charity is understood in the light of kenosis, the self-exhaustion of God, then it 
constitutes the most sublime act of abandonment for the sake of the other.  To participate 
in the hermeneutic experience, then, might mean to welcome the other in the name of the 
dialogical principle of charity, that is, by listening to the non-violent reasons of the other. 
(14)   
 
Third, charity serves to weaken belief; interlocutors with distinct onto-stories coming together in 
charity might challenge each other with their stories and create new truths.  Vattimo refers to 
Ephesians in his exploration of this kind of relationship between charity and truth: “Veritatem 
facientes in caritate” (Nihilism xxvi).33  This “making” connotes a constructing of truth that is 
informed by the context of the interlocutors and, as such, provisional.  Vattimo futher elaborates: 
“I am not saying that one should accept any statement no matter how vague and contradictory it 
may be.  I am trying to propose arguments, which, even though they do not claim to be definite 
descriptions of things as they really are, seem to be reasonable interpretations of our condition 
here and now” (Belief 46).34 Finally, charity becomes a generative, religious ritual in the story of 
uncertainty.  As we saw in chapter two, this sort of “invasion” of others and their embodied 
minds constitutes what Unamuno and his characters deem religious.  Charity, as an invasive, 
dialogical gift, violates the connectedness of man and presents the possibility of a new 
                                                           
33The translation of this phrase varies according to version and edition.  For example, The King James Bible gives 
“speaking the truth in love,” The New American Bible Revised Edition, “living the truth in love,” and, in Spanish, 
the Reina-Valera translation gives, “profesemos la verdad en amor.”  I have opted for a more literal translation of 





experience while, at the same time, serving to unquiet and weaken the onto-stories of the inter-
dialogic subjects. 
 Stories form the heart of the enchantment of uncertainty as performed through charity.  
Through the relation of stories, the reading and listening to them, and the subsequent 
interpretation of them, stories can make others question the truth of their beliefs, question the 
stories they tell, and even question the stories they tell about stories.  In Unamuno’s works, 
constructing narratives is not an attempt to return to a metaphysical certainty in search of 
security in the face of the failures of science, reason, and institutional Christianity but rather a 
process of continually amending and revising belief.  It is a constant refashioning and, to return 
to the concept Verwindung, secularizing of truths.  The intertextuality of his stories allows for the 
continual learning, the reassessing of, and the reflection upon the received traditions of stories.  
The stories that Unamuno twists and distorts about a Christian god permits a reformulation of 
Christianity and its secular heritage without static dogma but dynamic experience.  Through the 







In chapter one of this dissertation I discussed Nietzsche’s “death of god” as 
representative of the crisis of meaning that has, in part, characterized secular modernity.  This 
very crisis of meaning, I have argued, also presented Unamuno with possibilities to reinterpret 
and reformulate religion through interrelated stories of enchantment.  However, this crisis of 
meaning that seemed to legitimize Unamuno’s free play with religion also seemed to drive others 
to cling even more tightly to the metaphysical certainty of their onto-stories.  The introduction to 
this dissertation outlined the historical context of Spain at the time when Unamuno wrote, a 
tumultuous period in the nation’s history right before its Second Republic and subsequent Civil 
War.  Valdés has pointed to matters of religious belief as the principle factors dividing Spanish 
society at this time: “The civil war (1936-39) was fought as much on ideological grounds as 
economic ones, but the religious divide of belief and disbelief was the explicit cause for sinking 
the country into a civil war that left a million dead, all of its cities in ruin, its economy 
devastated, and, after 1945, left it isolated within Europe and in the world” (“Aesthetics” 17).  
The fanaticism and fundamentalism of both sides of the conflict offered certainty in the 
legitimization of a community during a period of rapid secularization, a time when “[m]eaning 
no longer resides in the axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed beliefs and understandings 
which constitute an epistemic and moral community” (Jenkins 15).  Styers underscores this 
search for stable meaning and fixed identity in late modern culture: “…religion offers the 
promise of clarity, security, and stability.  Yet while the turn to religion is an understandable 
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response to real conflicts and alienations, it is often marked by fanaticism, violence, and 
intolerance” (“Vattimo” 49-50).   
The major challenge for Unamuno was how to formulate a concept of community that 
was neither a going back to the intransigent community of the Catholic Church nor an adhering 
to ideologies of the equally intractable political parties and scientifist communities.  
Furthermore, how could he legitimate the beliefs of the individual in the face of so many onto-
stories without resorting to dogmatic thinking?  The difficulty of substantiating belief divorced 
from a community was not lost on Unamuno.  Augusto Pérez’s struggle with belief is indicative 
of this.  The protagonist’s constant imploring of Eugenia and Rosario to let him look them in the 
eyes, the proverbial window to the soul, suggests a desperate attempt to corroborate his beliefs 
with those of another.  This is further evident in Augusto’s comments on dreams: “El sueño de 
uno solo es la ilusión, la apariencia; el sueño de dos es ya la verdad, la realidad.  ¿Qué es el 
mundo real sino el sueño que soñamos todos, el sueño común?” (“The dream of one person alone 
is an illusion – a mere appearance; the dream of two persons is truth, reality.  What is the real 
world but the dream that we all dream, the common dream?”; Niebla 169; 116).  In AC, 
Unamuno offers a possible answer, albeit a bit sanguine, to the problem of community-formation 
with so many differing beliefs: “No me cansaré de repetir que lo que más nos une a los hombres 
unos con otros son nuestras discordias” (AC 18-19) (“I will not tire of repeating that what unites 
us most, one with another, are our discords”).  However, the revealing of the narrative quality of 
claims to truth, whether they be that god created man or that man created god, and the exposing 
of the similar cognitive faculties buttressing these claims serve as a stronger point of 
identification.  This recognition offers common ground for believers and non-believers at the 
same time as it subverts the social order of each by calling into question their foundations. 
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Ironically and sadly, though, the critics who seemed to best understand the subversive 
power of Unamuno’s words were from the Catholic, nationalist right.  Father Cirarda y 
Lachiondo’s address to the Vitoria Seminary characterizes the right’s response to Unamuno’s 
work: 
Unamuno no se contenta con sentir él la comezón de su duda – que ya ello sería lo 
suficientemente grave para que sus escritos nos preocupen – sino que por todos los 
medios a su alcance – y son muchos los que le brinda su original y sugerente estilo – 
pretende contagiar su propia duda a los lectores y atormentarles hurtándoles el suelo 
firme, en que basan sus creencias. (8) 
Unamuno is not content with just himself feeling the uneasiness of his doubt – which 
would already be sufficiently serious for his writings to worry us – but by all means 
within his reach – and there are many that afford an original and suggestive style to him – 
he attempts to infect his readers with his own doubt and torment them by robbing them of 
the firm footing on which they base their beliefs. 
 
He goes on to say “Unamuno es esencialmente herético en todas sus concepciones religiosas.  
Todas sus obras de carácter religioso tienen méritos más que sobrados para ser incluidas en el 
Índice de los libros prohibidos” (“Unamuno is essentially a heretic in all his religious concepts.  
All his works that have a religious character have more than enough merit to be included in the 
Index of forbidden books”) (39).  DST and AC, of course, would go on to be placed on the Index 
in 1957. 
 Cirarda y Lachiondo’s comments speak to Herrnstein Smith’s formulation of cognitive 
conservatism I wrote about in chapter four.  It seems here, though, that the tendency towards 
belief persistence outweighs the more adaptive property of the mind in incorporating new 
thoughts.  For the Church, Unamuno’s works were not seen “as potential illuminations but as 
cognitive irritants” (Smith 5).  The words, “fashionable,” “self-interested,” and “dubious,” that 
Smith suggests one might use in discrediting these “irritants” echo the early criticism on religion 
in Unamuno’s works; we will remember from chapters one and two that Unamuno’s works on 
religion were categorized as imitative of bad, northern European thought, a personal quest to 
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immortalize himself through art when he could no longer believe in a Christian god after the 
“crisis of 1897,” and, finally, simply neurotic.   
 The right’s cognitive conservatism may have played a role in dismissing Unamuno’s 
works, but there was another powerful force behind its rejection and censure of Unamuno – the 
fear of losing adherents and, thus, power.  Cirarda y Lachiondo’s remarks themselves indicate 
the potency of Unamuno’s stories and his success in penetrating the minds of his readers.  They 
recall Unamuno’s juxtaposition of the “tierra firme” (“firm ground”) and the “balsa movible y 
anegable” (“unstable and sinkable raft”) at the end of DST.  The subversion and the threat to 
power of both the right and the left that Unamuno’s stories present is that they offer the 
possibility of a different kind of community, a community built on uncertainty. 
I wrote in chapter three that the story of experience subverted the secular social order in 
that it connected transcendence and immanence and offered new possibilities for social 
connections.  The battle, however, was far from being declared over in favor of the believers.  
The story of uncertainty serves to temper any strong claims to truth grounded in experience and 
subverts both secular and Christian society.  Unamuno’s stories, by forcing the reader into 
dialogue with him and his characters, aim to strike at the “habituation and indifference,” as 
Latour puts it, of both secular and religious readers.  Through the metafictional mode, 
Unamuno’s stories work like a cognitive Trojan horse; they weaken belief from inside the 
reader’s mind.  By forcing the reader to participate in the construction of stories and reflect upon 
his participation in their creation, Unamuno’s stories oblige the reader to reveal to himself that 
his existence might also be fictional and constructed “through the arbitrary system of language” 
(Waugh 25).  Longhurst holds that this coercion of readers has community-making potential:  
Unamuno creates his own ideal community of readers by bringing the latter’s interpretive 
function to the fore, either by creating intradiegetic readers, or by forcefully reminding 
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the real readers of their essential role in penetrating the veil of the fiction, or by 
bombarding them, via the characters, with questions that require urgent answers. 
(“Reader” 752) 
 
In the formation of his community of readers, Unamuno shapes an epistemological community 
that understands that the creation of truths is inherently literary and, as such, malleable and 
flexible.  It offers a new mode of social relation based on living in the hypothetical and 
recognizing that fact. 
Unamuno’s fiction serves as an example of what such a weak community might look 
like.  For instance, Avito Carrascal, when he appears in Niebla, does not know what he believes 
yet feels a connection to others at night in the church.  SMBM provides the most striking 
examples of communities founded upon enchantments of both experience and uncertainty.  On 
the one hand, experience as a violation of physicality and spatiality enchants the people of 
Valverde de Lucerna in that they feel attachments to each other, the natural landscape, the town 
itself, and a superhuman agent.  On the other hand, uncertainty and living in the hypothetical 
enchant Don Manuel, Lázaro, and Ángela in that it presents them with a weak metaphysical 
referent and offers them a way of living that, while acting according to its possibility to make it 
more real, fosters attachments to others.  However, in this last sense, it is not an attachment to the 
faithful of Valverde de Lucerna in an attempt to maintain their “fe del carbonero” but rather an 
attachment to the reader.  If we can rely on Ángela’s narration and if Unamuno’s corrections 
have not altered the content of the story too much, our interpretations of the story might be true 
but only weakly and contingently so.  Ángela’s and Unamuno’s stories perform the enchantment 
of uncertainty; they are a charitable gift, una caridad invasora (“an invasive charity”), and potent 
words that shake the reader from habituation.  As a reader, my interpretation of the world of 
Valverde de Lucerna is contingent upon the interpretation of that of at least two others who have 
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also constructed their stories with the same unstable blocks as I have composed my own.  The 
confessing of their own twists and distortions to the narrative through the metafictional mode 
exposes the twists and distortions I have made.  Furthermore, by being compelled to 
acknowledge the contingency of my interpretation, I have already begun my initiation into the 
epistemological community that Unamuno tries to create through his readership.  I have accepted 
his gift of charity and have entered into dialogue with him and his characters. 
The “salutary effects” of recognizing that life must be lived in the hypothetical and 
forming a community whose members accept that their truths are contingent find their base in 
the rejection of dogmatic thinking.  Styers summarizes what this kind of antifundamentalism 
means for Vattimo, whose thought Unamuno seemed to have anticipated:  “…this worldview 
might promote greater candor and humility in the way in which truth claims are articulated, 
easier acknowledgement of the (contingent) legitimacy in the truth claims of others, and greater 
realism and engagement in the effort to develop consensus” (“Vattimo” 65).  Unamuno’s works, 
by constantly reminding us that they are stories and laying bare the instability of language, 
similarly speak to us with candor and humility and, through the “two-way pull” of the reader, 
they call us to acknowledge our truths as stories.  Additionally, by drawing our attention to the 
cognitive mechanisms at play in creating our stories, Unamuno’s narratives provide a common 
ground for believer and unbeliever.  Smith has examined what recognizing this commonality 
might signify:   
Scientists share cognitive tendencies, achievements, and limits with nonscientists; 
religious believers share them with nonbelievers.  Although each may put the world 
together and conduct his or her life in ways that are at odds with or opaque to the other, 
the cosmology and way of life of each deserves minimally respectful acknowledgement 
from the other.  Such acknowledgement would not mean accepting ideas one finds 
fantastic or claims one knows are false.  And of course it would not mean approving 
practices that one knows are confining, maiming, or murderous to oneself or to others.  
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What it would mean is recognizing, as parallel to one’s own, the processes by which 
those cosmologies and ways of life came to be formed. (149) 
 
In Unamuno’s stories, his highlighting the similar cognitive processes active in creating truths 
and forcing the reader to reflect upon how they are constructed does not mean that the Christian 
believer has to accept the non-believer’s onto-story that god is a man-made creation or vice 
versa.  But, this understanding could mean that each be more tolerant of the other’s story.  This is 
not to say that each person simply goes about her business and lets the other believe whatever he 
wants to believe.  This would merely recreate the privatization and compartmentalization of the 
secular script that Unamuno’s stories challenge.  Forming part of the community that creates 
truths through story-telling would mean sharing these stories and receiving others as an act of 
invasive charity.  It would mean invading, dominating, and knowing another and being invaded, 
dominated, and known.  It would mean that, in these violations, one could experience a sense of 
fullness and posit a world different from the one in which we live, as I have explored in chapters 
two and three, and it would mean that one could make and weaken truths by entering into 
dialogue, as I have suggested in chapter four.  This last possibility would allow the community to 
perpetually recreate itself through charity; it would permit a continual twisting and distorting of 
the stories of the interlocutors.  
In chapter four, I illustrated how recognizing the twists and distortions of stories bring the 
story teller back into his story.  I would be remiss, indeed insincere, without acknowledging my 
own twists and distortions to Unamuno’s stories and those that I have incorporated into this 
study of his works.  Mark Currie (1995) writes that, in contemporary literary criticism, there is 
“an affirmation of literariness in its own language, an increased awareness of the extent to which 
critical insights are formulated within fiction, and a tendency towards immanence of critical 
approach which questions the ability of critical language to refer objectively and authoritatively 
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to the literary text” (qtd. in Amago 114).  It is with this awareness and self-consciousness that I 
offer a conclusion. 
 This dissertation began with two epigraphs, one from Rudolf Otto and the other from 
Unamuno himself.  I have often thought about Unamuno’s “Vamos, pues, a mitologizar” (“Let 
us, then, mythologize”) as a response to the challenge posed by Otto of how to articulate “the 
holy” at the beginning of the 20th century.1  Otto expresses the difficulty of understanding “the 
holy” and points to literary devices as a means of coming close but never achieving full 
comprehension.  In my own conjuring of Unamuno’s spirit, I hear him accept this challenge 
saying, “Okay.  If that’s all we have, let’s tell a story” and, perhaps, under his breath, “Let’s 
muddy the waters in the process” (aquatic reference intended).  Story-telling becomes a truth-
making tool that continually draws the story teller and the interlocutor toward the distant while 
remaining an essentially immanent device.  Unamuno’s self-conscious disclosing and reminding 
his readers that he is telling a story and his play with words force the reader, in the “two-way 
pull” of his narratives, to self-consciously reflect upon his stories and acknowledge them as such.  
As I have tried to offer my own interpretation, I am constantly reminded that it is one among 
many and crafted with some precarious building blocks.  I, like so many others, have been baited 
into dialogue with Unamuno.  His stories force me to acknowledge that I may already be 
enacting the story of uncertainty through my interpretation.  Furthermore, as Unamuno’s stories 
are essentially distortions of Christianity, through my interpretation, I simultaneously weaken 
and propagate a Christian story while still being contained by it.  In short, the secularization of 
Christianity, as Verwindung, continues on through my contribution. 
                                                           
1I am not saying that Unamuno directly responds to Otto.  This would be impossible; The Idea of the Holy was 
published after DST.  By putting the two into dialogue, I am highlighting the challenges that both grappled with in 
putting into words a sense of the divine.  Not surprisingly, though, Unamuno did have a copy of The Idea of the 
Holy in his library (Orringer 86n21). 
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 Tweed ends his study of the crossings and dwellings of religions identifying with his 
objects of study: “The religious – and scholars too – are dwelling and crossing” (183).  
Additionally, throughout his study, he self-consciously underscores the literariness not only of 
religions but also of the theories of religion: “In adding tropes I suggest that religions, like 
theorists of religion, provide orienting tropes – including metaphors, similes, myths, allegories, 
personifications, and symbols – that function as figurative tools for making and remaking 
imagined worlds” (68).2  Smith similarly self-identifies with the “new naturalists” of her 
monograph.  Noting the same cognitive tendencies at work in her study and theirs, she self-
consciously and humbly ends her work: “Not me, says the self-vaunting evangelical atheist.  Tu 
quoque – you, too – says the defensive, resentful theist.  Et ego – I, too – says the reflexive, 
reflective naturalist” (149).3  With these two interlocutors that I have included in my exploration 
of the twists and distortions of the stories of enchantment in Unamuno’s works, I too 
acknowledge my own twists and distortions, the cognitive underpinnings, and the literary quality 
of my own interpretation.  As I have incorporated the stories of others in entering into dialogue 
with Unamuno and his characters, I am forced to humbly offer that hemos, pues, mitologizado 
(“we have, then, mythologized”).
                                                           
2The emphasis is in the original. 
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